1. Project Data

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<th>Reviewed by</th>
<th>ICR Review Coordinator</th>
<th>Group</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kimberly Kamlesh Parekh</td>
<td>Robert Mark Lacey</td>
<td>Joy Behrens</td>
<td>IEGHC (Unit 2)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The original project development objectives (PDOs) were: (1) to increase the number of out of school youth and young adults who complete recognized equivalency programs; and (2) decrease the number and/or rate of leavers from each program and level, thus increasing internal efficiency of the program (Loan Agreement, p. 4). The revised PDO after the September 16, 2015 Level 1 Restructuring was to support the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the establishment of a sustainable national equivalency program (2015 Amendment to Loan Agreement, p. 4). The project disbursed a total of US$4.483 million (ICR, pgs. 11, 18, 24), of which US$2.49 million or 56% corresponded to the period before the restructuring and US$1.99 million or 44% after
b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?
Yes

Date of Board Approval
16-Sep-2015

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
Yes

d. Components
The project components are:

(1) **Component 1 Curriculum Development and Production and Distribution of Instructional Materials**
(Estimated Cost at Appraisal US$ 1,968,318*; Actual Cost US$ 1.783 million). This component originally aimed to: (1) develop new curricula; instructional materials; and teachers manuals for equivalency Level II programs, including distance learning; (2) train trainers to deliver equivalency Level II programs; (3) establish small school libraries at each community learning center established by Directorate of Adult and Non-Formal Education (DNEAENF) (later renamed National Directorate for Recurrent Education (NDRE); and (4) print and distribute textbooks and instructional materials for primary programs, equivalency Level I programs, and equivalency Level II programs to support the curriculum revisions (PAD, p.4; Loan Agreement, p.4).

At the restructuring, the following activities were added (1) trial a select number of equivalency programs Level 1 and Level 2 courses; (2) provide support to the MOE task force to adjust the curriculum based on trial results and seek MOE endorsement for the national roll-out; and (3) finance the printing of learning materials and manuals for the nationwide roll-out for equivalence programs Level 2.

(2) **Component 2 Improved Quality of Service Delivery**
(Estimated Cost US$ 1,347,780*; Actual Cost US$ 1.855 million). This component originally aimed to: (1) strengthen NDRE management of services to out of school youth and adults through management and planning advice and training of managers and administrators as needed; (2) develop and implement a promotional campaign to support community engagement and improve participation in equivalency education; (3) improve the monitoring and evaluation capacity of NDRE; and (4) improve teaching capacity, including hiring and training of teachers, field coordinators and teacher trainers, and train central and community facilitators in equivalency education (PAD, p.4; Loan Agreement, p.4).

The activities added at restructuring were: (1) develop a regulatory framework for the recurrent education system and clarify roles and functions among the NDRE and district offices; support management, accountability, and ownership of CLCs; create ways for NDRE to secure budget for recurrent education programs; and support personnel status of tutors/teachers of Equivalence Programs; (2) increase training for NDRE staff and include on-the-job training by the consultants hired by the project and overseas study...
visits; and (3) support national and international project management consultants and/or advisors from Component 2 to Component 4.

(3) Component 3 Expansion of Local Capacity for Service Delivery through Community Learning Centers (CLCs) (Estimated Cost US$ 1,456,000*; Actual Cost US$ 0.304 million). This component originally aimed to: (1) evaluate NDRE’s existing Community Learning Center program, prepare selection criteria, procedures and information materials for the community groups and facilitators; (2) conduct workshops and train communities and introduce the concept of Community Learning Centers (CLCs); and (3) fund the provision of grants to selected communities that agree to establish and maintain a CLC (one in each of the 65 Sub-Districts) to cover the costs of furniture, equipment, supplies, and small works for such Learning Centers (PAD, p.4; Loan Agreement, p.5). At the restructuring, the number of CLCs to be supported was reduced from 65 to 9.

