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Regulating infrastructure : funding regulatory agencies (英语)

This note draws on recent international experience to illustrate some of the main issues and options associated with funding independent infrastructure regulators. Section 1 provides a background to the discussion by examining the role of independent regulators and their funding arrangements in the broader context of infrastructure regulation. Section 2 examines specific implementation issues and options in more detail. Section 3 presents a brief conclusion. The annex provides material on funding approaches in selected countries.

详细

  • 作者

    Smith, Warrick, Shin, Ben

  • 文件日期

    1995/09/30

  • 文件类型

    部门工作文件

  • 报告号

    16017

  • 卷号

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • 发布日期

    2011/10/24

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • 文件名称

    Regulating infrastructure : funding regulatory agencies

  • 关键词

    rate of return regulation;efficient allocation of resource;abuse of market power;price cap regulation;standard of transparency;political interference;general tax revenues;civil service salary;electricity and gas;benefits of regulation;source of funding;form of taxation;elasticity of demand;good regulatory regime;regulatory utility commissioner;Access to Electricity;independent regulatory agency;long run cost;civil service rules;general taxation;general budget;gross revenue;infrastructure regulation;regulatory fee;agency budget;budget process;independent agency;budget funding;telecommunications regulator;political manipulation;price regulation;agency staff;license fee;certification process;political process;elastic demand;regulatory discretion;regulatory rule;water regulator;alternative funding;electricity regulator;regulated sectors;concession fee;appeal process;adequate resources;energy purchase;privatized utility;utility bill;improved regulation;regulatory assessment;public reporting;accountability requirement;staff increase;legislative scrutiny;funding process;independent judgment;judicial review;budgetary allocation;budget autonomy;excessive regulatory;private water;financial autonomy;regulatory function;regulated industry;monopolistic activity;fair return;infrastructure reform;regulatory control;high infrastructure;high tariff;accountability regime;independent fund;special interest;pricing strategy;political pressure;appointment process;regulatory system;efficient operation;investment arrangements;infrastructure activities;exempt agency;potential investor;infrastructure provider;infrastructure service;regulatory arrangement;political discretion;cost-recovery scheme;general taxes;cost structure;tariff increase;tax levy;efficient regulation;efficient tax;tariff components;connection fee;industry regulator;cable subscriber;national association;social cost;formula linking;transparent process;driving force;infrastructure privatization;motor carrier;negative effect;regulatory independence;tariff schedule;regulatory cost;salary cost;government service;public users;government budget;institutional framework;

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