This paper investigates whether poor employment prospects of potential insurgents help to fuel conflict. The paper provides a new test of this "opportunity cost mechanism" using one of the largest shocks to labor demand in agricultural societies: harvest. Theoretically, the paper shows that because seasonal harvest shocks are temporary and anticipated, they change opportunity costs while keeping the dynamic benefits of fighting constant, yielding unbiased estimates even if those benefits are unobserved. In contrast, many other shocks in the conflict literature are persistent and unanticipated, thus also varying the dynamic benefits of fighting that confound estimates of the opportunity cost mechanism. Empirically, the paper estimates the effect of harvest shocks on conflict intensity in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan using subnational variation in the timing and intensity of harvest driven by local climatic conditions. Consistent with the opportunity cost mechanism, the results show that the onset of harvest usually reduces the number of insurgent attacks.
详细
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作者
Guardado,Jenny, Pennings,Steven Michael
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文件日期
2020/08/31
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文件类型
政策研究报告
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报告号
WPS9373
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卷号
1
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Total Volume(s)
1
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国家
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地区
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发布日期
2020/08/31
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Disclosure Status
Disclosed
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文件名称
The Seasonality of Conflict
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关键词
opportunity cost; development research group; marginal utility of consumption; marginal product of labor; low per capita income; commodity price shock; local climatic conditions; negative income shock; types of attack
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