(4) Component 4 Information, Monitoring, and Evaluation Technology (Estimated Cost US$ 227,903*; Actual Cost US$ 0.542 million). This component aimed to: (1) upgrade instructional, information, and office technology to support the establishment and expansion of capacity and monitoring of programs within DNEAENF; (2) carry out distance learning pilots; and (3) conduct studies to build the knowledge base for stronger equivalency education programming (PAD, p.5; Loan Agreement, p. 5).

*Estimated costs are from the PAD (PAD, p.4-5). The ICR notes slightly different funding for project components: (1) Component 1 was estimated at US $1.875 million; (2) Component 2 was estimated at US$ 1.283 million; (3) Component 3 was estimated at US$ 1.3 million; and (4) Component 4 was estimated at US$ 0.217 million.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: Actual project costs were US$ 4.483 million or 89.67% of the original estimate of US$ 5 million. Spending on Components 1 and 3 was less than expected (US$ 1.783 million rather than US$ 1.958 million and US$ 0.304 million rather than US$ 1.456 million respectively), while spending on Components 2 and 4 exceeded initial estimates (US$ 1.855 million rather than US$ 1.348 million and US$ 0.542 million rather than US$ 0.228 million respectively).

Financing: The IDA Grant was the sole source of financing (US$ 4.83 million or 89.67% of the original estimate of US$ 5 million) (ICR, p.24).

Borrower Contribution: The Recipient made no contributions to the cost of the project.

Dates: The project closed on December 31, 2016, one year after the expected December 30, 2015 closing date. The closing date was extended because of significant implementation delays.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

Original Objectives
The relevance of the original objectives is substantial.
The Government of Timor-Leste’s National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) (2011-2030) recognized the importance of improving institutions and building capacity, and highlighted the need for attention to out-of-school youth (ICR, p. 14). The Government’s Education Strategic Plan (2010-2015) included achieving universal completion of basic education by 2025 and eliminating illiteracy among all age groups by 2015 (PAD, p. 1). These goals were situated within a challenging education context. Net primary education enrollment was only 85% in 2007-08. Furthermore, only 33% of students remained until Grade 6 by 2009. In 2010, 25% of basic education school-age children (children ages 6-14) were not in school. Furthermore, of those above 15 years old, only 36% were functionally literate and 27% were semi-literate (PAD, p. 1). The project aimed to support the Ministry of Education’s Directorate of Adult and Non-formal Education (DNEANEF), later named National Directorate for Recurrent Education (NDRE), which did not have external support and was the largest provider for equivalency education. A further aim was to provide educational opportunities for over 8,404 children who had never had access to, or could not complete, their primary education (PAD, p. 1, 3).

The World Bank Group’s Timor-Leste Country Partnership Strategy (CPS, 2013-2017) prioritized improving efficiency and quality of service provision for education and skills development (p.17). The CPS also prioritized out-of-school youth in the Pacific region and the Bank was supporting similar programs in similar countries such as Papua New Guinea. Finally, the project was consistent with the Bank’s overall Education Sector Strategy (2020) and Timor-Leste Interim Strategy Note (2009-2010).

Revised Objectives

The relevance of the revised objectives after the Level 1 September 16, 2015 restructuring is **high**. The 2015 restructuring shifted the objectives from improving service delivery to improving the system for second chance education. According to the project team, this shift was driven by a need to go beyond providing education for students by providing a legal and policy framework for equivalency education. This framework was intended to increase legitimacy and recognition for equivalency education.

Rating
Substantial

Revised Rating
High

b. Relevance of Design

Original Objectives

The relevance of design under the original objectives is **modest**. The original program objectives aimed to increase the number of out of school youth and young adults who completed recognized equivalency education and to decrease the number and/or rate of leavers from each program and level, thus increasing the internal efficiency of the program. These objectives were supported by activities pertaining to curriculum development and design; teacher, education administrator, and community professional development; and local capacity development through the provision of community learning centers. However, there was a significant design shortcoming. The design was over-ambitious in terms of the
resources and time available for project implementation. The preparation team’s knowledge of the actual content of the NDRE database system, as well as the difficulties associated with data collection, was limited (ICR, p. 8). NDRE did not have the wherewithal to collect data on, and monitor, the number of equivalency education students. For example, little information was to be available on those who did not complete the program, even though they were a central part of the PDO. NDRE’s supervisory capacity was also weak, and design did not include sufficient activities or resources to remedy this. The project’s time frame was insufficient for the proposed support for 65 CLCs, particularly when consideration is given to the need for strong community participation.

