BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT SOCIAL STABILITY IN LEBANON
# Table of Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... 3  
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 4  
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5  
   1. Background ...................................................................................................................... 5  
   2. Research Methodology ..................................................................................................... 7  
II. Social cohesion and social stability .................................................................................. 9  
   1. Defining social cohesion ................................................................................................. 9  
   2. Extending the analysis to social stability ........................................................................ 10  
   3. Why social cohesion and social stability matter ............................................................ 13  
   4. Measuring intergroup relations ...................................................................................... 14  
   5. The state of social stability in Lebanon ......................................................................... 15  
   6. Operationalizing social stability policy in Lebanon ....................................................... 17  
III. Pressure points for social stability in Lebanon ............................................................... 20  
   1. Weak and bifurcated labor market ................................................................................. 21  
   2. Overburdened service delivery ...................................................................................... 25  
   3. Perception of intergroup threat ....................................................................................... 29  
   4. Declining mental health / growth of mental illness ......................................................... 33  
IV. Behavioral solutions for enhancing social stability .......................................................... 37  
V. References .......................................................................................................................... 48  
VI. Appendix .......................................................................................................................... 53  
   Appendix 1. Engagements ................................................................................................. 53  
   Appendix 2: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 .................................................... 54  
   Appendix 3. Cognitive and affective threat mechanisms .................................................... 56  
   Appendix 4. Measuring intergroup relations ...................................................................... 57  
   Appendix 5: International community projects to address pillars ..................................... 59
Abstract

The war in Syria has had an enormous impact on Lebanese society and economy. Lebanon is host to an estimated 1.5 million forcibly displaced Syrians—one-third of the country’s population. This dramatic transformation in the country’s demographics threatens social stability. The scale of the displacement of Syrian refugees to the country has put a severe economic, social, and political strain on Lebanon and is leading to growing tensions between host and refugee communities. This document presents a behavioral analysis and recommendations for interventions to target pressure points on social stability among Syrian refugees and the Lebanese living in host communities in Lebanon. The behavioral analysis outlines the pressure points for social stability and provides a menu of behavioral solutions to support and complement existing interventions to increase social stability.
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I. Introduction

1. Background

Known for its rich history and diverse social fabric, Lebanon continuously tests the boundaries of social cohesion. The country is home to numerous distinct and well-defined groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druze). Its political system is based on confessional affiliation, dividing power between the different confessions.\(^1\) The 15-year civil war strengthened the Lebanese confessional identities, increasing social cohesion within groups, while diminishing the Lebanese national identity, and weakening social cohesion at the national level (World Bank, 2016).

While Lebanon has weathered multiple shocks post-civil war, the country remains in a fragile state. After the civil war, Syria occupied Lebanon until 2005, with some degrees of stability. The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 led tens of thousands of Lebanese protesting daily calling for the end of the Syrian occupation. That year was one of the most unstable in Lebanon with 14 major bombings and assassinations, followed in 2006 by a 34-day conflict between Israel and Lebanon (known as the July 2006 war). Lebanon has been relatively stable since, but it has not been devoid of conflict. Sporadic assassinations and bomb attacks throughout the years continue to take place.

Despite modest economic growth and periods of economic boom post-civil war, the confessional system of governance limits the country’s ability to prosper and meet the needs of its people. After the civil war, the confessional system restricted the effectiveness of public institutions and services, leaving most Lebanese frustrated with public services and diminished trust in government (World Bank, 2017). The country continually faced ongoing macro-economic instability, weak business environment, insufficient investment in infrastructure, and weak institutions and regulatory framework (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, the labor market suffered from high unemployment rates with mismatches in the labor market and a high prevalence of low quality and low productivity jobs (World Bank, 2016). These constraints have kept poverty rates consistently: 28% of the population being poor. Poverty in Lebanon is unequally distributed, with highest levels in the north and the south, and dense pockets in suburbs of large towns (World Bank, 2016).

The war in Syria has had an enormous impact on the capacities of the Lebanese state. With the conflict in its seventh year, the estimated number of Syrian refugees has reached over 1.5 million—one-third of the country’s population.\(^2\) This is the largest number of refugees per capita of any country in the world. The scale of the humanitarian need continues to place an unsustainable strain on the country’s economy, public services, and social fabric. From the start of the conflict through 2015, the cumulative cost of the Syrian crisis to Lebanon is estimated to have been 18.15 billion USD. The crisis was estimated to have widened the country’s fiscal deficit by 4.2 billion USD between 2012 and 2015 (World Bank, 2014) and has had a profound effect on the ability of the state to deliver basic services. The utilization of healthcare facilities has increased by up to 50% in some cases, undermining financial sustainability and capacity to absorb a higher caseload. 586,540 displaced Syrian children (3-18 years) have registered for education on top of 451,323 vulnerable Lebanese children already in need of education assistance. 64% of the population lack access to safely managed drinking water services and the large displaced population has led to an increase of 15% of solid waste, 14% of wastewater, and 12% in water demand. The impact of the displaced Syrians on electricity usage is equivalent to five hours of supply per

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\(^1\) Confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally distributes political and institutional power among a country's communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population.

\(^2\) Source: UNHCR. Roughly 1 million Syrians have registered with the UNHCR as refugees. For a variety of reasons, a substantial proportion of Syrians who fled the war have not registered as refugees. The Government of Lebanon estimates that the combined number of registered and unregistered refugees is approximately 1.5 million.
day – with losses to the Lebanese Government and citizens estimated at around $333 million per year. It is estimated that 45% of the Syrian households are illegally connected to the national grid (UNHCR, 2017).

The Syrian crisis, beyond the direct challenge it presents of managing a vulnerable population, puts pressure on the already delicate situation. The crisis has put pressure on livelihoods and income-generating activities, creating severe difficulties for poor and displaced families to secure their basic needs. It is estimated that the conflict in Syria pushed 170,000 Lebanese people into poverty in 2014, and drove already poor Lebanese even deeper into poverty (World Bank, 2013). According to 2017-2020 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), 3.3 million out of the 5.9 million total population in Lebanon are in need and 1.5 million Lebanese (of whom 470,000 are children) of whom are living under the poverty line (World Bank, 2017). UNHRC estimates that 67% of vulnerable Lebanese are concentrated in 251 cadasters. These already vulnerable communities host 87% of the refugees. The increase in poverty, the worsening labor market, the instable security, and the deteriorating public services have caused further strain on social cohesion between Lebanese and increased tension towards Syrians (World Bank, 2016).

Beyond the direct economic burden to the Lebanese state and citizens, the dramatic change to the country also threatens to undermine social stability. Constraints related to residency/labor policies and challenging market conditions have compelled displaced Syrians to resort to illegal and exploitative labor to meet the basic needs of their families. This adversely affects vulnerable Lebanese citizens. The heavy strain on public resources and competition for low-wage jobs has given rise to tensions between refugee and host communities and between local communities and administrative authorities (UNDP, 2017). Only 28% of Lebanese citizens regard inter-community relations to be positive. Though relations are weak, most consider the level of tension stable and only 10% of Lebanese characterize relations as “very negative.” Yet a prolonged stay is a prominent concern for Lebanese citizens. Most Lebanese (63.1%) believe that it will take five years or more for Syrians to return to Syria, and of Lebanese respondents who believed it would take “five years or more,” 59.4% “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the statement that “Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together” (UNDP, 2017).

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3 Lebanon has 1,623 cadasters, each includes one or more villages or municipalities; at the same time one or more cadasters could represent one municipality. The vulnerability categorization is based on deprivation level scoring of households in access to health services, income levels, access to education services, access to water and sanitation services, and housing conditions (UNHCR, 2015).

4 71% of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the poverty line. 93 percent are food insecure—a 4% increase from 2015. Protracted poverty and food insecurity leads virtually all (96%) displaced Syrian households to adopt negative emergency and crisis coping strategies – for example, selling household goods, productive assets and housing or land, spending savings, buying on credit and incurring debt or withdrawing children from school.

5 This can be compared against 41.8% of Lebanese respondents who believed it would take “less than one year” who “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the same statement.
2. Research Methodology

Research objectives

With the support of the Government of Lebanon and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), the World Bank conducted a behavioral diagnostic analysis to better understand the psychological, social, and structural factors that underpin social stability between Lebanese and Syrian refugees living in host communities. The strategy note has two main objectives:

(i) Conduct a behavioral diagnostic analysis of the challenges to social stability in Lebanon to identify pressure points, with special focus on the relationship between the Lebanese host community and forcibly displaced Syrian community;

(ii) Provide a menu of behavioral solutions targeted at the identified pressure points that can be used to complement existing strategic efforts by the Government of Lebanon, the international community, and local NGOs.

Conceptual framework

In this behavioral diagnostic analysis, we focus on the contextual and situational factors that shape judgments and decision-making, the socio-psychological processes that affect mindsets, mental models, goal orientation, and mental health, and the structural (economic and political) that affect opportunities and access to resources. The approach draws on ideas from across the human and social sciences – psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, economics, and sociology – with a focus on understanding the drivers of behavior.6

The Government of Lebanon and its partners have been effective at managing and maintaining social stability in the country under extremely difficult circumstances. In addition to this commendable work, there are evidently other factors helping the country avoid widespread communal violence. We can only speculate as to these dynamics, but our observations during our field work suggest some of the following factors: the presence of the military and rule of law, the inclusion of Syrians in the education system, the relative functionality of the economy, the jobs created by the support to the Syrian crisis, the work of civil society organizations.

The analysis therefore focuses on areas identified as posing the most risk to social stability in Lebanon. We call these areas **Pressure Points**. We analyze the pressure points to identify where social tension is highest and the risk of conflict emerging is most probable. We focus on the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the key actors determining social stability.7

On the basis of the analysis, we propose a menu of behavioral solutions intended to add a layer of resilience to social stability in Lebanon. These solutions draw on evidence from around the world and are conceived as complements to existing work in this area. The solutions are not intended to assimilate refugees but rather to and minimize the downside risk of social breakdown posed by the crisis. The proposed interventions are targeted toward the pressure points with the intention of indirectly mitigating the threat of a social breakdown. These pressure points are just the latest sources of tension within a much longer trajectory of social tension in Lebanon, which is politically and historically derived. Thus, it is important to emphasize that the expected

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6 For background on behavioral approaches to development policymaking, see *World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior*.

7 We note that the fundamental drivers of social cohesion may likely lie in macro-factors such as an improved economy and geo-political alignments. A key finding in a recent review of ‘Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement’ was that projects and programs often over-estimate the impact that discrete activities have on social cohesion. Thus, while prior work in Lebanon on social cohesion has been rigorously assessed and found to have positive impacts on social cohesion, we emphasize that the (a) the proposed interventions fit into a broader ecosystem of threats to social cohesion, (b) that coordinated measures are required to address the issue due to the systemic nature of the challenge, (c) we cannot say ex ante whether the ideas proposed will work or what the magnitude of their impacts will be. Rather, the ideas need to be tested.
impact of such interventions on the system as a whole is tentative and must be ultimately empirically investigated.

**Evidence and data**

The analysis is based on formative research conducted from August 2017 – March 2018 consisting of:

(i) A desk review of all relevant studies and reports on social stability in Lebanon, scanning of journal articles and research on social cohesion, social stabilization, and other related terms.
(ii) Qualitative research collected from 10 focus groups with 150 Lebanese youths and Syrian refugees in Beirut, Akkar, Tripoli, Bekaa, Baalbek, and Nabatiyeh in October 2017.
(iii) Interviews with key stakeholders in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Health, and local government.
(iv) Interviews with INGOs supporting social stabilization in Lebanon including United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, International Medical Corps (IMC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Search for Common Ground, and Mercy Corps, as well as with local NGOs Abaad, AlRahma, Dari, and Al Mahdi Scout.
(v) Analysis of the UNDP Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon.

The document has four sections. Section 2 provides an analytical framework for studying social stability in Lebanon. Section 3 outlines four pressure points for social stability in Lebanon: the economy, service delivery, intergroup threat, and mental well-being. Section 4 provides a menu of behavioral solutions to the identified challenges to social stability.

**Research limitations**

The research faced two major limitations. First, we focus much of our analysis on the perceptions of Lebanese and Syrians and have relatively scarce and limited data with which to compare attitudes and beliefs against the objective reality. Second, local interventions to promote social stability have generally not been tested using rigorous methods. The rigorous evidence that does exist on this subject comes from very different contexts and the generalizability is unclear.
II. Social cohesion and social stability

1. Defining social cohesion

The concept of social cohesion (and relatedly social stability) has been widely studied and used as a basis for policy for decades. Scholars and policymakers alike have turned to social cohesion as a conceptual framework for thinking about issues related to immigration, integration, and inter-group dynamics; for monitoring society-wide shifts in perceptions and opinions; for understanding countries’ governance and economic performance; and for adapting policy responses to social and economic challenges. Yet, despite the practicality of the concept, there is little consensus on how to operationalize or, consequently, measure it. As Friedkin writes:

*Investigators interested in developing a general theory of social cohesion are confronted with a complex body of work that involves various definitions of social cohesion, specialized literatures on particular dimensions of social cohesion (e.g., membership turnover, organizational commitment, categorical identifications interpersonal attachments, network structures), and lines of inquiry focused on the social cohesion of specific types of groups (e.g., families, schools, military units, and sports teams).* (Friedkin, 2004)

In this section, we give a brief overview of the definitions that different research and policy bodies have given to social cohesion. We then conceptually link it to the related idea of social stability. The *World Development Report 2013: Jobs*, which focused a chapter on jobs and social cohesion, defined social cohesion in broad terms as “the capacity of societies to manage collective decision making peacefully.” The *World Development Report 2015: Governance* refers to social cohesion when discussing the related concept of trust, which it defines as “probability that an actor assigns to other actors of delivering on their commitment, conditional on their past behavior.”

Some policy institutes conceptualize social cohesion in procedural terms. For example, The Government of Canada’s Policy Research Sub-Committee conceptualizes social cohesion as “the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity … based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all [citizens].” Similarly, the Commissariat Général du Plan of the French government defines social cohesion as “a set of social processes that help instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community.”

Other researchers conceive of social cohesion in static terms, as a characteristic of social relationships either between groups or individuals. Chan et al. (2006) describe social cohesion as “a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of a society, as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that include trust, a sense of belonging, and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations” (pg. 290). Putnam (1993) describes the related concept of social capital as those “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”

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8 In this section, we focus on the definition of social cohesion because it is more commonly used in analysis. At the end, we graphically define how social cohesion and social stability relate to one another for the purposes of this report.

9 The concept of social cohesion is used in multiple disciplines, including social psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and public health. Disciplines have tended to adapt the conceptual definition to the problems and contexts commonly studied in their field (Bruhn 2009).

Despite the rich body of scholarly and policy literature on social cohesion and related themes, this research can seem disconnected. Box 1 below documents five variables through which the strength of social cohesion can be examined.11

Box 1. Five dimensions of social cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Cohesion</th>
<th>Social Breakdown</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Individuals’ feelings that they are part of and sharing values with the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Whether individuals have access or are excluded from institutions; whether they have effective opportunity or are marginalised from full participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Disengagement</td>
<td>Individuals’ involvement in political processes and collective decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Individuals’ feelings that others accept them, and recognise their contributions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Illegitimacy</td>
<td>Individuals’ trust in public institutions, such as non-governmental organisations, political parties, and governmental bodies to effectively manage connections among individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jensen 1998

2. Extending the analysis to social stability

Thus far, the relationship between social cohesion and social stability (the concern of this report) has not been clearly defined. Figure 1 describes this relationship by conceptualizing a spectrum of social order. To the far right of the figure, a socially cohesive society can be envisioned as a homogenous one in which all members regard themselves as part of the same well-defined group. In the center right, a socially assimilated society is one with multiple sub-groups that are converging to a commonly held identity that supersedes the sub-group identity. The center point is a society characterized by social stability. A socially stable country is one with multiple well-defined groups living together in a trusting environment. The area to the left of the center point depicts societies in which groups are coming into conflict with one another. This describes a situation in which people generally abide by the law, but hostile intergroup attitudes are common and explicit. “Social breakdown” describes a society in which sub-groups engage in openly hostile behavior towards one another. In this situation, a country risks falling into civil war.

Figure 1. Spectrum of group dynamics social order

To maintain social stability, it is necessary to understand and manage the causes of intergroup conflict. A large body of psychology research investigates the mechanisms through which cognitive factors instigate intergroup conflict (Tropp, 2012).

One psychological pathway to violent conflict is delegitimization. Delegitimization occurs when the negative and exclusionary mental models (e.g., categories or stereotypes) of outgroups provides a psychological authorization for engaging in conflict and intentional harm (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012). One way to assess and measure how groups perceive and categorize each other is through the Stereotype Content Model. The model examines how individuals view groups in their society in terms of warmth or competence: “perceived competence and warmth differentiate out-group stereotypes . . . Stereotypes depict out-groups as competent to the extent that they are perceived as powerful and high status; stereotypes depict out-groups as relatively warm and nice to the extent that they do not compete with others” (Fiske et al., 2002). Box 2 summarizes the Stereotype Content Model. Behavioral outcomes are predicted from the model. The natural consequence of the high/low warmth/competence framework manifests itself into four different behavioral outcomes: “active facilitation (e.g., helping), active harm (e.g., harassing), passive facilitation (e.g., convenient cooperation), and passive harm (e.g., neglecting) (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick. 2008).”

Box 2. Combinations of status and competition, and corresponding forms of prejudice as a function of perceived warmth and competence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thermal</td>
<td>Low competitive</td>
<td>Paternalistic prejudice Low status, not competitive Pity, sympathy (e.g., elderly people, disabled people, housewives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal</td>
<td>Low competitive</td>
<td>Contemptuous prejudice Low status, competitive Contempt, disgust, anger, resentment (e.g., welfare recipients, poor people)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fiske et al. (2002)
Another cognitive mechanism through which conflict can emerge is through intergroup threat. Intergroup threat occurs when one group's actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group. Intergroup threat may emerge from realistic sources of conflict, involving power, control, resources, and status – competition for scarce resources, contexts in which the success of one group threatens the well-being of the other. A separate form of intergroup threat is symbolic, relating to conflicting values, beliefs. Both symbolic and realistic threats may affect individuals through personal and social pathways.

### Box 3. Intergroup threat: conceptual foundations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realistic</th>
<th>Symbolic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Threats concern actual physical or material harm to an individual group member such as pain, torture, or death, as well as economic loss, deprivation of valued resources, and threats to health or personal security</td>
<td>Threats concern loss of face or honor and the undermining of an individual’s self-identity or self-esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Threats to a group’s power, resources, and general welfare</td>
<td>Threats to a group’s religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison (2009); see also Neuberg and Cottrell (2002)

Once conflict and violence has emerged, psychological factors can coalesce to trap groups in a cycle of discord. One mechanism through which this may occur is group-based anger and blame. Emotions such as fear, humiliation, and contempt encourage intergroup aggression. These may be linked to other cognitive processes such as rumination about upsetting events, justification of in-group actions, and the essentialization of members of the outgroup. Another pathway through which conflict may fortify itself is through strong group-based identification. The extent of identification with a group is related with conflict enhancing attitudes, perceptions and behaviors (Roccas & Elster, 2012). Groups’ shared narratives and collective victimization, which often reflect psychological needs, goals, and motives to shape historical memories, fuel intergroup conflict by introducing barriers and obstacles to moving forward beyond conflict (Bilali & Ross, 2012).
3. Why social cohesion and social stability matter

Social cohesion and social stability are a foundational necessity for societal functioning. On the one hand, high levels of social cohesion have historically been viewed as an essential basis for the nation state. Documenting the historical focus on social cohesion, Michael Walzer writes that going back to the Renaissance and enlightenment, patriotic feeling, and political participation “rested and could only rest on social, religious, and cultural unity. They were the political expressions of a homogeneous people … citizenship was only possible where it was least necessary, where politics was nothing more than the extension into the public arena of a common life that began and was sustained outside.”12 Research over the past 25 years has illustrated that socially cohesive societies have more effective democracies and perform better economically.13 Individuals’ social trust and the aggregate social trust in a community are associated with higher levels of happiness.14

On the other hand, the absence of social cohesion and the breakdown in social stability has led societies into civil war. This can cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars. The typical monetary cost of civil war for an affected country and its neighbors is estimated at approximately 64 billion USD (Collier, 2007). More generally, low social trust undermines institutional quality.15 Latent social conflict and social cleavages lower countries’ economic growth trajectories by weakening their ability to manage external shocks.16

Addressing social cohesion in refugee contexts is generally distinct from typical migration settings. Traditionally, policymaking has focused on assimilating immigrants into their host countries. Integration and cohesion policy was a central pillar of post-war policymaking in the period of immigrant settlement between 1948 and 1981. In this context, three questions about immigrants permeated the politics and policymaking of immigration: “Are they like us?” “Could they be made to be more like us?” and “Can we live together?”17 The assumption underpinning these policy goals was that refugees were permanently relocating and therefore would have to adopt the norms and values of their new home.

Assimilation is not the goal in most contemporary refugee contexts, including in Lebanon. The position of the Government of Lebanon (GoL) is that any form of local integration is unconstitutional and that the only durable is for Syrians displaced in Lebanon to safely return to their country of origin in accordance with international laws and norms, taking into full consideration the vital interests of the host country. Resettlement to third countries is seen as an alternative durable solution. In any refugee situation, the goal for the international community is the realization of durable solutions to the plight of refugees. While local integration is not an option for displaced Syrians in Lebanon, humanitarian concerns and social stability demands require that the dignity and well-being of displaced Syrians must be preserved until they can attain durable solutions outside of Lebanon.

Within this context, the goal of social stability policy in Lebanon is to mitigate the downside risk to the people of Lebanon, the effectiveness of the government, and the refugees caused by the massive influx of displaced Syrians. Strategies to reduce the prevalence and intensity of intergroup conflict are important for maintaining social stability and social cohesion alike. Large influxes of migrants (whether forced or voluntary) may strengthen distinctions between the different social contracts that different actors (e.g., citizens, legal residents, and illegal residents) have, increase the salience of group membership and social standing, drive economic inequality between high-skill and low skill workers, and threaten social commitment to equal opportunity. This

16 Rodrik (1999).
17 Saggar et al. (2012).
may lead to reductions in intergroup trust, empathy, and cooperation and increases in intergroup prejudice and violence. To maintain social stability, efforts should be made to protect healthy relations between the Syrian refugee population and the host community in Lebanon.

4. Measuring intergroup relations

Social stability, social cohesion, and intergroup relations can be measured using a wide variety of techniques in a wide variety of settings. Generally, intergroup relations can be examined in terms of implicit and explicit attitudes, beliefs and expectations about in-groups and out-groups, and in terms behavioral tendencies toward one another. Many of these can be measured in laboratory environments, online, over the phone, and through in-person interviews. The table below summarizes some of these methods.

Box 4. Approaches to measuring intergroup relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement method</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implicit association test</td>
<td>A measure from social psychology that can be used to test the strength of a person's automatic association between a social group and societal stereotypes. One of its strengths is that it enables researchers to overcome the challenge of social desirability bias assessing people's attitudes towards commonly stigmatized groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Trust scale</td>
<td>A measure aimed to quantify an individual's general level of trust toward other people. In particular, it measures two of the main factors that form general trust: (1) belief that other people are basically honest and (2) belief that trusting others is risky.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infra-humanization scale</td>
<td>A measure examining the degree to which individuals deny characteristics to out-groups that make us uniquely human, rendering them less than human, if not wholly non-human.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotype content model</td>
<td>A measure of individuals’ group stereotypes and interpersonal impressions along two dimensions: (1) warmth and (2) competence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator game</td>
<td>A behavioral game in which the first player, &quot;the dictator&quot;, decides how to split an amount of money between herself and the second player. To measure intergroup relations, individuals could play with in-group and out-group members. The average difference in individuals’ behavior when they are playing with in-group and out-groups would be a measure of intergroup social-preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust game</td>
<td>A behavioral game in which two players are paired and both are given a quantity of money. The first player is told that he or she must send some amount of money to the second player, though this amount may be zero. The first player is also told that the amount she or he chooses will be tripled by the experimenter, so the second player will receive triple the amount given by the first player. The second player is then told to make a similar choice. In the experiment, individuals would play with in-group and out-group members. The average difference in behavior would be a measure of intergroup social-preferences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The state of social stability in Lebanon

The 2017 UNDP-ARK perceptions survey offers a valuable snapshot on the state of social cohesion and social stability in Lebanon.\(^{18}\) Intergroup tension in the country is latent, but those latent sentiments are prevalent, and although they are stable some areas are at risk of descending into violence. Only 28% of Lebanese consider inter-community relations positive (though, nearly half of Syrians do, and only 10% of Lebanese characterize relations as “very negative”). Worryingly, individuals in some regions report a relatively high propensity for violence. Lebanese households with members working in agriculture, construction, or day labor are especially concerned about competition for jobs, though the concern extends to families that do not face high risk of job loss from Syrians.

Figure 4. Agreement with statement, “Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened”

While the basic group dynamic is between the Lebanese and Syrian populations, the Lebanese population is separated into highly distinct sub-groups: Shia, Sunni, Christian, and Druze. The forced displacement of Syrians has affected these relationships, too. The majority of Lebanese respondents to the 2017 UNDP-ARK perceptions survey (85.8%) believe that Lebanese from different confessions live peacefully among one another. In fact, most Lebanese believe that the relationship between different Lebanese confessional groups has improved or worsened since 2011. 67.3% of Lebanese reported that the relations between different Lebanese groups had become “better” or “much better” (see figure below). Christians and Druze respondents reported similar perceptions, with over 77% of Christian and Druze stating that the relations had gotten “better” or “much better.” However, only 43.4% of Shia respondents stated that the relationship between different groups had gotten “better” or “much better.” Also reflecting the perception of poor current relations in Baalbek-Hermel, only 24.5% of respondents in this governorate reported that relations had gotten “better” or “much better” since 2011.

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\(^{18}\) The data reported in this section come from the first wave of perceptions survey (ARK 2017).
Figure 5. Lebanese response to, “Since 2011, do you think that relations between different Lebanese groups have improved or worsened?”

The figure below attempts to map the key stakeholders affecting intergroup perceptions and relations. Respondents in the UNDP survey indicated low concern for the media, though this was something we identified as a concern during the fieldwork.

Figure 6. Stakeholder mapping
6. Operationalizing social stability policy in Lebanon

Multiple ongoing efforts are being led by the Lebanese government, the international community and local NGOs to address the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. In 2012 an inter-ministerial committee was formed to manage the Syrian crisis, and shortly after a platform managed by UNHCR was launched to coordinate all international aid partners activities. These efforts are coordinated through the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a multi-year program developed by the Government of Lebanon and the international partners to ensure a holistic, coordinated and integrated intervention. In 2017, 1.34 billion USD were received and allocated to programs i) ensuring protection of vulnerable populations, ii) providing immediate assistance to vulnerable populations, iii) supporting service provision through national systems, and iv) reinforcing Lebanon’s economic, social, institutional, and environmental stability. As illustrated in Figure 7, the funding is distributed across ten sectors. An interagency working group was established for each sector to better coordinate efficient and effective interventions.

Figure 7. 2017 Donor funding by sector (USD Million)

Source: UNHCR: 2017 End Year Statistical Dashboard, Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon

Donors have provided record levels of funding to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon; however, the funding remains insufficient to meet the growing needs of the crisis. As in previous years, only 48% of the funding required for 2017 was received (Figure 6). According to the 2017 annual Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) survey, 58% of households are now living in extreme poverty (an increase of 5% from the previous year) and 76% are living below the poverty line.

Source: 2017 End Year Statistical Dashboard, Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon.

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19 Source: 2017 End Year Statistical Dashboard, Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon.
While the funding targets specific sectors that address pressure points such as food security, education, basic assistance, and water, concerted efforts are being made to increase social stability in Lebanon (4% of funding in 2017). In this context, social stability is defined as “a state of intergroup relations at the community level, where sources of tension between groups are addressed and managed through formal institutions or systems to prevent them from resulting into collective violence, human rights abuses, or further loss of opportunities for vulnerable groups” (UNHCR, 2018). A total of 62 partner organizations are currently working under the guidance of the MoSA to support municipalities and local institutions in identifying priority interventions that are critical in maintaining social stability within the communities (UNHCR, 2018).

Given the delicate situation within the host communities, the 2017-2020 LCRP emphasizes the critical need to provide dialogue spaces for inter-community engagement and establish dispute resolution mechanisms. Activities include: i) analysis and mainstreaming; ii) youth empowerment; iii) dialogue and conflict prevention mechanisms; iv) support to other local institutions; and v) solid waste. Out of the 124 million USD funding requested for 2017, 49 million USD was received, targeting 183 out of the 251 vulnerable communities (UNHRC, 2018).

Large projects requiring coordination across multiple municipalities, such as solid-waste-management initiatives, have a significant role to play in these efforts. According to the 2017 Social Stability Dashboard, such projects have a positive effect on social stability and manage to reduce tensions, especially in small municipalities. Individuals who benefited from assistance displayed positive perceptions of institutions, less prejudice toward other communities, and less tendency to turn to violence (UNHCR, 2018).

Youth empowerment programs increase civic engagement and provide soft skills training. In 2017, more than 7,000 youths volunteered in local activities engaging with 50,000 youths in vulnerable cadasters (UNHRC, 2018). One such program is the National Volunteer Services Program (NVSP), supported by the World Bank, trained 3,200 youths across different regions in soft skills. These youths volunteered for 12 weekends in communities other than their own (World Bank, 2017b).

Projects such as establishment of conflict prevention mechanisms at the community level appear to have improved social stabilization by providing channels to defuse escalating tensions. 100 municipalities throughout the country have established local community led dialogue and conflict prevention mechanisms (UNHCR, 2018). Furthermore, 300 Social Development Center staff and 109 local CSOs were trained in conflict prevention. The 2017 Social Stability Dashboard highlighted two instances where these mechanisms defused
escalating tensions, one in Bekaa following host community frustration with Syrian competition with jobs, and another one in the Zgharta district following a murder incident in one of the towns (UNHCR, 2018).

The sector also provides critical support in analyzing and monitoring social stability dynamics and intercommunity tension. Among the deliverables are regular perception surveys such as VASyR, the Perception Surveys, the Stabilization Monitoring Surveys, and the Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice Survey. These surveys assess regularly situational changes and monitor social tension throughout Lebanon. The sector also maintains an interactive conflict map to track incidents, protests, and conflict within the communities (UNHCR, 2018).

These activities as well as ones from other sectors such as livelihood and education can provide entry points for behavioral interventions by appending or tweaking these programs based on insights from behavioral science.
III. Pressure points for social stability in Lebanon

This section analyzes the pressure points for social stability in Lebanon. Pressure points are areas identified as posing the most risk to social stability in the country. The analysis draws on desk-based research and fieldwork conducted in October 2017. The pressure points are analyzed to identify where social tension is highest and the risk of conflict emerging is most probable. We focus on the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the key actors determining social stability.

Pressure points are triggered by structural (economic and political) and behavioral (social and psychological) factors. Behavioral science classifies barriers or bottlenecks in two main categories: structural and behavioral. Shaped by standard economics, structural factors refer to economic, policy, or organizational practices that affect individual or societal well-being. These include but are not limited to jobs, housing, services, and security. These issues tend to be more visible and concrete.

Behavioral factors are viewed through the prisms of disciplines such as psychology, sociology, behavioral economics, and anthropology. By examining the social and psychological factors that drive people’s actions, this approach emphasizes the impact of context on individual decision-making and behavior. The report zooms in to identify the specific beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that affect social stability. It then zooms out to examine the social context in which attitudes are formed, beliefs are spread, and decisions are made. This analysis considers the role that norms, narratives, and identities have in shaping the quality of the relationship between refugees and Lebanese people.

A mix of structural and behavioral factors are the root of the social stability strain in Lebanon. On the structural front, the influx of the Syrian refugees has caused overcrowding, saturation of basic public services, and competition for jobs in Lebanon (World Bank, 2013). On the behavioral front, intergroup threat and compounded stress from uncertainty and fragile political stress has deteriorated the relationship between Syrian refugees, Lebanese host communities, and overall Lebanese society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bifurcated labor market</th>
<th>Overburdened service delivery</th>
<th>Perception of intergroup threat</th>
<th>Mental health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The UNDP perceptions survey finds that the labor market is the most commonly reported source of tension between Syrian refugees and the host population in Lebanon. Lebanese youth complain that Syrians work in sectors that they not legally permitted to work in and have caused wages to decline.</td>
<td>Public services, especially those services that are non-excludable such as public spaces, are considered to be under strain. Access to services has been source of tension. Many Syrians and Lebanese drop out of school early, due to transport costs or to support the family.</td>
<td>Lebanese and Syrians perceive the quality of their relationship differently. Syrians regard their relationship with Lebanese people to be positive. The Lebanese generally hold Syrians in low regard. Lebanese youth spend little time with Syrians and indicate little desire to do so.</td>
<td>The current crisis is creating the conditions for declining mental well-being amongst both Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth. Evidence suggests that rates of anxiety and depression among children and adolescents are very high. Implementation capacity in Lebanon is far below what is necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Weak and bifurcated labor market

Situational analysis

Seven years into the conflict, poverty levels are high, and long-term resilience is eroding as households exhaust savings and struggle to generate income. At present, 1.5 million Lebanese (and 470,000 Lebanese children) are estimated to live below the poverty line. The burden was not felt evenly – Syrians generally settled in areas with high rates of poverty and the most vulnerable communities are concentrated in specific pockets of the country: A large majority of deprived Lebanese (67%) and persons displaced from Syria (87%) live in the country’s 251 most vulnerable cadastres. In some locations, unemployment is almost double the national average. Most Lebanese households in these areas report a decrease in income over the past two years.