Revised Objectives
The relevance of design under the revised objectives is high. The revised program objectives aim to support the Ministry of Education in the establishment of a sustainable national equivalency program. The emphasis on establishing a robust legal and policy framework for equivalency education including an endorsed curriculum is relevant. It is logically linked to the objective of establishing a sustainable national equivalency program. The restructured project was revised to include other specific activities to achieve this objective. The revised indicators were measurable and attributable and the targets were more likely to be achieved within the remaining timeframe.

Rating
Modest

Revised Rating
High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1
Objective
To increase the number of out of school youth and young adults who complete recognized equivalency programs; and to decrease the number and/or rate of leavers from each program and level, thus increasing internal efficiency of the program

Rationale

Outputs

- Development and piloting of eleven equivalency Level 2 subjects (grades 7-9 equivalent).
- Development of seven Level 1 and 2 teaching materials for nine subjects.
- Conducted three multi stakeholder workshops to validate curriculum.
- Recruitment and staffing of 20 national pedagogical staff members for NDRE, equivalency education legal advisor, monitoring and evaluation specialist, district staff to facilitate CLCs.
- Training of 20 national pedagogical staff members.
- Training by national pedagogical staff for district coordinators on new curriculum.
• Recruitment and staffing of 97 Level 1 equivalency program teachers and 42 Level 2 equivalency program teachers.
• Completion of CLC manual with World Bank approval.

Outcomes
The ICR reports 1,100 students as having completed the level 1 program (p. 10), which partially achieves the project development objectives. No information is provided on the decrease in number and/or rate of leavers from each program and level because that information was not collected.

Rating
Modest

Objective 1 Revision 1
Revised Objective
To support the Ministry of Education in the establishment of a sustainable national equivalency program

Revised Rationale

Outputs

• The curriculum of the equivalency program was developed and tested in January 2015 and June 2015 based on needs and demand identified by a project-supported study involving an international curriculum development consultant.
• Piloting of eleven equivalency Level 1 subjects (Phase 3) & Level 2 subjects (Phase 4 and 5).
• Development of NDRE education equivalency implementation manual.
• Endorsement and promulgation of Level 2 equivalency program learning materials and attached to an equivalency program decree.
• Permanent staffing of 20 national pedagogical advisors, 9 district SCEP staff, and 110 teachers by the Ministry of Education as of January 2016.
• Training for 20 national pedagogical advisors and 110 teachers (50 Level 1 and 60 Level 2 teachers) in face to face and self-student learning methodology for equivalency education.
• Training for 9 district Second Chance Education Program (SCEP) staff for establishing CLCs and liaising with the community and parents on equivalency education.
• Establishment of nine Community Learning Centers (CLCs) in eight districts.
• Establishment of small libraries in all 9 Community Learning Centers (CLCs).
• Completion of 'Needs and Demand' Study which examined the mode of curriculum delivery.
• Evolution of delivery of equivalency education from face-to-face to combination of face-to-face and self-learning.
• Training of 50 Level 1 equivalency program teachers and 60 Level 2 equivalency program teachers on new mode of combined face-to-face and self-learning.
• Development of Monitoring and Evaluation Information Systems for students, teachers, CLCs, and
institutions.

- Participation of 1,328 Level 1 (55% female) and 342 Level 2 (70% female) equivalency education students.

Outcomes

The ICR has two indicators to measure the achievement of the revised objective: (1) endorsement by the MOE of the legal framework related to recurrent education, and (2) endorsement by the MOE of the curriculum. These were both exceeded. The Decree Law for equivalency education operationalizes the existing 2008 Basic Education Law and 2010 Organic Law of the Ministry of Education which both articulate the foundation for creating recurrent education. The Decree Law was endorsed not only by the Ministry of Education (the project outcome target), but also approved by the Council of Ministers in July 2016, and has been promulgated by the President. NDRE has prepared numerous ministerial 'dispatches’ to operationalize the Decree Law. Through ministerial decrees, the Ministry of Education as approved the implementation, licensing, and accreditation of equivalency education, thereby allowing equivalency graduates to have greater opportunities to transition into the formal system (should they choose to do so) or to access employment.