Livelihoods in Lebanon have been severely affected by the Syrian conflict, stunting growth in areas such as construction, industry, the service economy and tourism. Vulnerable populations in Lebanon face particular challenges in terms of livelihoods and income-generation opportunities – unemployment is 51% among the heads of vulnerable Lebanese households assessed by the NPTP. The youth unemployment rate in Lebanon is estimated to be over three times the national unemployment rate, while women are twice as likely to be unemployed as men. (World Bank, forthcoming).

The massive intake of refugees has created a newly bifurcated labor market. Syrian refugees now constitute a significant part of the Lebanese labor force, particularly in the sectors of construction, daily labor, agriculture, and manufacturing. As Figure 9 shows, recent estimates suggest that 384,000 Syrians are in the labor force in Lebanon constitutes an estimated people, of which about 30% are estimated to be employed. Recent estimates also indicate that up to 80,000 Syrians (mainly youth) are unemployed. Focus group interviews with Lebanese and Syrian youth indicated that Syrians work long hours for wages that are below the legal minimum and subsist in professional domains in which they are not lawfully permitted to work. Their working conditions are poor, and their job security is precarious. This dynamic has altered the power balance between Lebanese employers and workers. According to the 2018 LCRP, precarious residency permission, labor policies, and harsh market conditions compel Syrian refugees to resort to seeking illegal and exploitative labor to meet basic needs. Persons displaced from Syria face additional challenges accessing the formal labor market, which despite allowing access to the agriculture, construction and environment sectors, is very limited in practice due to onerous legal and administrative frameworks. Syrian refugees tend to have lower education levels, and due to the lack of formal job creation in the economy, they are constrained to work in the informal economy, competing with poor and vulnerable Lebanese.

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21 LCRP (2018) report that a national exercise in 2015 correlated poverty data and UNHCR registration data identified 251 cadastres as home to 87 percent of displaced Syrians and Palestine Refugees and 67 percent of deprived Lebanese.
24 UNDP Mind the Gap: A Labor Needs Assessment for Lebanon
28 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
29 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
30 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
Labor market conditions in Lebanon were already challenging prior to the Syrian crisis. Post-civil war, the Lebanese economy has experienced jobless economic growth, impacting mostly women and youth. Between 1997 and 2009, GDP grew at an average rate of 3.7% per year, while employment grew only 1.1%. Unemployment was around 11%, with job wait time close to 13 months for men and 10 months for women. Furthermore, 23,000 youths enter the labor market annually competing for 3,400 new jobs created each year. This does not factor in the influx of low-skill Syrians who had been working in Lebanon since the early 1990s. Estimates suggest Syrian workers constituted around 17% of the total labor force in the country, or around 300,000 workers pre-conflict. Syrian migrants were mainly employed in a restricted subset of occupations allowed by their work permits: construction, agriculture, and services. Since the crisis, many Syrians have not had access to permits.

The crisis has led to a substantial increase in the bargaining power of employers. According to the 2018 LCRP, the influx of Syrians has led to a large increase in labor supply and increased competition for low skill work, deterioration of average wages and increased risk of exploitative working conditions. During focus group discussions, Syrian youth reported that they or their family members were often forced to take on any work available due to their dire need. Both Syrians and Lebanese participants reported that Syrians are willing to work long hours and do any required tasks. Syrians are very unsatisfied with the working conditions. They complain of pay discrimination (which appears to be greater for females), harassment (physical or sexual for females), employment instability, and poor working conditions, including physically demanding work and long hours.

**Impact of livelihoods challenges on social stability**

The aggregate availability of jobs is overwhelmingly determined by structural conditions, but behavioral factors may affect the magnitude of impacts and shape how displacement is experienced. Both the ARK-UNDP survey...
and Aktis impact evaluation (2016) show starkly that jobs and the narratives surrounding their availability are the primary threat to social stability. During the focus-group discussions, the labor market was the most commonly reported source of tension between Syrian refugees and the host population in Lebanon. This is consistent with assessments by ILO and with data from the UNDP survey displayed below, which shows that the Lebanese and Syrians were primarily concerned with competition for low-skill jobs. These frustrations manifested in labor protests targeting Syrian workers’ shops in the first half of 2017.

Figure 10. Reported drivers of Lebanese/Syrian communal tensions

![Diagram showing reported drivers of communal tensions](image)

Source: UNDP (2017) Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon

Individuals’ expectations and beliefs regarding wages and jobs can affect the job search intensity of Lebanese youth, employers’ attitudes and behaviors towards Syrians, and community norms around treatment of Syrians. Low-skilled and economically vulnerable workers believe that their job opportunities, wages, and working conditions have declined. The World Bank estimated in 2013 that the crisis would push an additional 170,000 into poverty by end of 2014, and create an additional 220,000-324,000 unemployed Lebanese, primarily unskilled youth. Pre-crisis, entry-level wages for low-skill work were around 800 USD to 900 USD per month. Since the crisis, reports indicate that Syrian workers are generally paid a monthly wage of about 250 USD, which is 44% less than the minimum wage of 450 USD.

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40 2014 ILO Assessment of The Impact of Syrian Refugees In Lebanon and Their Employment Profile.
41 LCRP (2018) There were over 50 protests and/or municipal restrictions reported in first half of 2017.
42 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
43 World Bank 2013 MILES Report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior and attitudes</th>
<th>Hypothesized causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrians seek employment in areas that they are not legally permitted to work in</td>
<td>- Syrians cannot find jobs they are legally permitted to work in</td>
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<td>- Suspension of UNHCR registration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and challenges in residency and work permit regulations have discouraged Syrians from seeking jobs in domains that are legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employers prefer to hire undocumented Syrian workers than Lebanese workers</td>
<td>- Syrian workers can be hired at lower cost</td>
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<td>- 75% of Syrians are without legal residency (VASyR, 2017), giving employers more power to determine the working conditions of Syrian workers as compared with Lebanese workers</td>
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<td>- Syrians are perceived to have a better work ethic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employers pay Syrian workers wages below the legal minimum</td>
<td>- 75% of Syrians are without legal residency (VASyR, 2017), giving employers asymmetric power in negotiations</td>
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<td>- Employers may feel less social obligation to pay members outside their group a living wage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syrians work for wages that are lower than minimum wage</td>
<td>- Syrian workers have a very weak safety net and thus a very low reservation wage</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Syrian workers have low levels of human capital. Syrians’ peer groups accept these wages, keeping reference wages low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanese citizens believe that there have only been negative economic consequences as a result of the arrival of forcibly displaced Syrians in Lebanon</td>
<td>- The Lebanese economy and labor market have been negatively affected by the crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Information on the positive effects of the economy is rarely provided by media outlets</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lebanese filter out information inconsistent with the perspective that the impact of the economy is only negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanese youth lack agentic psycho-social beliefs in their job search</td>
<td>- Young people do not believe they can succeed in their job search</td>
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<td>- Young people give up on entry-level jobs with low pay without considering the long-term skills they provide</td>
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**Strategic response**

The Livelihoods Strategy within the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 seeks to alleviate of the socio-economic shock of the Syrian crisis on the most vulnerable groups, especially youth and women, by improving their access to income and employment. The sector aims to do so by supporting the creation and preservation of an average of 8,072 jobs per year until 2020 (75% of which will be created, 25% of which maintained). This would effectively triple the number of employment opportunities generated annually by the Lebanese economy pre-crisis, but also double the overall number of jobs created indirectly by the international response investments in other sectors.

Since 2015, Livelihoods partners have increased support to local economic development and support to small businesses and value chains. In addition, they have strengthened their analysis of market needs and aimed at providing integrated employability support through skills training, career guidance and internships to vulnerable groups, as well as short-term labor opportunities through work intensive projects. They have served over 50,000 direct beneficiaries and 1,824 small businesses reached since 2015. The experience providing market-based skills training highlighted the need for integrated programs with life-skills support, internship/apprenticeship schemes, and supports to transition to the labor market (either a job bridge or career guidance/job-matching). These programs focus on youth and women.

Support for Syrians will prioritize skills relevant to sectors in which they are legally permitted to work or that they will need upon potential post-conflict return. In recognition of the need for solutions that address the
vulnerabilities of all people in Lebanon, the Government of Lebanon made an amendment of the “pledge-not-to-work” into a “pledge to abide by Lebanese laws and regulation.” This will be done alongside skills leading to home-based opportunities, with a conflict-sensitive approach ensuring that competition with host communities is not exacerbated through such programs. In any case, it is crucial that the activities of the Livelihoods sector are balanced between stimulating the demand and supply side of the labor market, i.e. that the number of beneficiaries accessing the job market is matched by the number of jobs created or maintained, either through integrated programs or through a balance of interventions. To harmonize the content and modalities of non-formal skills trainings in the Livelihoods sector, guidelines will be elaborated by a dedicated task force composed of the most experienced partners (including line ministries, UN Agencies, NGOs and donors) in this field.

The link between Lebanon’s weak and bifurcated labor market and social stability can be examined by focusing on specific behavioral and attitudinal mechanism that have been observed in the field and desk research. The table below summarizes some variables and hypothesized causes.

2. Overburdened service delivery

Situational analysis

Public services are overstretched in Lebanon, with demand exceeding the capacity of institutions and the current infrastructure to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. Lack of access to public services afflict displaced Syrians and the local Lebanese population alike: in a 2017 survey, 58% of Lebanese indicated that they did not use any public services in the last three months.44

Access to comprehensive primary healthcare as well as hospital and advanced referral care is still lacking in Lebanon, where the healthcare sector remains underfunded: $100m was received in 2017, a mere 32% of the $308m total appeal.

In energy, the Lebanese Government’s 2010 Policy Paper for the electricity sector identified a deficit in installed generating capacity,45 a deficit that has only worsened with the 486 MW increase in production capacity required as a result of the 1.5 million estimated displaced Syrians.46 More than 45% of Syrian households are illegally connected the national grid, leading the Government to incur uncovered costs, a problem accentuated by the lack of funding – in 2017, only $3m of funding was received of total required of $99m. Insufficient electricity supply has forced Lebanese and Syrians alike to further rely on environmentally unfriendly private generators. As such, five partners actively implemented projects in the energy sector in 2017 to install renewable energy equipment and rehabilitate electric distribution networks.

With regards to water, sanitation, and hygiene, 64% of the Lebanese population does not have access to safely managed drinking water services: over half of all water supply networks are past their useful life, and only 3% of wastewater is treated for bacteriological contamination prior to discharge into the ground.47

Impact of service delivery on social stability

Despite the considerable resources and effort being put into service delivery by the GoL and its international partners, many basic public services are regarded as unsatisfactory. Health services, social services, and public

47 UNICEF and WHO Joint Monitoring Program (2016).
and recreational space are regarded most poorly. The most commonly reported explanations for the limited access to services in the UNDP-ARK survey were corruption and quality of services.

Lebanese attitudes to access to services are complicated. While roughly half of Lebanese respondents to the UNDP-ARK survey ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘international aid/assistance goes to the people who most deserve it’, the vast majority of individuals believe that vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programs. While anecdotal, the participants in our focus group sessions and expert interviews reported Lebanese believe that Syrians cause backlogs in the national system, while having better and free access to services from international providers.

The Lebanese commonly hold misperceptions about the benefits that Syrians are receiving. During the focus groups, Lebanese respondents believed that the Syrians are entitled to financial aid amounting to about 100 USD per family, in addition to free healthcare, housing, water, electricity, education, fuel for heating, and food stamps. A local government official interviewed during one of the focus groups field visits stated that, money to cover these services had existed at the start, but funding has decreased significantly. Out of all the Syrians interviewed in the focus group, only two were receiving any financial assistance. In fact, in 2017, only 56,820 households (out of 195,776 severely vulnerable) received cash assistance monthly, and 188,706 received seasonal cash transfers or vouchers. There is a disconnect between what Lebanese believe Syrians are receiving as financial assistance and the reality.

**Figure 11. Perception of international aid/assistance to vulnerable Lebanese**

![Perception of international aid/assistance to vulnerable Lebanese](source)

*Source: UNDP (2017) Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon*

The link between Lebanon’s overburdened service delivery and social stability can be examined by focusing on specific behavioral and attitudinal mechanism that have been observed in the field and desk research. The table below summarizes some variables and hypothesized causes.

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50 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
51 Sentiments reported in focus group discussions.
52 UNHCR: Basic Assistance: End Year 2017 Dashboard Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/62228
### Behavior and attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesized causes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- There are insufficient resources to meet demand</td>
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<td>- Common pool resources are not always well managed</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Where donor funding is available to cover services to Syrians, service providers give priority to Syrians</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Some of these services are free of charge to Syrians while poor Lebanese have to pay</td>
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Lebanese are unhappy with the availability of common pool resources such as water, housing, electricity, and health services

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Lebanese and Syrians leave school prematurely</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Limited school availability for Syrians</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Some teachers and school administrators discriminate or discourage Syrians to stay in school</td>
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<tr>
<td>- There are economic pressures at home for both Syrians and Lebanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transport costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of psychosocial supports</td>
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Lebanese and Syrians leave school prematurely

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanese overestimate the level of support that Syrians receive through international donor funding</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The crisis in Lebanon has dramatically affected vulnerable Lebanese but much of the attention, especially from international media and institutions, focuses on vulnerable refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lebanese generally believe that Syrians receive generous support from international donors. Yet 28% of refugee households rely on WFP assistance and most Syrians are sinking deeper into dept. 58% of Syrian refugee households are not spending enough to meet the basic needs for survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- While information on the support provided by international donors is publicly available, it is not disseminated or covered consistently by the media</td>
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Lebanese overestimate the level of support that Syrians receive through international donor funding

### Strategic response

Efforts to improve the provision of public services have been via government organizations and NGOs. In **education**, the Ministry of Education (MEHE) and other Education Partners (the number of partners vary between regions, with about 10-15 partners in most regions, and highest concentrations in Mount Lebanon and Bekaa) are working to enhance access to formal and regulated non-formal education for 586,540 registered displaced Syrian children (3-18 years of age), 57,506 Palestine refugees, and 451,323 vulnerable Lebanese children. A total of 431,306 children were provided access to quality basic education through the distribution of teaching material, subsidization of school cost, and the opening of 349 second shift schools and transportation. The World Bank’s Emergency Education System Stabilization Project aims to support this, providing financing for school operating costs at the level of the school in order to improve the learning environment and responses to the continued influx of Syrian refugee children. The Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) Program also addresses this through a three-pronged goal of (i) equitable access, (ii) enhanced quality, and (iii) strengthened systems, funneling an investment of 234M USA into the education sector. Furthermore, the MEHE held a year-long Back to School campaign, reaching out to 69,000 households to target children in hard-to-reach-areas, as well as a cash assistance program for families in poverty, in response to negative attitudes to education. As a result, the 2017/2018 school year witnessed a 13% increase in enrolment of non-Lebanese children and a 3% increase in enrolment of Lebanese children in public Basic Education schools, and there was a 26% increase in secondary education enrolment. Yet, despite promising efforts and funding for education – 260 million USD was received in 2017, about 70% of the required 373 million USD – it is estimated that half of the displaced Syrian children remain out of certified education. Major challenges to education that remain are

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54 World Bank Emergency Education System Stabilization Project (P152898).
55 World Bank Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon Support Project (P159470).
56 UNHCR Lebanon Interagency 2017 Education Dashboard.
three-fold: (i) there is a language barrier, as the Lebanese curriculum is taught in French and English, whilst students in Syria learn Arabic; (ii) the numerous unregistered Syrian learning centers in Lebanon, though instrumental to providing education to refugees, have no official framework of regulation and student certification and can halt future access to livelihood opportunities for their students; and (iii) families in dire economic situations often rely on their children to earn money, so child labor becomes a major barrier to school enrolment and attendance.

In healthcare, there are positive results to the efforts of 46 organizations: a total of 1,881,702 subsidized primary health care consultations were provided through both fixed health facilities as well as mobile medical unit, attaining 85% of the sector target of 2,214,286 subsidized consultations. Yet, as a result of insufficient funding, many referrals to secondary healthcare were not covered by partners, including serious chronic conditions (e.g. dialysis for chronic renal failure) as well as catastrophic illnesses (e.g. cancer). Another challenge for the future is the strain on overburdened hospital facilities: in some cases, utilization has increased 50% since the onset of the crisis, resulting in delayed treatment – for example, the limited number of hospital beds constrains in-patient psychiatric care for displaced Syrian patients. Other concerns also include expanding routine vaccination for children, as well as increasing access for Syrian women to ante-natal and post-natal care – in 2017, there was an increase in newborn deaths amongst displaced Syrians that were relatively higher than neonatal mortality amongst Lebanese. World Bank efforts to improve healthcare included the Lebanon Health Resilience Project, which aims to expand the scale of PHC services by increasing the number of contracted network Primary Health Care Centers from 75 to 204, and strengthen the capacity of newly contracted PHCCs to provide quality care – including the provision of immunization and reproductive health packages. The Emergency Primary Healthcare Restoration Project also seeks to provide essential healthcare services for poor Lebanese affected by the influx of Syrian refugees through packages of preventive, primary, and ambulatory care.