Second, the revised and piloted curriculum was approved at ministerial level, endorsed by the Council of Ministers, and promulgated by the President. The curriculum was attached as an annex to the Recurrent Education Decree Law which is not the usual practice in Timor-Leste but was done to signal the government's commitment to recurrent education at the request of the Minister of Education. The new curriculum was made publicly available in the Jornal da Republica in 2016. The new curriculum is now being taught in the nine CLSs supported by the project (six established and three new). The project's shift from face to face delivery to semi-presential delivery is also key in building a sustainable equivalency program. This shift involved a change from face to face class, five times a week to a combination of face to face and distance learning. This enabled youth and adults who can regularly participate in education due to family reasons, work, etc. an opportunity to continue equivalency education. Licensing and accreditation offer robust assurance mechanisms for CLCs and other providers, while certification offers validation for equivalency education students. The equivalency education program produced 100 graduates in 2016 and 101 graduates in 2017.

Nine communities in eight districts were able to meet the pre-requisites for establishing CLCs, including ensuring stakeholder participation in the development of CLCs, identifying community needs, writing proposals for accessing CLC project grants, and officially requesting inclusion in the CLC registry. Training is provided to CLC councils and committees on how to manage the grants they receive, as well as on how to sustain the recurrent education program. The ICR reports that the MOE views the nine CLCs as models on which to base future expansion.

The equivalency program is sustainable. The legal and regulatory framework; piloted and revised curriculum; licensing, certification, and accreditation processes; provision of CLC manuals and other materials; increased NDRE capacity - are all essential building blocks for sustainability. Furthermore, the MOE is financing the current nine CLCs as well as retaining staffing and paying the salaries of national pedagogical staff and teachers. The equivalency program should be sustainable. The Decree Law should ensure that any new government recognizes NDRE and the EP programs. It will likely increase NDR's ability to negotiate its
budgets from any new administration. NDRE has the legal mandate to raise funds and to provide assurance that funding would be used in a transparent manner. Now that the Decree Law and curriculum have been promulgated and published, political pressure from Timor-Leste's large youth population would make it very difficult to withhold funding without provoking social unrest. Moreover, as already noted, since project closure, NDRE has been able to continue support for equivalency program classes in all nine existing CLCs; pay existing teachers, and redeploy them when necessary; run a select number of vocational programs in three CLCs, and establish two classes targeting disabled pupils. The project team reports that, thanks to NDRE's strengthened capacity, it is able to take the leadership in managing its programs and in identifying the critical needs that must be met if the results are to be sustained. Additional technical staff trained during the project have been retained, so that the institution possesses full technical capacity to run the equivalency and CLC programs.

**Revised Rating**
High

### 5. Efficiency

The PAD (p. 68) suggested that the economic benefit of primary education is "generally accepted by the Bank in nearly all development country environments," and that Timor-Leste would be like other countries in this respect. The only source cited to support this rather general argument was that "an estimated rate of return of 51.5% was achieved from the Bangladesh Post-Literacy and Continuing Education project" (PAD, p. 71). The PAD did, however cite data from the Timor-Leste Living Standards Survey (TLSS) for 2007, as well as a paper that found that "the extent of poverty declines rapidly with higher educational attainment" in Timor-Leste (PAD, p. 68).

Nevertheless, the PAD did not include an economic analysis specific to second-chance education in Timor-Leste, suggesting instead the difficulty of determining the rate of return to "social sector interventions" and "activities of a capacity building nature" and citing "the limited availability of recent data relevant to such calculations for Timor-Leste" (PAD, p. 68).

The ICR indicated that project modeled the effects of completing Level 1 and Level 2 equivalency programs to completing primary and pre-secondary education on earnings. The model predicted that students participating in Level 1 and Level 2 equivalency programs (and assuming that these graduates do not dropout and continue to participate in the workforce until the age of 65) would have a 19 percent rate of return for Level 1 and 14 percent for Level 2. However, the ICR also acknowledged that these figures represented an upper bound estimate and that international evidence suggested that achievement of such a high rate of return for adults would be challenging. Data on the impact of actual second chance education programs and their impact on earnings were mixed (ICR, p. 35) and no data were provided specifically for Timor-Leste. The ICR's Annex 3 mentioned that Timor-Leste's 2014-2015 Survey of Living Standards provided data to suggest a positive association between education and earnings. Annex 3 also mentioned some academic sources on the benefits of education in development contexts, including a brief summary of mixed findings from evaluations of second-chance programs in several countries. However, the ICR did not provide analysis specific to the costs or estimated potential benefits of this specific Timor-Leste project. The ICR did not, for instance, provide updated costs per student per year in the equivalency program. Updated information on
these costs, which were considered to be high at appraisal, and possible comparisons with other programs, would have also helped assess their efficiency.

The project's implementation efficiency was hampered by an internal reorganization of NDRE, including changes in key staff; insufficient resources for supervision, monitoring, and evaluation; and a weak management information system (ICR, p.9). It was also negatively affected by presidential and parliamentary elections, which delayed the hiring of pedagogical teams and teachers (ICR, p.10).

The ICR applied a split rating to efficiency (diverging from guidelines). This review assesses efficiency across the project.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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<tr>
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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the original objectives is rated substantial, as the project was in line with Timor-Leste’s and the World Bank Group’s education strategy. Relevance of the original design is rated modest. Insufficient account was taken of the need for a robust legal and regulatory framework for equivalency education, and the aims of the project were over-ambitious given the human, institutional and financial resources available. Efficacy under the original objectives - increasing the number of out of school youth and young adults who complete recognized equivalency programs and reducing the number of those who leave without completion - is rated modest. Although some progress was made in developing, curricula and materials and in training staff, the ICR provides little or no evidence concerning the number of students completing equivalency education or on the number leaving prior to completion. Efficiency is rated modest due to absence of reliable data in Timor-Leste, and due to implementation delays. These are considered significant shortcomings, and outcome under the original objectives is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

Relevance of the revised objectives is rated high, as the revised project focuses on developing the equivalency education system, rather than service delivery alone. Relevance of the revised design is rated high. The revised design planned additional and specific activities, which could be clearly linked to the achievement of the intended outcomes. Efficacy under the revised objective - to support MOE in the establishment of a sustainable
national equivalency program - is rated high due to the development of the legal and policy framework, accreditation, certification, and endorsement of the curriculum by the MOE, and the meeting of nine CLCs as necessary prerequisites. There are strong indications that the national equivalency program will be sustained. Efficiency, however, is rated modest, and outcome under the revised objectives is therefore assessed as moderately satisfactory.

Using a 1-to-6 scale (where 1 is highly unsatisfactory and 6 highly satisfactory) to assigning numeric values to the outcome ratings, and taking account of the 56% grant disbursements at the time of the restructuring, leads to an outcome rating of 3.44, which rounds to 3, leading to an overall outcome rating of moderately unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
   Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Within the Ministry of Education, the institutional risk is moderate considering NDRE's significant capacity building efforts and equivalency education's strong legal and policy framework. There is a moderate risk concerning future MOE financing for both the current 9 and 10 planned CLCs and for national pedagogical staff and teachers. According to the project team, the Ministry has announced its intention to continue budgeting fully for these activities.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
   Modest

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry
   The Government and the Bank engaged in collaborative discussions throughout the preparation process. Specifically, the project’s scope and activities were underpinned by the Timor-Leste National Education Strategic Plan (2011-2015). The preparation team also took account of a range of relevant Bank documents, including Timor-Leste Education Sector Support Program (2008-2013); the regional strategy for out of school youth in the Pacific sub-region; the Education Sector Strategy 2020; and the Timor-Leste Interim Strategy 2009-2010. Timor-Leste's fragile state context and related capacity weaknesses were also taken into consideration.