In energy, the World Bank has bolstered these efforts with the Environmental Pollution Abatement Project, which aims to strengthen the capacity of Ministry of Environment through technical support and training as well as provide concessional loans of at least $100,000 to 20-25 enterprises to implement pollution control projects in order to bring air emissions, effluent discharges, and industrial waste generation towards compliance. The PCB Management in the Power Sector Project also aims to dispose of high risk PCBs and improve the inventory management of transformers in the power sector in an environmentally sound manner. Yet the main issue with the energy sector remains the lack of funding – going forward, the main challenge of the sector remains the need to raise funds and advocate the importance of the sector.

In the area of water, sanitation, and hygiene, recognizing the need for urgent action, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MOEW) developed the 2010 National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS) and launched several priority infrastructure projects, including the Canal 800 Irrigation project, Environmental Pollution Abatement Project and other water, wastewater and storage infrastructure. The Lebanon Water Project was started with USAID in 2013 to address infection and diseases caused by poor water quality in 1,200 schools across the country, installing new water tanks and updated filtration systems. The World Bank has also made efforts in water supply: the Great Beirut Water Supply project and Lebanon Water Supply Augmentation Project have both increased the provision of potable water to residents in the Beirut region and created short-term labor-intensive jobs for the construction of the Bisri Dam, pipelines to existing reservoirs, and hydropower plants. This will help ensure that the 1.6 million people living in the Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon area have improved access to safe and clean water.

57 UNHCR Lebanon Interagency 2017 Healthcare Dashboard.
58 World Bank Lebanon Health Resilience Project (P163476).
60 World Bank Environmental Pollution Abatement Project (P143594).
61 World Bank PCB Management in the Power Sector Project (P122540).
62 UNHCR Lebanon Interagency 2017 Energy Dashboard.
63 World Bank Lebanon-Water Supply Augmentation Project (P125184).
3. Perception of intergroup threat

Situational analysis

Perceptions of intergroup threat reduce social cohesion and social stability between groups. Individuals experience intergroup threat when members of one group perceive that another group can cause them harm (physical, material, integrity, value system, or identity) (Nelson, 2009). The threat can be realistic, threatening economic livelihood, health, safety, or well-being of individuals. It can also be symbolic, affecting the value system, self-esteem, standards, or identity of individuals. When people experience realistic or symbolic threats from other groups, the affective response (psychological state such as emotions and mood given the situation) and cognitive responses (thoughts that occur while we are listening to someone talk) are likely to be negative (Nelson, 2009).

Different types of threats dominate the Lebanese discourse regarding Syrians. One is the economic threat, impacting the availability of jobs, access to public services, and basic needs of Lebanese (food, housing, health, and education). This threat is salient and impacting the everyday lives of already vulnerable Lebanese. The other threat is symbolic, where vulnerable Lebanese feel that the presence of the Syrians within their communities is a threat to their self-esteem, perception of power, and culture. Other Lebanese not directly impacted by the Syrian refugees (middle class or affluent Lebanese or others living in areas not hosting Syrian refugees), are experiencing symbolic threat, where they perceive the large presence of Syrian refugees in the country as a threat to their identity, culture, and relationship with the other confessional groups. Threat perceptions often motivate expression of anti-outgroup prejudice and behavior (Nelson, 2009) and increase mistrust of outgroups.

The Lebanese civil war (1975-90) and subsequent Syrian occupation (1990-2005) are important factors that have undermined trust. Syria has played a major role during the civil war and afterwards. Syria influenced the everyday lives of Lebanese (economically, politically and security), with power tilting in favor of Syria. The Syrian crisis and overflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon has created a perception of asymmetric power, where the power appears to have shifted towards Lebanese. While Lebanese are divided in their allegiance towards Syrians, this shift in power has fueled further the mistrust and intolerance of Lebanese towards Syrians. The 2017 UNDP perception survey shows that this effect of political events on trust is widespread throughout the nation (Figure 11). The focus groups discussion revealed that, the negative view of Syrians has persisted despite most focus-group participants being born after the civil war. Some participants reported that their parents taught them to be wary of Syrians due to the occupation after the civil war. The threat of Syrians staying in Lebanon, and what it could mean for national stability and economic prosperity, increased the anxiety and stress of an already fragile society. When asked where the Syrians should live if they were to stay, the Lebanese respondents said they should live in their own camps. They felt that the Syrians “hated” them and would not reciprocate if they became refugees themselves.
Lebanese perceive symbolic threats as well, targeting their culture and way of life. Lebanese focus groups participants expressed a wide variety of complaints: “Syrian men harass Lebanese women”; “Lebanese men take Syrian women as second wives”; “Syrians crowd houses and lack hygiene”; “Syrian children cause conflicts”; “Syrians host sleeper terrorists”; “Syrians stay out late at night and cause trouble.” Many Lebanese women in the focus groups didn’t feel that Syrians were respecting or adapting to the country’s norms.

Lebanese youth spend little time with Syrians. The focus groups discussions revealed that not many Lebanese have Syrian friends. One man responded to a question about this with “thank god no!” When asked when they had encountered Syrians, they report that they had contact through vocational training or work but that their interactions are very limited. They avoid speaking with them in the seminars.

**Impact of intergroup threat on social stability**

Negative attitudes manifest themselves in antisocial behavior. The UNDP perception survey indicates that over 29% of Syrians have personally experienced or witnessed a physical or verbal harassment, an increase in 10 points from previous survey conducted in the same year (Figure 12). In some areas in the South, up to 50% of Syrians reported experiencing or witnessing harassment (UNHCR, 2018). Syrians report having taken action based on harassment, and roughly 50% report having done nothing. When seeking help, Syrians rely on neighbors and social networks rather than the police or local authorities.
Figure 13. Syrians face high levels of verbal harassment

Source: UNDP (2017) Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon

The attitudes and beliefs of Lebanese youths toward Syrians may undermine social stability. The beliefs of Lebanese are shaped by salient and shocking events, the persistent effects of which are amplified by social media and news. As evidence for their fear, most Lebanese focus group participants gave an example of a rape and murder of a girl by a Syrian refugee that had occurred in early October 2017. Such incidents trigger Lebanese living in municipalities hosting Syrians to demand eviction of Syrians from their towns (Reuters, 2017). According to 2017-2020 LCRP, 75,000 individuals felt they threatened by security related evictions (UNHCR, 2018).

The link between the intergroup threat and social stability can be examined by focusing on specific behavioral and attitudinal mechanism that have been observed in the field and desk research. The table below summarizes some variables and hypothesized causes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior and attitudes</th>
<th>Hypothesized causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lebanese youth hold negative views about Syrians | - Lebanese worry that Syrians’ culture has a harmful effect on Lebanese culture  
- Lebanese parents teach their children not to trust Syrians  
- Lebanese youth consume media that uniformly reports negative stories about Syrians |
| Lebanese media depict stories that magnify the perceptions of problems | - Media outlets have incentives to run sensational stories drive readership, viewership, and listenership, as well as confirm political agenda |
| Lebanese spend little time with Syrians | - Youths’ peer groups may socially sanction them for doing so  
- Their cultures and preferred activities are different |
| Some Lebanese have normalized harassment behaviors | - A small number of harassers believe that their behavior is normatively permissible |
| Lebanese local communities continue to pressure local governments to evict Syrians | - There are ongoing threats to evict Syrians. Haddath (Baabda district North of Lebanon) was the first district to enforce such eviction in October 2017 |

**Strategic response**

Current interventions to improve social stability have shown positive results in managing the delicate situation, especially in the host communities. As illustrated in the 2017-2020 LCRP, the conflict resolutions mechanisms have managed to lessen the negative impact and spillover effect of events such as job threats and shocking incidents. Furthermore, contact interventions such as joined skills training or social events have improved relationship between individuals. During the focus groups, when asked whether all Syrians were “bad,” few Lebanese identified some Syrians that they regarded positively.

While these interventions have positive impact at the individual level, they do not appear to shift the Lebanese perception towards Syrians as a group. Most focus groups participants who experienced positive relationships with Syrians still felt threatened by Syrians and wanted them to exit Lebanon. This is most likely due to the overall symbolic threat that the large presence of Syrians poses to Lebanese. The long Syrian presence in Lebanon and the uncertainty of its resolution has created further stress and salient fear for Lebanese.

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan outlines three areas to address intergroup tension:

1. Increase legitimacy of public institutions: If public service delivery is improved based on local participatory processes, then the legitimacy of public institutions, particularly municipalities, is strengthened, and resource pressure is decreased.

2. Create opportunities for dialogue: If local communities, municipalities and national institutions have the capacities to address sources of tensions through dialogue, then these institutions and actors are empowered, and conflict is prevented.

3. Enhance the capacity for early warning and conflict sensitive programming: If LCRP partners are trained on do-no-harm approaches and provided with early warning information, then partners have the capacity to
mainstream sensitivity to the local context throughout the response informing both stabilization and humanitarian interventions.

4. Declining mental health / growth of mental illness

The three pressure points outlined above affecting social stability in Lebanon also have a pivotal role in influencing the mental well-being of diverse population segments impacted. As such, declines in mental health for both Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth populations may be attributed to these and other risk factors outlined below.

Situational analysis

The crisis has put the mental well-being of Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth at risk. Children and adolescents living through violence and conflict are exposed to high levels of traumatic experiences, contributing to the onset of mental, behavioral and emotional illnesses (Dimitry, 2012). The probability of developing a mental disorder increases when exposed to war events (Karam et al, 2008). In 2012, a study conducted by the American University of Beirut (AUB) found that 26.1% of children and adolescents in Lebanon experienced a psychiatric disorder and 13.1% encountered anxiety disorders; of those, only 6% sought treatment (Maalouf et al, 2016). A more recent study conducted in 2016 examined the prevalence of mental health disorders in Lebanese children and adolescents; the findings revealed that 50.7% experience anxiety, 13.3% experience depression, and 5.7% are coping with PTSD (Karam et al, 2016). The unpredictability and instability of the present context contributes to rising anxiety levels and worries about the future for Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth. The table below reports prevalence rates of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in both populations.

Figure 14. Prevalence of mental health disorders among Lebanese and Syrian children and adolescents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental health outcomes</th>
<th>Prevalence (%)</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety (SCARED rating ≥30)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression (CDI rating &gt; 20)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD (RI rating &gt; 37)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SCARED, Screen for Child Anxiety Related Disorders: CDI, Children’s Depression Inventory: PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, RI, Child/Adolescent PTSD Reaction Index

Years of confrontation unfolding within and around Lebanon, coupled with complex challenges arising from a mass inflow of Syrian refugees are raising concerns and uncertainty about the future for Lebanese youth (Shaar, 2013; Cherri et al, 2016; VASYR, 2017). Though still determined and hopeful, Lebanese youth also worry about their ability to obtain stable, high-quality employment, and have concerns about the delayed transition to adulthood and family formation.

Exposure to displacement, insecurity and the loss of lives are contributing to an increased prevalence of mental illnesses among Syrian refugee youth (Hassan et al, 2015). This segment is experiencing rising levels of depression, fear, anxiety, isolation and stress, which are contributing to a loss of identity and sense of hopelessness about the future (Robinson et al, 2015). A study exploring the prevalence of mental disorders among Syrian children and adolescents found that they are experiencing high levels of anxiety (56%), depression (16.8%), and PTSD (4.7%) (Karam et al, 2016). The tragedies and violent conflicts of the Syrian war, including

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64 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.

65 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.
experiences of mass displacement, are etched into the memories of Syrian refugee youth, who struggle to cope with the past while navigating the realities of their new lives in Lebanon.66

Present social and economic challenges in Lebanon are affecting youth mental well-being. Extensive research has found that poverty, unemployment, low educational attainment, social inequality and discrimination are strong risk factors for developing common mental disorders (Allen et al, 2014). Several of these factors are prevalent within the Lebanese context today and affect different segments of the youth population. Poverty figures for both segments suggest that 27% of Lebanese households live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2016), while a staggering 76% of Syrian refugee households fall in this category. Supporting household finances while pursuing education continues to be a high priority for both Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth. Though the situation is improving, Syrian refugee youth report experiencing obstacles in accessing educational opportunities due to discrimination, low school capacity, language barriers, transportation costs and school fees (where applicable). Perceptions of injustice, unfairness, and discrimination are also known to have adverse effects on self-reported mental health indicators, including higher levels of depression, anxiety and a sense of hopelessness. As both youth segments experience their respective social and economic hardships, the likelihood of each developing or sustaining mental illnesses markedly increases.

**Impact of mental health on social stability**

The prevalence of mental illness is contributing to social instability in Lebanon. A series of environmental, social and economic factors are intensifying levels of mental illness in Lebanon, both for Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth populations. The consequences of increased mental illness contribute to rising health care demands and costs; loss of wages, economic productivity and growth; and experimentation with negative coping mechanisms - including destructive behaviors that affect social stability.

When tangible opportunities to enhance one’s social and economic well-being are not present, and when support services are inaccessible or ineffective, hopelessness sets in. This trend is leading youth to experiment with negative coping mechanisms including drug and alcohol abuse and addiction, self-harming behaviors and suicidal thoughts. Stakeholders working in youth development have found that substance abuse and addiction among youth in Lebanon are on the rise. According to a 2014 study, 41% of Syrian refugee youth reported having thoughts about taking their own lives (UNICEF, 2014). It is deeply concerning to observe these realities unfold, particularly when hope fades and no alternatives can be found to pursue constructive, meaningful endeavors.

If left untreated, poor mental health could trigger violence and threaten social stability. Depression in adolescents and young adults is associated with violent outcomes (Yu et al, 2017). Research suggests that the risk of violent crime in individuals with depression is around three times higher than in those without, and is increased twofold in depression sufferers compared to their siblings without depression (Fazel et al, 2017).

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66 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.
Strategic response

Mental health services are being extended to both segments of the youth population through public, private, and civil institutions. There are, however, some notable data gaps making it difficult to assess the capacity and quality of services being rendered. These challenges include: verifying MHPSS service capacity and demand; extent of service access barriers including stigma, information and transport constraints; and determining the quality, standards, and efficacy of support and treatment provided through various interventions (particularly for private and non-governmental organizations). From a capacity perspective, there are an estimated 0.87 to 1.26 psychiatrists and 1.65 to 3.42 psychologists working in Lebanon per 100,000 people (WHO, 2014). In total, there are 15.27 mental health workers per 100,000 people, including public, private and NGO mental health services. The capacity constraints of public mental health services, personal awareness of mental disorders, costs of private sector treatment, and the stigma associated with disclosing mental illnesses are some of the barriers preventing individuals from accessing mental health support. It is estimated that 9 out 10 Lebanese who have mental disorders are not receiving treatment, while more than 90% of the mental health services that are provided are delivered through the private sector - thus paid with out-of-pocket fees (Ministry of Public Health, 2015). Efforts to boost the capacity of primary health care workers to offer mental health support are underway by the Ministry of Public Health. To date, 800 health workers supporting 300 primary health care centers (PHC), have received initial training on mental healthcare through the WHO Mental Health Gap Action Programme.

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67 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.
(mhGAP), while an additional 50 have received advanced training. This training, combined with initiatives to embed the delivery of mental health packages across 40 PHCs over the next four years, will strengthen the public health care system in addressing the growing need for mental health treatments (UNHCR, 2018).