   The project focused on out of school youth equivalency education (as opposed to technical and vocational
education which were being supported by other external partners). Priority was given to the development of CLCs and to supporting NDRE, which had not yet been fully incorporated into the MOE or financed by other partners.

At the time of entry, the World Bank identified one strategic and five operational risks. The strategic risk was that NDRE would not be able to sustain equivalency education after the project ended (rated high). The operational risks were: (1) NDRE would not have the capacity to make quality improvements or to manage implementation of expanded services (substantial); (2) NDRE staff would face critical constraints such as limited demand for equivalency programs, shortage of equivalency teachers; and challenges with equivalency student retention (substantial); (3) NDRE would not be able to produce timely monitoring, evaluation, and reporting data (moderate); (4) MOE would lack Bank-related procurement expertise (substantial to high); and (5) MOE would lack financial management skills necessary for fiduciary compliance (substantial). Most of these risks materialized. In view of their identification, preparation could have been better able to anticipate the difficulties in meeting targets and monitoring progress, which became evident in the pre-restructured project. These are considered significant shortcomings, and Quality at Entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
The World Bank and Government of Timor-Leste collaboratively conducted 12 Implementation Support Missions between April 2012 and December 2016, guided by a task team leader (TTL) who was based in Jakarta. The supervision team included a balance of financial management, procurement, safeguards, and implementation specialists. The ICR documents that the July 2014 Mid-Term Review led to the September 2015 Restructuring, which was appropriate and relevant. The modification of the PDO to focus on the legal, regulatory and institutional framework was the result of the Bank team’s active involvement. The team also provided strong support for curriculum development.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance
During implementation, the Government adopted the legal framework for equivalency education and committed to financing equivalency education personnel including national pedagogical staff and teachers, and Community Learning Centers. This change of emphasis, reflected in the project’s restructuring, from
the urgencies of service delivery to the establishment of the regulatory and institutional underpinnings for a sustainable recurrent education system was critically important. There were some moderate shortcomings, including not emphasizing the systemic factors from the outset, and delays caused by the restructuring of the NDRE, elections, and other political factors.

**Government Performance Rating**
Moderately Satisfactory

**b. Implementing Agency Performance**
NDRE was successful in coordinating the adoption of the legal framework for equivalency education and operationalizing equivalency education (including developing the curriculum, strengthening teacher training, and improving modes of delivery). This coordination was done in close collaboration with, and support by, Bank-financed international consultants. NDRE also incorporated the project's monitoring and evaluation system, i.e. data collection, dissemination, and utilization, into broader government monitoring and evaluation. Specifically, NDRE generated data for the MOE's Education Management Information Systems (EMIS). However, NDRE's initial weak data management capacities made it impossible to complete or to monitor the project as originally envisaged. In addition, delays resulted from lack of familiarity with Bank procurement requirements.

**Implementing Agency Performance Rating**
Moderately Satisfactory

**Overall Borrower Performance Rating**
Moderately Satisfactory

**10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

**a. M&E Design**
The original M&E framework presented components, activities, and indicators that were in alignment with the PDOs. However, the original M&E framework failed to consider the human, institutional, and financial resources needed to collect the data. The revised M&E framework continued to present project objectives, activities, and indicators that were in alignment. More data were available for the revised objectives. The revised indicators were measurable with baselines and targets. Responsibility for M&E rested with NDRE.