An estimated 1121 mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) activities were deployed in 2014-15, with the goal of serving nearly 4 million Lebanese and 1.1 million Syrian refugees (Ministry of Public Health, 2015). More recent figures suggest that 31,994 specialized mental health consultations took place between January to September 2017, for vulnerable segments of the population. The number of youth who actually benefited from these activities, and the extent to which the programs achieved their goal of addressing their mental health challenges, is unclear. Some MHPSS activities use international best practices, offer comprehensive training and employ rigorous evaluation methods, and were identified as providing quality and effective support. Other interventions were not as well-regarded. Some NGOs purported to deploy a “parachute-style” approach to MHPSS services. The staff of these organizations were noted to have had limited training and understanding of the issues, as well as minimal cultural context and technical know-how, resulting in treatment that worsened youths’ mental health challenges and discredited both the field and intervention approaches. The stigma associated with disclosing mental health issues serves as a significant barrier for some youth to reveal their illness or seek treatment when needed. Positive narratives to shift the social perceptions of mental disorders, or stress the importance of mental health and well-being, could have a marked impact in reducing stigma and increasing the uptake of treatment by youth.68

The application of psychosocial support (PSS) can facilitate wider dialogue between groups and improve the mental well-being of diverse youth populations. Youth desire safe spaces that enable candid and constructive dialogue. They welcome creative approaches to delivering PSS services in a way that eliminates stigma. Some youth called for ongoing, rather than periodic, PSS initiatives that afford opportunities for civic leadership and empowerment, including pathways to generating income. Such programs could restore individual dignity, foster hope, and instill a sense of purpose, thereby improving overall mental well-being and coping skills.69

An emerging set of innovative initiatives that provide psychosocial support, technical training and economic opportunities hold promise in providing marginalized youth with positive alternatives to the difficult circumstances many endure. One example contributing to social inclusion between youth from differing regions, as well as enabling the development of essential skills (i.e., soft-skills, entrepreneurship, etc.) is the National Volunteer Service Program (World Bank, 2016). This program facilitates community development and youth empowerment, while simultaneously promoting social cohesion among different segments of youth (i.e., geographic, confession, ethnic, income, etc.). Another example that has demonstrated strong potential is a joint initiative between UNICEF and the Digital Opportunity Trust (DOT) Lebanon to support technology training and entrepreneurship through the Innovation Labs Network and Digital Youth Project. This initiative equips youth with essential digital literacy training, and then helps them obtain employment that harnesses their newly developed skills (e.g., micro-jobs, freelancing, data analytics). These opportunities are extended to Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian and other youth segments, bringing about a renewed sense of dignity and hope, constructive pathways, and tangible outcomes to improve the quality of their lives.70

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68 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.
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70 Sentiments shared by Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth and key stakeholders during focus group sessions.
IV. Behavioral solutions for enhancing social stability

This section introduces possible behavioral solutions to the behavioral bottlenecks discussed in the previous section. The proposed ideas are intended to serve as a starting point for exploring ways to improve existing programs or establish new ones. Further detailed discussions are needed to design and shape the solutions based on the local context. The proposed solutions will be evaluated based on feasibility (cost and political support), impact (effect size, evidence and scalability), and sustainability. While each proposed solution is meant as a standalone intervention, taking a holistic approach where multiple interventions are implemented to address each tension point will most likely result in greater positive impact to social stability. Additional detail regarding each solution is available in Annex 6.

Overview of Strategic Solutions by Target Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target level</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Intervention ideas</th>
<th>Possible Entry points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase inter-communal trust via film and narratives that promote hope and common identity</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote positive stories on intergroup stability through art and media awards</td>
<td>NVSP, NGOs, Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase access to mental health support through Youth Community Platform</td>
<td>UNDP, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve decision making and use of heuristics for community influencers through training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduce anxiety from intergroup threat through prosocial messages on public posters</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase social stability by recognizing youth entrepreneurs that promote tolerance and cooperation</td>
<td>New projects (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Encourage employers to adopt prosocial behaviors through socially recognizing positive deviant employers</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(employers)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve social stability by encouraging public-private partnerships for service delivery including social entrepreneurship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduce anxiety and mental health issues by extending support through existing youth interventions</td>
<td>NVSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduce anxiety and stress, and increase resilience by embedding psycho-social supports into employment projects</td>
<td>Livelihood projects, World Bank, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve decision making and use of heuristics by embedding training in employment projects</td>
<td>World Bank, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Encourage bystander intervention to harassment and negative behaviors by training prosocial individuals on effective intervening methods</td>
<td>UNICEF and Dot Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many Lebanese worry that the economic, social, and political turmoil is uprooting their culture and way of life. Part of the reason for such intense worries may be that news organizations report negative news in greater detail than they do positive news. Without alternative sources of publicly available information, Lebanese may overestimate the dangers associated with refugees.

To provide alternative perspectives to the negative stories that foment intergroup threat and undermine mental health, new perspectives could be highlighted through film about the situation, beliefs, attitudes, and hopes of Syrians and Lebanese, highlighting underreported information about the Syrian population. For example, it could tell stories of Syrians who receive no international aid; who want to return to Syria to rebuild their homeland; who are extremely grateful for the hospitality of Lebanese. It could also report the perspectives of Lebanese who believe that Syrians are trustworthy; that Syrians want to return home; and that helping the Syrians has shown the strength of Lebanese society.

Idea # 1 Increase inter-communal trust via film and narratives that promote hope and common identity
The use of mass media has been found to be an effective tool in reducing social instability. In a randomized experiment, Rwandese communities listened to radio soap operas containing messages about social conflict and resolution (the treatment group) or reproductive health (the control group). Results from interviews, focus groups, role-playing exercises, and unobtrusive measures of collective decision-making indicated that the treatment program changed people’s perceptions of social norms regarding the appropriateness of open expression and dissenting behavior (Paluck and Green 2009a). Interestingly, the intervention altered perceptions both of norms and of individual behavior, even though individual attitudes were unchanged. The implication is that targeting social norms may be a more fruitful avenue for changing prejudiced behaviors than targeting personal beliefs, although the staying power of such interventions needs further investigation. Radio soap operas are especially interesting because they changed people’s perceptions of norms in conflict areas, whereas an extensive review of the literature indicates that many other policies aimed at reducing prejudice have been ineffective (Paluck and Green 2009b).

A film articulating the nuanced experiences and perspectives of vulnerable Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees could be produced. Its intention would be to give voice to ordinary people’s hopes and fears, to articulate the challenges they face daily, and to provide testimony to the extraordinary compassion of ordinary Lebanese who have welcomed so many vulnerable refugees to Lebanon. In doing so, it could also share information on the economic reality for Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees, the contexts in which they engage in problematic behaviors, and to articulate Syrians hope to return to Syria to rebuild their country.

The project could involve experts in the field (such as BBC Media Action, experts in the use of communication to affect policy goals), local media companies, and one of the international implementation partners currently working in Lebanon. To design the film, the project would also involve academic experts in the use of film in policy. As an entry point, the NVSP could leverage its network to identify appropriate implementing partners to identify appropriate venues for viewing the soap opera in local community halls. This could be complimented with a platform enabling early pilot viewership.

The intervention would be evaluated in three stages: Online testing and piloting, a clustered field trial, and longitudinal study at the national level.

**Stage 1:** Different plots, narratives, and character developments could be experimented with online with a sample of Lebanese youths.

**Stage 2:** The finalized film could be shared in community halls using a clustered randomized control design.

**Stage 3:** The film could be introduced at scale, replicating the most effective designs identified during the two previous piloting stages.

The approximate size of the online sample would be 1,500 (stage 1). The approximate size of the field trial would be 4,000 (stage 2).

**Idea # 2 Reduce anxiety from perceived intergroup threat through prosocial messages on public posters**

A powerful example of using public posters to shift mindsets and activate norms comes from an effort to reduce traffic deaths. In Kenya, it is well-known that passengers in minibuses are particularly vulnerable to being killed in traffic accidents. To reduce accidents, passengers were reminded of their right to a safe ride on public transportation. Stickers posted in the buses encouraged passengers to “heckle and chide” reckless drivers (see Figure 9 below). The intervention was a remarkable success. Insurance claims involving injury and death fell by half. The cost per year for a life saved was about 5.80 USD, making the program even more cost-effective than childhood vaccination, one of the most cost-effective health interventions available.
Posters could be designed to depict hopeful and underreported narratives from Lebanese and Syrians (20 Lebanese posters, 20 Syrian posters). Each design would include a picture of a Lebanese and Syrian men and women of different ages. Some posters would have one person. Some posters would have 3 people. Each design would include a statement aimed at publicizing an underreported narrative – for example, a Syrian man might say “I want to return to my homeland to rebuild it.” Underneath the statement, a simple statement would be highlighted: Most young Syrian men want to return home.

The NVSP could leverage its network to identify appropriate implementing partners working on the ground across Lebanon to ensure that posters are placed in appropriate places.

This intervention would have two phases – a design phase and a macro-impact evaluation phase. Narratives could be tested in mobile labs in the design phase. In the macro-evaluation phase, the intervention could be tested using a clustered RCT, distributed across the 1108 municipalities. The sample would be stratified according to socioeconomic welfare and the number of refugees in each zone. Data from the UNDP tension map and the perceptions survey could be used throughout the intervention (from baseline through intermediary phases to end line) to assess impacts on social tension. Administrative data could be collected to identify community level statistics.

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Many individuals report a strained relationship between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community members. Some Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese have expressed being mistreated and discriminated against by community influencers (for example, teachers, government officials, service delivery staff, and community leaders). While individuals might have explicit biases towards members of an outgroup, most people are not aware of the implicit biases they might have. Biases influence how individual make decisions. They are often subconscious, defined by how we interpret the world and internalize the interpretations. While most help us navigate through our days and optimizing effort of decision making, some can negatively affect how we judge others and take in information. This could be a hidden threat to intergroup relations.

To equip Lebanese and Syrians with tools and strategies to combat biases and prejudices they might experience, trainings could be developed for community leaders to manage their biases. Because they play an important role in the community, influencing and setting the tone of what is an acceptable way to treat and talk about certain groups, their beliefs and behavior towards Syrian refugees can be perceived by members of the community as a role model for themselves.

**Idea #3 Improve decision making and use of heuristics for community influencers through training**

A program to reduce bullying in the United States offers a compelling example. Popular students were enlisted to tackle harassment. They wrote and read aloud essays about harassment, performed skits, and sold wristbands to discourage bullying. When their behavior changed, their peers did too. Six months after the intervention, teachers were 33% more likely to identify students with ties to social referents as defenders of other students from harassment, and 88% less likely to identify students with ties to social referents as contributors to negative school environment.\(^{71}\)

Trainings could be provided for community influencers to help them role model good behavior in the community and signal acceptable and unacceptable behaviors and norms. As an example, trainings might be made available to teachers, government officials, service delivery staff, and community leaders. Most individuals are not aware of their own biases. Research has shown that implicit bias can be reduced through a combination of awareness of bias, concerns about what effects the bias has, and what strategies to use to reduce bias. These strategies could include perspective taking, counter-stereotyping, and encouraging a more empathetic mindset.

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\(^{71}\) Paluck and Shepherd, 2010
Potential partners could include MOSA to target Social Development Center staff, UNDP through their Conflict Resolution and Peace Building programs, and MoE to work with teachers. The training could be rolled out in one month, midline data collected at 12 weeks, end line data collected at 24 weeks. The intervention would be randomized at the municipality level. One group will be the control, the other group would receive training intervention. Impacts would be measured through implicit bias (as measured using the implicit association test), reduction in reported violence, harassment, and conflict.

**Idea # 4 Improve decision making and use of heuristics by embedding training in employment projects**

An example of this kind of intervention comes from an experiment in five racially diverse middle schools in California, where a brief intervention encouraged math teachers to adopt an empathetic instead of a punitive mindset with regard to discipline. The teachers read an article about reasons why students misbehave (e.g., social and biological changes during adolescence, worries, stresses, and social anxiety), which discouraged teachers from labeling students as troublemakers. The article encouraged teachers to place value on students’ experiences and to develop and sustain positive relationships with the students. This message was reinforced with stories from students. The intervention neither discouraged disciplinary actions, nor encouraged the view that students’ perspectives were necessarily reasonable. The intervention reduced suspensions from school.72

A training at the start of public works projects set up by the World Bank could be developed to focus on building cognitive strategies such as perspective taking, counter-stereotyping, and encouraging a more empathetic mindset. The goal for this would be to equip Lebanese and Syrians participants in public works programs with tools and strategies to combat biases and prejudices they might experience.

The intervention would be set up in two stages. First, the training modules would be piloted to test their efficacy. Second, public works cohorts would be broken into two groups via a random lottery. One group of public works projects will receive the treatment (debias training), and another group of public works projects will be the control group. Training would be rolled out in one month, midline data collected at 12 weeks, end line data collected at 24 weeks (depending on the duration of the public works project). Impacts would be measured through implicit bias (as measured using the implicit association test), reduction in reported harassment and conflict in the workplace.

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**One of the determinants of social stability is the harassment or violent interactions between individuals from different groups. The UNDP Perception 2017 survey found that 20% of Syrian refugees experienced verbal harassment. While it is likely that a very small fraction of Lebanese is responsible for the bulk of verbal harassment, one way to reduce this behavior is to shift normative expectations and stigmatize harassment behavior.**

**One approach to reduce harassment is to strengthen bystander intervention. Bystander is someone who witnesses an event without being involved directly with the event. A prosocial bystander is someone who intervenes when he witnesses a problematic event between a perpetrator and a victim. Intervening not only can stop from the event escalating, but it can also signal disapproval of the behavior. Furthermore, passive bystander who witness the intervention might be more willing to intervene in future similar situations (Bryan & Test, 1967). However, in post conflict countries such as Lebanon, bystander intervention might not be encouraged due the possibility of the bystander becoming a target him/herself. Knowing how to intervene in a way to defuse the situation without triggering another conflict requires skills development. Providing prosocial youth with the right tools on how to intervene can equip them with the skills and confidence to intervene without risking their own safety.**

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72 Okonofua et al., 2016
Idea # 5 Encourage bystander intervention to harassment and negative behaviors by training prosocial individuals on effective intervening methods

A training program could be created for prosocial youth in equipping them with the necessary skills to be confident to intervene in a constructive way. The program would be aimed at prosocial youth involved in NVSP projects and would include simulations on how to respond effectively within different scenarios. It could be implemented in partnership with MOSA and other youth initiative programs. This could complement existing interventions such as NVSP and other youth targeted interventions by UNICEF.

The program could be piloted to first assess the efficacy of the modules and expected dropout rate. 8 training modules delivered in 4-8 weeks (twice a week). Baseline data collected before the training, followed up by an endline survey 36 weeks later. Impact could be assessed by measuring awareness of harassment, attitude toward bullying and harassment, empathetic responsiveness, and reduction in harassment in public places.

The crisis has put the mental well-being of Lebanese and Syrian refugee youth at risk. The available data suggests a high prevalence of anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that professional mental health capacity is far below level of need. A low-cost scalable mental health solution is required to adequately support youth in Lebanon in need of mental health support.

To address this, a multi-faceted program of activities could be developed to enhance youth awareness and access to MHPSS services by equipping civil society staff and community volunteers with relevant information and training to extend support. This would be intended to expand mental health access and usage, and to improve psychological and economic wellbeing.

Idea # 6 Reduce anxiety and mental health issues by extending support through existing youth interventions

Training could be extended on MHPSS to NGO staff and community volunteers, leveraging the World Health Organization’s Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP) curriculum and innovative techniques developed by expert partners. The training may be delivered offline, online or through a hybrid model which facilitates a cost-effective, convenient and scalable model of delivery to rapidly build capacity and scale impact. One mental health technique that could be provided is called behavioral activation, a formal therapy for depression that helps patients refocus on their goals and valued directions in life.

The NVSP could leverage its network to identify appropriate implementing partners working on the ground across Lebanon. The app could be promoted using online (social media) and offline methods. A digital platform would be created to coordinate and facilitate the expansion of this service deliver. For example having a six session programme using the app augmented by 15-30 minute phone calls with the lay counsellors to support the participant as they work through the session, and helping them to trouble shoot difficulties. The rationale for using a digital platform is that consultations with experts suggest that the idea of adequately trained experts who can deliver behavioral activation on the scale needed seems unrealistic in the context.

In terms of implementation partners, the program could be set up with NVSP, IMC, Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Ministry of Education (MoE); youth-oriented international organizations and NGOs. Medical and research expertise could be achieved through collaboration with faculty from the University of Oxford economics and psychiatry departments at the University of Oxford (Stefan Dercon, Alan Stein, Mina Fazel, and Michelle Craske).

The first stage of the intervention would be the development of the app. Using an iterative design process, the digital platform will be co-constructed through a participatory design process. A series of usability
questionnaires will be utilized during this iterative rapid development phase. Baseline data would be collected on demographic, socioeconomic, and psycho-social characteristics, as well as mental well-being. Intermediate indicators on mood could be collected using a mood app, which participants would be incentivized to engage with. End line data would be collected 6-months after the intervention has been completed. Further funding could be requested to collect data 12-months and 3 years later.

Idea # 7 Increase access to mental health support through Youth Community Platform

An engaging online platform could be designed and built that provides vital information on mental health and amplifies constructive narratives to enable cooperation, understanding and shared prosperity among different segments of youth. The goal of this platform would be to enhance youth awareness and access to essential information and messages contributing to social-stability, cooperation, peace-building and the promotion of mental health. In addition, the constructive narratives and pursuits could be promoted to instill hope and inspiration to wider segments of youth.

The intervention could be introduced in partnership with NVSP, Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Ministry of Education (MoE), software development companies, marketing and media companies, international organizations and NGOs (focused on peace-building, mental health, economic development, education, etc.); academia; and technology companies with large distribution platforms (FB, Google).