**b. M&E Implementation**
The project faced many monitoring and evaluation challenges, particularly during the first three years (ICR, p.11). NRDE staff did not have sufficient resources for the transportation needed for data collection. In 2014, project staff were finally able to collect partial information. An even more critical issue was the shortage of M&E experts in Timor-Leste with the required information technology skills. This could only be remedied in
early 2015 with the recruitment of two specialists, one national and the other international. From that date, NDRE changed the focus to capturing information about students and teachers that could help with equivalency education program development and management. Forms were created to capture data; processes developed for collecting information; and NDRE was assisted in report preparation. As a result, after the restructuring (which became effective in September, 2015), NDRE could provide more readily available data (ICR, p.11). By project closure, all M&E activities were completed and data collection plans for students, teachers, and CLCs were being applied. Project coordinators, equivalency education teachers, CLC councils and committees were trained on how to use the database system and manual. In addition, NDRE fed project generated data into the broader MOE EMIS system.

c. M&E Utilization
Information collected after the mid-term review, including the results of a needs and demand study, was used by NDRE to develop curricular materials, for teacher training, and for assessing the demand for level II courses.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards
This project was a Category ‘C’ operation and therefore a separate assessment was not required (ICR, p. 13). It triggered the environmental safeguard OP/BP 4.01 because the IDA credit and Timor-Leste financing created Community Learning Centers. However, this involved minor renovation work was limited to renovation of existing buildings or the addition of a single room to be used as classroom space in an existing building (PAD, p. 79). The Ministry of Education’s existing Bank-supported environmental guidelines for major school rehabilitation was expected to be applied (PAD, p. 79). In addition, the project created a CLC manual to incorporate environmental guidelines and hired a Construction Engineer to ensure application of standards. Project safeguards were monitored and considered to be satisfactory (ICR, p. 13).

b. Fiduciary Compliance
The ICR (p. 13) reports that financial management was satisfactory. Interim financial reports were submitted on time, and NDRE complied with all financial covenants. External audits were also submitted on time (the ICR does state whether or not the auditor’s opinions were qualified).
Procurement was considered only moderately satisfactory “due to the fact that the NDRE did not extend
contracts within the effective period, [so] that the continuation of the consultants’ service had to be treated as ‘single source selection’” (ICR, p.13). Turnover in NDRE staff also delayed contract approvals. Other than delays, the ICR reports no major issues or instances of mismanagement of procurement.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
   None reported.

d. Other
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### 12. Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreements/Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>When applying the split rating calculation, the ICR Review uses the percentage of disbursements before the restructuring (US$ 2.49 million divided by US$ 4.483 million, or 56%) and after the restructuring (US$ 1.99 million divided by US$ 4.483 million, or 44%). The ICR Review provides a rating of efficiency across the project. The ICR provided split ratings of efficiency, diverging from guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>According to the harmonized guidelines, when one element of Bank performance is rated in the satisfactory range and the other is rated in the unsatisfactory range, the overall Bank Performance rating is determined by the Outcome rating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower Performance</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Lessons

IEG draws two main lessons from the ICR's account of the experience of preparing and implementing this project:

- When a focus on service delivery, however apparently urgent, precedes the establishment of a robust legal, policy, regulatory and institutional framework, systemic sustainability can become difficult if not impossible to achieve, and the quality of services may also be undermined. A focus on the systemic framework also coincides with the Bank's comparative advantage and normal emphasis.
- Lack of information and weak data management were identified as risks during the preparation stage. Such risks need to be mitigated if their materialization is not to affect negatively both the pace and quality of project implementation and the ability to monitor project outcomes.

14. Assessment Recommended?

Yes

Please explain

Differences between the ICR and IEG ICR Review ratings on some elements. It would be useful to look at the lessons of this project in achieving the goals of second chance education. The assessment could also examine the extent to which the systemic reforms are sustainable. Such an assessment could be carried out in tandem with that of a similar project in Papua New Guinea (Flexible and Open Distance Education Project).

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR combined the relevance of objectives and design, which conflated the two categories. There were also some departures from the guidelines. Discussions of the achievement of project development objectives
in the main narrative and annex were only presented after the restructuring. Information on the achievement of project development objectives was gleaned from the Implementation section and other sections. The percentage of final disbursements used for the weighting of overall outcome was erroneous, as was the conclusion drawn from it. Efficiency was not rated across the entire project (instead, the ICR incorrectly gave separate efficiency ratings for the project before and after restructuring). The ICR contained little discussion of the project’s impact on gender and on vulnerable groups. A clearer analysis of the factors affecting sustainability would have been useful given the centrality of this in the revised objective.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Modest