The intervention would be tested using a clustered randomized control trial. The impact of the intervention could be measured by tracking rates conflict incidents in treatment regions as measured by ARK (compared against control region), usage rate of mental health (compared against control group); user engagement on social media platforms (Facebook/WhatsApp), sentiment and mental well-being through quantitative and qualitative data analysis (e.g., viewership, sharing, voting, surveys, comments, participation, booking, etc.).

A large share of Syrians is legally prohibited from working because they lack work permits. Yet many have no other source of income. Their families could not survive without a wage. Thus, undocumented work is widespread among Syrians. It is sanctioned infrequently and arbitrarily. Approaching employers’ hiring practice through the lens of norm adherence and fairness concerns is one way to create a level playing field. Lebanese employers hire Syrian workers because they can pay them below minimum wage and break standard employment laws. Strategies that emphasize a social obligation to treat employees fairly can reduce employers’ abuse of the system. Employers hire undocumented Syrian workers at wages below the legal minimum. To create a level playing field for Lebanese workers to compete, emphasize employers’ social obligations to treat all workers fairly. Laws that are greatly at odds with the social reality or existing social norms are unlikely to be effective. Most African countries have laws banning female genital cutting, for example, yet the practice remains widespread in many areas (UNICEF 2013).

Social norms can make clear what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior. This is called an injunctive norm. In an environmental context, it has been shown that visitors to Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park who receive empirical information (“Many past visitors have removed the petrified wood from the park, changing the state of the Petrified Forest”) were more likely to steal petrified wood, whereas normative messages (“Please don’t remove the petrified wood from the park”) helped reduce theft.\textsuperscript{73}

To portray employers who pay below minimum the wage as deviants, run a public campaign emphasizing role-model employers who pay fair wages. In the United Kingdom, compliance increased when citizens received

\textsuperscript{73} Cialdini 2003; Cialdini and others (2006).
letters noting that most people in their postal code had already paid their taxes than when the letter did not contain this information about social norms. Poorly designed messaging about social norms can backfire, normalizing undesirable behaviors. Information campaigns aimed at reducing undesirable behavior sometimes unwittingly draw attention to the fact that a specific undesirable behavior is widespread.

**Idea # 8 Encourage employers to adopt prosocial behaviors through socially recognizing positive deviant employers**

Within a community, there usually are individuals or groups who face the same challenges as others and have similar resource constraints but manage to find better and more effective solutions to problems. In behavioral science, these individuals are referred to as ‘positive deviants’. It is most likely that there are several employers in Lebanon currently paying fair wages and promoting positive workplace culture between Lebanese and Syrian employees. Once the ‘positive deviant’ employers in the communities are identified, promoting them or their practices through a public campaign could encourage other members in the community to adopt similar approaches. This sends a strong message regarding the expected norms in the workplace, making clear what is appropriate and indirectly what is inappropriate behavior. Such approach has been successfully used to address malnutrition in Vietnam, reduce school dropouts in Argentina, and reintegrate child soldiers back in the community in Uganda (Singhal, 2013).

The intervention could be implemented in partnership with MOSA, Ministry of Labor, and Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. A competition for companies with “best workplace environment”, representing positive and prosocial environment in the workplace, paying fair and adequate salaries and benefits, with diverse employees, and promoting positive relationships between all groups. Companies that meet the proposed criteria would receive a highly visible award and recognition by the government and NGOs. This could be assessed using a longitudinal analysis, tracking the number of companies applying for the award the following years. A national employee survey could be administered before and after the intervention, and a year later, to determine impact of the intervention.

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**Young people are both excluded from social and economic opportunity in Lebanon and capable of being levers of transformative change in the social well-being of the country. Young people can identify problems to do with disability, mental health, gender-based violence, and intergroup tension long before they become international priorities. Building on the success of the NVSP program, this program would identify and encourage entrepreneurs to deploy creative and effective strategies that address priority issues for the government and diverse populations segments in Lebanon.**

**Idea # 9 Increase social stability by recognizing youth entrepreneurs that promote tolerance and cooperation**

To recognize and fund youth entrepreneurs that are advancing commercial and social endeavors, and contributing to social stability in Lebanon, Entrepreneurship Awards could be established. This would involve the creation of an annual or bi-annual Entrepreneurship Award that recognizes and supports (e.g., financial, advisory, etc.) outstanding entrepreneurs that are either ideating or deploying innovative solutions to pressing challenges, resulting in improved social, economic and environmental outcomes for diverse populations, thereby contributing to greater hope, peace, tolerance and stability in the country.

The programme could be implemented in partnership with NVSP and promoted using relationships with non-profits and academia. Beirut Digital District (BDD) and Wamda/ArabNet are other potential partners as are social/tech incubators and accelerators, venture and social capital (i.e., impact investing) firms, Banque du Liban,

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74 Behavioural Insights Team (2012).
media outlets, corporate sectors, and technology companies with large distribution platforms (FB, Google). This could be assessed using a longitudinal analysis, tracking the number of newly registered entrepreneurs/enterprises advancing commercial and social endeavors, and social outcomes associated with new enterprises created (framework TBD).

**Idea # 10 Promote positive stories on intergroup stability through art and media awards**

An annual or bi-annual Art & Media Award could be created to promote and recognize artistic and media related endeavors that disseminate positive narratives throughout society, as well as to counter-balance negative stories capturing public narratives about the ability of Lebanese society to solve its problems and maintain stability in the face of the Syrian crisis. The goal of this would be to recognize outstanding endeavors that create or feature positive stories across different mediums (short film, photography, etc.), which promote hope, peace, tolerance and stability.

The awards would be established through NVSP, building on its relationships with NGOs, academia and public/private school network. The awards would be targeted at young people living in small cities/towns with high-level of conflict incidents and low-level use of mental health care (plus high rate of mental illness and excess treatment capacity). Partners could come from across the private and social sector: media outlets; civil society (art and film; psychology and psychiatry) and other NGOs; academic institutions (public health, psychology, arts and media, etc.); corporate sector; artists and studios/companies; and technology companies with large distribution platforms (FB, Google).

The intervention could be assessed using a clustered randomized trial. Impacts could be measured by assessing the rates conflict incidents in treatment regions as measured by ARK (compared against control region); Usage rate of mental health (compared against control group); user engagement on social media platforms (Facebook/WhatsApp), and sentiment and mental well-being through quantitative and qualitative data analysis (e.g., viewership, sharing, voting, surveys, comments, participation, booking, etc.)

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*The Lebanese government, like governments around the world, is facing two major challenges. Young people are both excluded from social and economic opportunity in Lebanon (they over three times more likely to be unemployed than adults) capable of being levers of transformative change in the social well-being of the country.*

*The Lebanese blame Syrians for high levels of youth unemployment. Yet the struggle to find a first or second job is a global phenomenon. Young people are over three times more likely to be unemployed than adults. Rates of idleness among youth differ from country to country, but can be as high as 50%. This suggests that there may be general underlying causes to youth unemployment.*

*At the same time, Lebanon has enormous social challenges in supporting vulnerable populations on issues including disability, mental health, gender-based violence, and intergroup tension. Many of these problems are identified locally long before they become national or international priorities and, in addition, organic solutions are often most effective.*

**Idea # 11 Improve social stability by encouraging public-private partnerships for service delivery including social entrepreneurship**

Building on the success of the NVSP program, public private partnerships harnessing young people’s entrepreneurial potential could be developed to tackle social problems – with grant funding offered to young people to establish financially sustainable social enterprises to address locally identified problems.

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In collaboration with the private sector, NVSP could establish a social enterprise hub. The hub could be open to applicants who have successfully completed the NVSP. Workspace, financial support, and a package of behavioral solutions could be created (for example, focusing on inculcating entrepreneurial mindsets and design thinking). The NVSP could leverage its network to partner with willing firms and to identify potential startups. Private sector firms could partner in mentorship relationships with social enterprises to give them organizational support and potentially financial support (e.g., matched by the program).

Two forms of evaluation could be used to evaluate the efficacy of the supports provide. Applicants to the program could be screened to meet a basic quality, then randomized into different treatment arms. Within a given treatment, rapid feedback could be solicited throughout the program based on utilization questionnaires. The program’s impact could be measured in using data such as the number of newly registered entrepreneurs/enterprises advancing commercial and social endeavors; the scale of the social enterprise as measured by its revenue, staff size, number of people served, and number of service hours provided; social outcomes associated with new enterprises created (framework TBD).

Idea #12 Reduce anxiety and stress, and increase resilience by embedding psycho-social supports into employment projects

In collaboration with job centers and firms, a package of behavioral solutions (for example, focusing on proactive mindset, visualized career paths, internships, and resilience building) could be created to support young people on their journey into employment. The service could be delivered both online and offline in a blended format through a digital platform that provides enhanced supports at scale for zero or low marginal cost. The ultimate goal would be for the supports to increase job-search intensity, job-search success, and socio-economic well-being among unemployed Lebanese and Syrian youth.

There are many compelling examples of this innovative work being introduced to programming. In South Africa, when unemployed youths were asked to complete a detailed job search plan, the number of job applications submitted increased while the time spent search remained the same. Job seekers who followed the detailed plan diversified their search strategy and used more formal search channels. By increasing search efficiency and effectiveness, job seekers received more job offers (30%) (Abel et al, 2017). The World Bank is currently applying some of these approaches in Turkey, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Iraq. In the UK, BIT worked with job seekers at employment centers on expressive writing and self-affirmation exercises. Those who took part in the exercises (along with other nudges) were 15 to 20% more likely to be off benefits 13 weeks after signing on.76

The program could be created with the flexibility to be integrated into NVSP activities, Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), UNDP, and non-profits such as IRC. The NVSP could leverage its network to identify appropriate implementing partners working on the ground across Lebanon. The intervention would take 6 months to pilot and 12 months to scale and evaluate. In phase 1, rapid feedback would be solicited from service users and the program would be experimentally adapted on the basis of feedback. In phase 2, a final version would be implemented at scale in a randomized experiment.

Despite the considerable resources and effort being put into service delivery by the GoL and its international partners, many basic public services are regarded as unsatisfactory and are underutilized by Lebanese. Health services, social services, and public and recreational space are regarded most poorly. At the same time, the Lebanese commonly hold misperceptions about the benefits that Syrians are receiving, believing for example that all Syrians are entitled to financial aid amounting to about 100 USD per family, in addition to free healthcare, housing, water, electricity, education, fuel for heating, and food stamps.

Idea #13 Improve service delivery through participatory planning

76 Cohen et al., 2009; Behavioural Insights Team, 2015
Promising evidence exists on the impact of participatory planning. In Uganda, parental participation in a social accountability process proved more effective than a process that was more top-down. Researchers tested two variants of a community monitoring intervention involving a school scorecard. In one variant, a monitoring committee was given a scorecard designed by researchers in conjunction with the Ministry of Education. In the second variant, committees designed their own scorecards in a participatory process. Although the scorecards were substantively similar, the participatory variant significantly improved student learning, student presence, and teacher presence compared to the government-led process, which had no impact. An experiment indicated that the participatory process succeeded by increasing parents’ willingness to contribute to a shared good—improved school performance. Here, altering the institutional environment was a low-cost means of eliciting socially beneficial behavior and improving school performance.

To increase the trust and quality in service delivery at the municipal level, local communities (especially young people in communities) could be given funds to spend on locally identified problems. In partnership with the MOSA, the intervention could be set up with local community organizations and political representatives in local councils. Grants would be made available to communities to solve locally identified problems at the municipal level. The beneficiaries of the grants would participate in and be responsible for designing and planning the projects. The would also be involved in the implementation of projects, either by co-financing or by providing labor, funds, management, or supervision. Social accountability tools, such as community scorecards, could be incorporated to facilitate participatory monitoring.

The intervention could be rolled out through a lottery, and randomized at the municipal level. One group will be the control, the other group will receive the training intervention. The impact of the program could be measured by looking at trust in service providers, satisfaction with service delivery, efficiency of funds used.

**Idea # 14 Enhance service delivery by bringing Human Centered Design to Social Development Centers**

Human-centered design is a design approach that organizations can use to enhance the quality of their service delivery by examining their practices from the perspective of the service users. There are three stages to user centered design: An investigation phase that focuses on understanding the lives, behavioral journeys, and user experiences of the users. An ideation phase that focuses on developing innovative and creative solutions to the user challenges or bottlenecks identified in the investigation phase. A roll-out phase, where the organizer test the ideas that were generated in the ideation phase. Social Development Centers could begin by doing a diagnostic investigation of their service users, in a process that profiles the “archetype users” and creates a “behavioral journey” for each. By identifying the key constraints that core users – for example, youths, women, elderly, children – experience in using services, the SDCs could generate their own creative solutions to help users take advantage of their services.

**Idea # 15 Enhance the culture of volunteerism in Lebanon**

Volunteering is an important dimension of civic life in Lebanon, and the NVSP program is committed to further promoting the culture of volunteering in Lebanon, empowering volunteers in their program, and increasing the numbers of volunteers. One idea is to develop behaviorally informed content that can be piloted and distributed via social media to (i) solidify volunteer identity; (ii) increase volunteer agency, and (iii) recruit new volunteers. The NVSP would notify of volunteers within the network of a competition for the best videos highlighting the experiences of volunteering, including themes such as (a) a day in the life of a volunteer #VolunteerLife and (b) what motivates volunteers to volunteer #WhyWeVolunteer. Videos would be selected based on how inspiring, funny, and motivational they are. These messages would be then edited and turned into videos highlighting particular motivations that would be piloted and scaled.

Videos could be A/B tested to identify which are most effective.

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77 Serneels, Zeitlin, and Barr 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Video message</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Volunteering helps me build my career</td>
<td>Professional ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volunteering helps me serve community and country</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Volunteering enables me to help vulnerable members of society</td>
<td>Compassion</td>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Messenger</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female volunteer</td>
<td>Serves as role model to female volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male volunteer</td>
<td>Serves as role model to male volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mixed gender group</td>
<td>Illustrates that volunteers make friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female group</td>
<td>Associates volunteering with female identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Male group</td>
<td>Associates volunteering with male identity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
V. References


World Health Organization. (2014). Global Health Observatory Data Repository
VI. Appendix

Appendix 1. Engagements

During the field work, we engaged with the following groups:

- Ministry of Social Affairs, Minister’s Advisor
- Ministry of Health
- NVSP grant recipient volunteers
- UNDP Coordinator for Social Cohesion/Stabilization
- Search for Common Ground
- USAID Livelihoods & Inclusive Finance Expansion
- Mercy Corps
- International Medical Corps (IMC)
- International Rescue Committee
- National Mental Health Programme
- Abaad Resource Center for Gender Equality
- Farah Foundation
- Scout Al-Mahdi
- Dary Center
- Community leaders

In addition, we observed the public spaces and held focus group sessions with youths in different parts of the country. We spoke to host populations and refugee populations.
Appendix 2: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1 Ensure protection of vulnerable populations</strong>&lt;br&gt;Strengthen protection services and interventions for displaced persons from Syria and vulnerable populations, empower individuals and mainstream protection across all sectoral interventions. Promote protection of, and access to, affected people in accordance with relevant instruments of international refugee and human rights law ratified by Lebanon.</td>
<td><strong>2 Provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations</strong>&lt;br&gt;Address the immediate needs of the vulnerable populations (displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese, Palestine Refugees from Syria and Palestine Refugees in Lebanon), prioritizing the most vulnerable through temporary solutions, with the aim to mitigate the rapid deterioration of social and economic conditions.</td>
<td><strong>3 Support service provision through national systems</strong>&lt;br&gt;Strengthen national and local capacities to meet the increasingly overwhelming service-related needs and seek to reinforce confidence in the equitable access to and quality of public services for vulnerable populations. Establish or upgrade basic public service infrastructure; strengthening service delivery in the most vulnerable communities affected by the crisis through the support of the network of Social Development Centres of MoSA as a key gateway.</td>
<td><strong>4 Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental stability</strong>&lt;br&gt;Strengthen productive sectors to expand economic and livelihood opportunities, benefiting local development and the most vulnerable communities. It will invest in mitigating the environmental impact of the Syrian crisis, ensuring actions are taken to avoid further degradation of the natural eco-system and its long-term sustainability. Furthermore it will invest in national and local capacities to promote dialogue that mitigates tensions and conflicts at municipal and local levels with a particular focus on youth and adolescents.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Key activities</th>
<th>Key activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensure that persons displaced from Syria have access to <strong>legal status</strong> in accordance with Lebanese laws and regulations, while anticipating their return as the durable solution, and while abiding by the principle of non-refoulement</td>
<td>• Provide <strong>direct and targeted assistance to the most vulnerable populations</strong> to meet their survival needs including needs caused by displacement, ensuring complementarity across sectors</td>
<td>• <strong>Ensure all children</strong>, including children displaced from Syria, can access, learn and be <strong>retained in a quality learning environment</strong> (formal and non-formal) widening the absorption capacity of education premises (rehabilitation, expansion and construction), in addition to strengthening the education system to be able to cater to all children;</td>
<td>• Promote <strong>job creation and support businesses to generate income for local economies in poor areas</strong> benefiting all vulnerable communities, and the outcomes of the Brussels conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continue to work on solutions such as <strong>resettlement</strong> and other admissions to third countries</td>
<td>• <strong>Reduce exposure to hunger, homelessness, health complications and disease outbreaks, violence, abuse and exploitation</strong> as well as the worst effects of poverty</td>
<td>• <strong>Ensure support to vulnerable farmers</strong> via safety nets</td>
<td>• <strong>Enhance the productive capacities of local micro and small to medium enterprises (MSME) and cooperatives</strong> through improving local economic infrastructure and supporting their capability to respond to market demands</td>
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78 Source: UNHCR (2018).
| **• Continue facilitating** | **• Continue immediate and temporary service delivery in informal settlements, collective shelters, substandard dwellings and gatherings** | **• Ensure that the most vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians can access disease prevention interventions and affordable healthcare, with a focus on accessibility and quality of services controlling disease outbreaks** | **• Promote sustainable agriculture production by supporting vulnerable food producers and communities and improve agricultural livelihood activities** |
| **access to civil documentation** for persons displaced from Syria as per Lebanese laws, regulations and policies | **• Ensure tailored provision of protection and other services for persons with specific needs**, such as persons with disabilities, older persons as well as for women and children | **• Protect the most vulnerable**, especially children and women, older persons and persons with disabilities, and other minority groups at risk of violence (including abuse, exploitation and neglect), through: | **• Reduce the impact of the crisis on Lebanon’s environment with a particular focus on integrated solid waste management, water and wastewater management, use of renewable energy sources and energy-efficient products, protection of the air quality, conservation of land use and ecosystems by strengthening the good management of natural resources and sustainable investments abiding by environmental regulations** |
| **• Build the capacity of** | **• Continue to respond to emergency humanitarian needs as they arise through immediate and temporary** | (i) increased outreach and responsiveness of community and institutional systems | **• Support government institutions and government partners to implement necessary economic, labour, social welfare, disaster risk management and environmental protection reforms** |
| Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian communities to identify protection concerns, provide feedback on programmatic interventions, and contribute to the referral of cases to specialized service providers | **• Ensure that the most vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians can access disease prevention interventions and affordable healthcare, with a focus on accessibility and quality of services controlling disease outbreaks** | (ii) referrals and a full package of services, including appropriate support to survivors through a robust and coordinated national system | **• Address social and economic risks faced by Lebanese, displaced Syrians and Palestinian adolescents and youth with a particular focus on empowering young women and girls, including through TVET and decent work opportunities** |
| **• Support the GoL to** | **• Ensure that the most vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians can access disease prevention interventions and affordable healthcare, with a focus on accessibility and quality of services controlling disease outbreaks** | (iii) *Expand safe water, sanitation, hygiene and energy* for the most vulnerable Lebanese and persons displaced from Syria through reinforcing existing infrastructure. | **• Prevent social tensions from further rising within stressed communities by strengthening the capacities of government, local systems and mechanisms, and individuals to address critical needs and promote intra- and inter-community dialogue, with full respect of the Lebanese laws and regulations** |
| enforce laws to prevent and address *child abuse, sexual and economic exploitation* | **• Scale up service delivery mechanisms that are cost-efficient, yet responsive to needs and offer clear benefits to all vulnerable communities** | | |
### Appendix 3. Cognitive and affective threat mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat type</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup anxiety⁷⁹</td>
<td>A type of anxiety that people experience when anticipating or engaging in intergroup interaction. It is more specific than social anxiety because it is restricted to intergroup contexts. Intergroup anxiety may be aroused only by specific outgroups or by outgroups in general. Affectively, people experiencing intergroup anxiety feel apprehensive, distressed, and uneasy. Physiologically, intergroup anxiety can lead people to experience elevated galvanic skin responses, increased blood pressure, increased cortisol levels. Cognitively, people develop appraisals that interactions will have negative consequences – for example, embarrassment, misunderstanding, fear, discrimination, physical harmed, negative evaluation by the outgroup, or disapproval from in-group members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Esteem Threat ⁸⁰</td>
<td>Membership of positively valued groups is a basis upon which individuals maintain their self-image. When outgroups directly or indirectly undermine the esteem of individuals’ group this may provoke intergroup bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctiveness Threat ⁸¹</td>
<td>Individuals seek membership in distinctly positive groups and threats to ingroup distinctiveness are therefore aversive. When competing groups occupy similar identities, threatening uniqueness, this may prompt competitive intergroup comparisons and intergroup provoke bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotype threat</td>
<td>A situational effect whereby individuals feel themselves to be at risk of conforming to stereotypes about their social group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006)*

⁷⁹ Stephan (2014).

⁸⁰ Tajfel & Turner (1979); Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1999).

⁸¹ Tajfel & Turner (1986); Branscombe et al. (1999).
Appendix 4. Measuring intergroup relations

A. In-Lab Experiments

Academics have long leveraged in-lab experiments to better understand the dynamics of in-group/out-group behavior. Atwell Seate and Mastro, for example, investigate the effects of news media coverage on the perceptions of immigration policy and intergroup behavior between natives and non-native persons in America. The treatment group in this experiment was exposed to immigration stories with intentionally threatening depictions of immigrants, which were then endorsed by in-group members. The authors note:

*The most interesting finding of the current study is the nature of the relationship between ingroup identity and ingroup norm endorsement in influencing the indirect effect of intergroup threat on passive and active harming behaviors. For both information sharing (i.e., passive harm) and English-only law support (i.e., active harm), contempt mediated the relationship between news exposure and subsequent behaviors when individuals either: (a) did not see the ingroup member endorsing the emotional norm and had high levels of ingroup identification or (b) had average or high levels of ingroup identification and were exposed to the ingroup member endorsing the emotional norm. It seems that for those who had the highest levels of group identification, fewer communication cues were needed to underscore the normative group-level emotional profile (i.e., these individuals experienced higher levels of contempt regardless of the presence of an ingroup member in the news story). However, those with average levels of ingroup identification needed to be exposed to an ingroup member endorsing the emotional tone of the story for the indirect relationship between media exposure and harming behaviors via contempt to hold.*

Additional examples of the impact the media can play on perceptions of immigration and intergroup tension are available from Brader et al. (2008) and Gadarian and Albertson (2013). Together, these findings are important to bear in mind as the team begins to think about designing interventions to foster cohesion or stability. A charismatic individual can influence the behavior of group members that report weak or average levels of commitment to or identification with the in-group.

B. Questionnaires and Surveys

In addition to experiments, academics have administered questionnaires and surveys as another way of tracking the appearance and persistence of social cohesion. The European Social Survey (ESS) is a cross-sectional questionnaire conducted biennially intended to capture perceptions and opinions about topics related to subjective well-being, immigration, politics, and human values. The ESS has been administered at least once in roughly 36 countries across Europe between 2002 and 2016. Here is a sampling of questions that are particularly germane to the topic of social cohesion:

- Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?
- Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Such matters include good educational qualifications, speak country’s official language, Christian background, race, work skills needed in country, committed to way of life in country.

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83 Brader, Valentino & Suhay (2008); Gadarian & Albertson (2014).
Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?

Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?

Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?  

Fiske et al. (2002) employed a questionnaire in developing Stereotype Content Model. Competence-related questions were phrased in the following way: “As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group? [competent, confident, independent, competitive, intelligent].”85 Warmth-related questions were phrased in the following way: “As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group? [tolerant, warm, good natured, sincere].”86 Status-related questions were framed in the following way: “How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by members of this group?; How economically successful have members of this group been?; and How well educated are members of this group?”87 Finally, competition-related questions were framed as such: “If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), this is likely to make things more difficult for people like me. The more power members of this group have, the less power people like me are likely to have. Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the resources of people like me.”88 The authors acknowledge the potential risk of socially desirable response bias, and note that the instructions to the questionnaire were framed in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of this risk.

Other scholars have turned to Implicit Association Tests for capturing unconscious attitudes toward out-group members.89 For example, Iyengar et al. (2013) use an adaptation of the implicit association test to demonstrate that people in immigrant-receiving countries are more receptive and welcoming to immigrants at the individual, personal level. The authors note:

. . . people were willing to admit immigrants as temporary workers—and even citizens—at a rate considerably higher than expected, given their levels of support for immigration generally. Exposure to individuating information makes it possible for people to disassociate individual immigrants from the generic category or policy area that they represent. Attitudes toward individual immigrants are characterized by a person-positivity bias.90

C. Games

Behavioral games may provide more insight than the standard survey approach to measuring social cohesion. Researchers have found that survey questions may be too abstract to accurately measure social cohesion, and, in some cases, individuals from treatment communities may tailor their survey responses to please outside researchers or funders. Games provide an opportunity to measure social cohesion by isolating prosocial motivations in treatment and control groups after an intervention designed to promote social cohesion.

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84 European Social Survey.
85 Fiske et al. (2002).
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Lehr and Banaji (2015).
90 Iyengar et al. (2013).
For the games to work, they must be anonymous. Subjects cannot expect reward or punishment by others in their community on the basis of their actions so as to measure internal social motivations.91

1. Dictator Game
This game typically consists of two individuals, one who is given some quantity of money and one who is given nothing. The player with the money (“the dictator”) is told she or he must offer some money to the second player (which can also be 0). The second player must accept the quantity and cannot punish the dictator. In community variants, subjects may all play dictators and simply choose how much money of the quantity given to donate to a local needy family. They are allowed to keep any money they do not donate. Dictator games are used to measure altruism.

2. Trust Game
In a traditional trust game, two players are anonymously paired and both are given a quantity of money. The first player is told that he or she must send some amount of money to the second player, though this amount may be zero. The first player is also told that the amount she or he chooses will be tripled by the experimenter, so the second player will receive triple the amount given by the first player. The second player is then told to make a similar choice.

3. Public Goods Game
In a public goods game, players are given tokens and secretly choose how many private tokens to put into a public pot. The tokens in the public pot are multiplied by a factor that is greater than one and less than the number of players, and then the public good is distributed evenly among players. Each player keeps the tokens they do not contribute. The game functions such that the total payoff for the group is maximized when everyone contributes all of their tokens to the public pool. However, the Nash equilibrium is zero contributions.

Appendix 5: International community projects to address pillars

A. Labor market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Project description (short)</th>
<th>Project timeline</th>
<th>Project budget</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Regional focus</th>
<th>Link to social cohesion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Greater Beirut Public Transport Project</td>
<td>(1) Finance BRT infrastructure on the Northern Highway and outer ring road of Beirut 2) Finance feeder and regular bus services (bus stops and shelters, street furniture, roadworks) 3) Capacity building and project management for institutional strengthening for the supervision of BRT/feeder operations</td>
<td>March 15, 2018 - December 31, 2023</td>
<td>US$ 345.00 million</td>
<td>The project is expected to create about 2 million labor-days of direct short-term jobs in the construction industry, most of it for low-skilled Lebanese and Syrians.</td>
<td>Greater Beirut and at the city of Beirut’s northern entrance</td>
<td>Creation of jobs, reduced congestion and travel times, improved quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Roads and Employment Project</td>
<td>(1) Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance: 500km of roads 2) Improving Road Emergency Response Capacity of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) to deal with road emergency works/extreme climates 3) Capacity Building and</td>
<td>February 6, 2017 - June 30, 2022</td>
<td>US$ 200.00 million</td>
<td>Expected to create 500,000 to 750,000 labor-days of direct short-term jobs for Lebanese host</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Help meet needs in the infrastructure and road sectors, and create jobs for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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91 Please see Gilligan, Pasquale, & Samii (2014) for information on how these games were operationalized in a social cohesion experiment in Nepal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>Greater Beirut Water Supply</th>
<th>Implementation Support of the Lebanese agencies in the planning and management of the road sector</th>
<th>Lebanese and Syrians, therefore easing economic and social pressures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Construction of bulk water supply infrastructure (2) Construction of 16 supply reservoirs of storage capacities varying between 500 and 1,000 m3 each, and water supply distribution network of about 187 km of pipelines (3) Project management, utility strengthening and national studies</td>
<td>December 16, 2010 - June 30, 2019</td>
<td>Direct beneficiaries of the project include approximately 1.2 million people living in the Baabda, Aley, parts of the Metn and Southern Beirut areas of the Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon region; and 350,000 residents of the Southern Beirut suburbs.</td>
<td>Help meet needs in the water supply and create jobs, therefore easing the economic pressures BUT negative social impacts associated with land acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>National Volunteer Service Program</td>
<td>(1) Expanding youth volunteerism (2) Improving the employability of youth through enhanced (soft) skills as well as psychosocial awareness and community-building activities (3) Additional financing (AF)</td>
<td>Increase youth civic engagement which will contribute to improved social cohesion across communities and regions; promote awareness of the mental health and psychosocial wellbeing challenges affecting Syrian refugees; provide opportunities for interaction between participating youth and Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees living in the targeted host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Additional financing (AF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Bank</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporting Innovation in SMEs Project</strong></td>
<td>Encourage the equity investment market to increase the supply of early stage investment finance for financially viable, new, and existing innovative firms through: (1) innovation in Small and Medium Enterprises (iSME) funding program, (2) project management.</td>
<td>October 31, 2012 - June 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Bank</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lebanon-Water Supply Augmentation Project</strong></td>
<td>Increase the provision of potable water to residents in the Beirut region and create short-term labour-intensive jobs for the construction of the Bisri Dam, pipelines to existing reservoirs, and hydropower plants</td>
<td>Septembe r 30, 2014 - June 30, 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustaining and Enhancing the Institutional Capacity of Investment Development Authority of Lebanon - IDAL Phase II</strong></td>
<td>Address the decrease in jobs and especially among youth resulting from a decrease in investments across all economic sectors and geographical areas of Lebanon, coupled with a decrease in exports of most Lebanese goods</td>
<td>January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support to the Economic and Social Fund for Development</strong></td>
<td>The project will support the Economic and Social Fund for Development through enhancing employment opportunities and community development activities. UNDP has regional offices and projects across the country and strong partnerships with local actors and could therefore ensure synergy with both the community development and the job Creation Component at ESFD to achieve the vision and results of a sustainable and comprehensive local development approach. The project will focus to support ESFD in fostering employment opportunities in deprived areas of Lebanon. It will assist in the identification and implementation of local development projects involving all local stakeholders.</td>
<td>01 January 2011 - 31 December 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UNDP project at the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET) 2017-2019 addresses the key objectives and areas to support the fulfillment of the priorities of the ministry for economic growth, trade enhancement, internal markets development, by upgrading the Ministry’s economic policy analysis, public services, legislative capacities, and promoting good governance. In 2017-2019, the project will carry out the implementation of this vision with pre-determined targets and indicative activities.

### B. Service delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Project description (short)</th>
<th>Project timeline</th>
<th>Project budget</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
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<th>Link to social cohesion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Greater Beirut Public Transport Project</td>
<td>(1) Finance BRT infrastructure on the Northern Highway and outer ring road of Beirut 2) Finance feeder and regular bus services (bus stops and shelters, street furniture, roadworks) 3) Capacity building and project management for institutional strengthening for the supervision of BRT/feeder operations</td>
<td>March 15, 2018 - Decemb er 31, 2023</td>
<td>US$ 345.00 million</td>
<td>The project is expected to create about 2 million labor-days of direct short-term jobs in the construction industry, most of it for low-skilled Lebanese and Syrians.</td>
<td>Greater Beirut and at the city of Beirut’s northern entrance</td>
<td>Creation of jobs, reduced congestion and travel times, improved quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Lebanon Health Resilience Project</td>
<td>1) Scaling up the scope and capacity of the Primary Health Care (PHC) Universal Health Coverage (UHC) program 2) Finance provision of health care services in public hospitals 3) Strengthening project management and monitoring of the MoPH and Project Management Unit</td>
<td>June 26, 2017 - June 30, 2023</td>
<td>US$ 120.00 million</td>
<td>Expected that the number of displaced Syrians that will access the centers and the scaled up package of services under various subsidy mechanisms will increase from 130,000 to 375,000</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Relieves some strain that the refugee crisis has put on the healthcare system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Roads and Employment Project</td>
<td>(1) Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance: 500km of roads 2) Improving Road Emergency Response Capacity of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) to deal with road emergency works/extreme climates 3) Capacity Building and Implementation Support of the Lebanese agencies in the planning and management of the road sector</td>
<td>February 6, 2017 - June 30, 2022</td>
<td>US$ 200.00 million</td>
<td>Expected to create 500,000 to 750,000 labor-days of direct short-term jobs for Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon.</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Help meet needs in the infrastructure and road sectors, and create jobs for Lebanese and Syrians, therefore easing the economic and social pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Second Education Development Project</td>
<td>(1) Early Childhood Education (ECE) program for children aged 3-5 (2) Support improvements in quality of education (3) Education sector policy development and management</td>
<td>Novemb er 30, 2010 - June 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 42.60 million</td>
<td>~350 schools</td>
<td>No direct link to Lebanese-Syrian relations and social cohesion, but helps provide greater opportunities for children in disadvantaged areas of the country</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Greater Beirut Water Supply</td>
<td>(1) Construction of bulk water supply infrastructure (2) Construction of 16 supply reservoirs of storage capacities varying between 500 and 1,000 m3 each, and water supply distribution network of about 187 km of pipelines (3) Project management, utility strengthening and national studies</td>
<td>Decemb er 16, 2010 - June 30, 2019</td>
<td>US$ 370.00 million</td>
<td>Direct beneficiaries of the project include approximately 1.2 million people living in the Baabda, Aley, parts of the Metn and Southern Beirut areas of the Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon region; and 350,000 residents of the Southern Beirut suburbs.</td>
<td>Greater Beirut Region, including neighborhoods of Southern Beirut</td>
<td>Help meet needs in the water supply and create jobs, therefore easing the economic pressures BUT negative social impacts associated with land acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Emergenc y Nat'l Poverty Targeting Proj</td>
<td>Expand the coverage and enhance the social assistance package of the NPTP to Lebanese affected by the Syrian crisis and all Lebanese households under the extreme poverty line, and enable the Government of Lebanon (GOL) to pilot a graduation program for selected NPTP beneficiaries to ‘exit’ from poverty</td>
<td>June 6, 2014 - Decemb er 31, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 96.20 million</td>
<td>The NPTP would need to be scaled up to absorb 50,0008 people in 2014, in addition to an increase of more than 100,000 in 2015/2016 to reach the remaining 4% extreme poor</td>
<td>Mohafaz at Mont-Liban, Mohafaz at Liban - Nord et Sud, Mohafaz at Beqaa, Mohafaz at Nabatiye, Mohafaz at Aakkar, Mohafaz at Baalbek-Hermel, Beyrouth</td>
<td>Social protection programs promote social cohesion and can reduce tensions, allowed people to feel safer again, re-establish trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Lake Qaraoun Pollution Prevention Project</td>
<td>Reduce the quantity of untreated municipal sewage discharged into the Litani River and to improve pollution management around Qaraoun Lakes</td>
<td>July 14, 2016 - June 30, 2023</td>
<td>US$ 60.00 million</td>
<td>Direct beneficiaries of 344,000 Malwaf at Beqaa</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, and UNHCR</td>
<td>Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon Support Project</td>
<td>Promote equitable access to education services, enhance quality of student learning, and strengthen the education systems in the Recipient’s education sector in response to the protracted refugee crisis</td>
<td>Septemb er 27, 2016 - February 28, 2023</td>
<td>US$ 234.00 million</td>
<td>Total cumulative direct beneficiaries of the Program include approximately 540,000 public school students and staff</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Increased access to schooling has economic intergeneration al gains, as well as positive labor productivity and social cohesion externalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Lebanon Municipal Services Emergenc y Project</td>
<td>(1) Finance the provision of high priority municipal services and initiatives that promote social interaction and collaboration in the eleven participating unions of municipalities (2) Rehabilitation of critical infrastructure (3) Project implementation support</td>
<td>June 19, 2014 - June 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 10.00 million</td>
<td>Main Project beneficiaries will be residents in the targeted unions of municipalities affected by Syrian refugee inflows, of which an estimated 300,000 will benefit from improved provision of municipal services and improved infrastructure</td>
<td>Mohafaz at Liban - Nord et Sud, Mohafaz at Beqaa</td>
<td>Restoring and building resilience in equitable access to and quality of public services strengthens social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, UNDP</td>
<td>LB-Environme ntal Pollution Abatement Project</td>
<td>(1) Strengthen through technical support and training the capacity of MOE, and provide project management support. (2) Provide concessional loans for pollution control to an estimated 20 to 25 public and private enterprises in order to bring air emissions,</td>
<td>June 19, 2014 - June 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 18.00 million</td>
<td>Target 5,000 direct project beneficiaries</td>
<td>PMU located in Beirut and housed at MOE</td>
<td>No direct link, although reducing pollution increases quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Proposed Grant</td>
<td>Recipient Area</td>
<td>Project Goal</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>effluent discharges, and industrial waste generation towards compliance</td>
<td>Sept 30, 2014 -</td>
<td>June 30, 2024</td>
<td>US$ 617.00</td>
<td>Mont-Liban (Bisri)</td>
<td>Relieves some strain that the refugee crisis has put on water provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Increase the provision of potable water to residents in the Beirut region and create short-term labour-intensive jobs for the construction of the Bisri Dam, pipelines to existing reservoirs, and hydropower plants</td>
<td>Nov 21, 2014 -</td>
<td>June 30, 2020</td>
<td>US$ 32.00</td>
<td>EDL employees is estimated at about 490 people, and population living in the areas surrounding the power plants is about 205,000</td>
<td>Help schools improve the learning environment and foster social cohesion between different student communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Dispose of high risk PCBs and improve the inventory management of transformers in the power sector in an environmentally sound manner</td>
<td>Mar 9, 2015 -</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 21.00</td>
<td>Target 150,000 direct project beneficiaries</td>
<td>Across Lebanon Relieves some strain that the refugee crisis has put on the healthcare system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Restore access to essential healthcare services for poor Lebanese affected by the influx of Syrian refugees through (1) provision of the essential healthcare package (2) financing readiness and capacity building of primary health care centers (3) project outreach, management, and monitoring</td>
<td>Mar 19, 2015 -</td>
<td>Dec 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 19.51</td>
<td>WFP supported 652,671 Syrian refugees and 16,251 Palestinian refugees from Syria with basic food assistance. Additionally, 52,246 vulnerable Lebanese were reached under the National Poverty Targeting Programme</td>
<td>Across Lebanon Benefits both Syrian refugees and host communities, relieving tension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>(1) Cash-based assistance (2) Provision of school meals (3) Food assistance for assets (4) Improving livelihoods for smallholder farmers (5) Increasing national response capacity</td>
<td>Nov 19, 2015 -</td>
<td>Dec 30, 2020</td>
<td>US$ 109.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Impacts</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR, UNDP</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Improve water supply and water quality: UNHCR handed over 5 water reservoirs to Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment. In addition 53km of drinking water supply networks were extended/rehabilitated, 962 households were also connected to the water supply network and WASH facilities inside 5,029 households were improved.</td>
<td>(Unclear, but ongoing since at least 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 224 million</td>
<td>2.7 million People Targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Social Stability Working Group</td>
<td>Direct support to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the Ministry of State for the Displaced Affairs (MoSDA), to cover equipment, trainings, supplies, and operational staffing costs.</td>
<td>(Unclear, funds allocated yearly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 33.9 million (in 2017)</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR, UNDP</td>
<td>Community Security and Access to Justice</td>
<td>(1) Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services that respond to their needs (2) MOIM Governorate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs (3) Vulnerable groups, including women, have access to basic justice services (4) Basic needs of prison population at risk are addressed</td>
<td>May 1, 2015 - Decemb er 31, 2017; 11 Septemb er 10 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 774,00 0</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>The Rehabilitation of Saida Dumpsite</td>
<td>This project aims at rehabilitating the existing Saida landfill to solve an environmentally unacceptable situation and to use the land again for the benefit of the Saida municipality. The procedure of the rehabilitation is “Landfill Mining” which includes a treatment of excavated waste at site to produce secondary construction material complying with local and EU standards.</td>
<td>04 October 2012-31 Decemb er 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 25 million</td>
<td>Saida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Sustainable Land Management in the Qaraoun Catchment</td>
<td>The project will promote an integrated approach towards fostering sustainable land management – seeking to balance environmental management with development needs. Amongst other things, it will set-up a multi-sector planning platform to balance competing environmental, social and economic objectives in district development plans and associated investments.</td>
<td>1 January 2016-31 Decemb er 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 3,487,6 71.00</td>
<td>West Bekaa, Zahle and Rachaya Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Support to Host Communities in North Lebanon in the WASH Sector</td>
<td>Identification, implementation of water supply/storage works and commissioning and handover of works to North Lebanon Water Establishment</td>
<td>01 January 2014-31 Decemb er 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 8,806,3 16.84</td>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Demonstration Project for the Recovery of Lebanon – Phase 4</td>
<td>Application of renewable energy and energy efficiency systems and measures across Lebanon’s several economic sectors (commercial, industrial, and utility-scale, and a demonstration project on a village scale and bioenergy sourced heating) and beneficiaries</td>
<td>01 January 2014-30 June 2017</td>
<td>US$ 4,860,530.68</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Support</td>
<td>Lebanese Centre for Water Conservation and Management (LCWCM)</td>
<td>The objective of this project is to create a centre at the MEW that will coordinate and promote sustainable water management through both technical and policy-level support.</td>
<td>01 January 2010-31 Decemb er 2017</td>
<td>US$ 150,000.00</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact, although relieved some strain that the refugee crisis has put on water services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Machrek Energy Development – Solar</td>
<td>The ENPI regional energy project aims at the promotion and implementation of innovative technologies and know-how transfer in the field of solar energy, particularly PV systems</td>
<td>01 January 2013-30 September 2017</td>
<td>US$ 1,016,405.00</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Integrated Solid Waste Management of Baalbek Caza</td>
<td>The Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) Project aims to introduce in Lebanon the techniques of a modern system to manage waste, reducing the amounts being disposed into landfills, recovering material and energy, and producing compost for various uses. The Ministry of Environment, through the UNDP Energy and Environment Programme, is undertaking the implementation of the Integrated Solid Waste Management activities in an environmentally sound manner.</td>
<td>01 January 2011-31 Decemb er 2018</td>
<td>US$ 2,476,190.00</td>
<td>Caza of Baalbek in North Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Institutional and Technical Support to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) towards</td>
<td>The UNDP and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) are entering in a second phase of partnership for five years, based on the successful relationship built in the framework of the implementation of the joint project from 2010 to 2016: &quot;Technical Support to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in the Implementation of</td>
<td>01 January 2017-31 Decemb er 2021</td>
<td>US$ 2.4 million</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact, although improved education access can relieve social tensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Education Sector Development Plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accessible and Quality Education</td>
<td>The project aims to support the modernization of the Railway and Public Transportation Authority. The main outcome of the designed project is to provide the necessary institutional capacity to the Railway and Public Transportation Authority to define, develop, and implement potential and strategic public transportation projects, as well as deliver a technical assistance in the implementation of reforms aiming at the modernization, and efficiency of both the institution and the public transportation sector in Lebanon. The project will develop a strategy to enhance the institutional capacities of the Railway and Public Transport Authority, and provide support through the subsequent phases for the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the reform plan and strategy.</td>
<td>01 January 2016-31 December 2018</td>
<td>US$ 1.288 million</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>No direct impact, although improved transport can increase standard of living and decrease tensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Shelter Working Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Shelter sector works towards ensuring vulnerable population groups have access to affordable shelters at minimum standards. This was mainly achieved through the distribution of weatherproof and insulation kits that protect against severe weather conditions.</td>
<td>(Unclear, funds allocated yearly)</td>
<td>US$ 39m (of US$129 required) in 2017</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Provides shelter for displaced Syrians; relieving tension with host communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Health Working Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In 2017, the Health Sector continued to provide financial support to displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese, Palestine Refugees from Syria and Palestine Refugees from Lebanon in access to health care through the national health system and continued to implement activities aimed at strengthening service delivery.</td>
<td>(Unclear, funds allocated yearly)</td>
<td>US$ 100.5 m (of US$308 required) in 2017</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Relieves some strain that the refugee crisis has put on the healthcare system</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

C. Intergroup threat
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project description (short)</th>
<th>Project timeline</th>
<th>Project budget</th>
<th>Regional focus</th>
<th>Link to social cohesion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Technical Support to the Lebanese Government</td>
<td>Aims at strengthening the structures of legislative, oversight and representation capacities of the Lebanese Parliament, while closely working with Parliamentarians, Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary staff to promote Human Rights, Gender Equality and Women Empowerment, Inclusive Participation national dialogue and conflict prevention</td>
<td>January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2017</td>
<td>Originally US$ 674,520 for 2013; budget for 2017 is US$ 260,000</td>
<td>Across Lebanon (Parliament)</td>
<td>Strengthen the relationship between parliament and civil society and social groups; civil peace building</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Support Office for Consensus Building, Civil Peace, and Constitutional Strengthening II</td>
<td>Support consensus building, sustainable civil peace, constitutional strengthening and stakeholders’ dialogues in Lebanon and in the MENA region through technical assistance, technical information and shared knowledge resources, collective and action research, common meeting spaces for stakeholders, facilitation expertise and other essential resources.</td>
<td>July 1, 2013 - June 30, 2018</td>
<td>US$ 793,688.87</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Supports the organization of dialogue sessions, roundtables, workshops, reconciliation processes and consensus building initiatives in Lebanon and the Region, increasing dialogue and social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Peacebuilding in Lebanon Project</td>
<td>The third phase of the project will focus on addressing the new challenges to civil peace and peace building in the country posed by the Syrian crisis: (1) Education promoting social cohesion (2) Promote balanced and conflict-sensitive media coverage (3) Local level peace building strategies to mitigate tensions developed in selected conflict prone areas of Lebanon hosting Syrian refugees (4) An NGO platform promoting nationwide truth and reconciliation</td>
<td>January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2019</td>
<td>US$ 4,729,765.20</td>
<td>Across Lebanon</td>
<td>Social cohesion was enhanced at the local, community and national levels between civil society; focal point to many partner organizations on issues pertaining to the impact of the Syrian crisis impact on social cohesion in Lebanon, both in terms of inter Lebanese relations and Lebanese Syrian interaction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### UNDP

Support the implementation of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) Strategic Plan; Phase I

- (1) Institutional Capacity of the LPDC Office for Policy Reforms Enhanced
- (2) Support to LPDC to Establish the National Observatory for Palestinian Affairs
- (3) Capacity of line ministries mandated with Palestine refugees strengthened
- (4) Capacity of LPDC to act as the focal point for national and international partners, on issues regarding Palestinian refugees in camps and surrounding communities strengthened
- (5) Capacity of LPDC to facilitate multiple platforms of dialogue and consensus-building enhanced

- 01 April 2015-31 December 2017
- USD 2,732,932.00
- Across Lebanon
- Improve Lebanon - Palestinian relations

### UNDP

Peace Building in Lebanon phase 3: Strengthening Tripoli’s Social Cohesion

1. Promoting social cohesion through developing a Mechanism for Social Stability
2. Promoting social cohesion through a Violence Free School
3. Support ex-fighters advocating for peace instead of war (responsible party: Fighters for Peace)

- 06 March 2017-06 December 2017
- USD 2,362,219.25
- Tripoli
- Create “safe spaces” for local identity groups to discuss their concerns openly; enhance mutual understanding of the different “Other”

### UNDP

Preventing and Responding to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) with a special focus on Syrian Conflict related Sexual Violence, through Capacity Building, Advocacy and Knowledge Products

This project aims at increasing protection of Syrian and Lebanese communities affected by the Syrian crisis against SGBV. Building on past achievements of UNDP and UNFPA, the project will develop the capacities of relevant national and local institutions and engage stakeholders and tools to raise public awareness on the issue of SGBV in the crisis context.

- 01 January 2017-31 August 2018
- USD 250,000
- Across Lebanon
- Strengthen protection against sexual violence for both Syrian and Lebanese

### D. Mental health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project description (short)</th>
<th>Project timeline</th>
<th>Project budget</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Regional focus</th>
<th>Link to social cohesion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>National Volunteer Service Program</td>
<td>(1) Expanding youth volunteerism (2) Improving the employability of youth through enhanced (soft) skills as well as psychosocial awareness and community-building</td>
<td>February 15, 2011 - Decemb er 31, 2018</td>
<td>USD 2.00 million</td>
<td>To date (Dec 2016), around 6,500 Lebanese youth aged 15-24 and close to 150 NGOs, universities, schools and municipalitys</td>
<td>Mohafazat Mont-Liban, Mohafazat Liban - Nord et Sud, Mohafazat Beqaa, Mohafazat Nabatiye, Mohafazat Akkar, Mohafazat Baalbek-</td>
<td>Increase youth civic engagement which will contribute to improved social cohesion across communities and regions; promote awareness of the mental health and psychosocial wellbeing challenges affecting Syrian refugees; provide opportunities for interaction between participating youth and Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees living in the targeted communities</td>
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<td>activities (3) Additional financing (AF)</td>
<td>Hermel, Beyrouth</td>
<td>host communities through psychosocial and community building activities</td>
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