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# Conflict Prevention & Post-Conflict Reconstruction: *Perspectives and Prospects*



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
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Conflict Prevention  
&  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction:  
*Perspectives and Prospects*

April 20–21, 1998  
Paris, France

The World Bank  
Post-Conflict Unit  
Social Development Department  
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# Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Preface and Acknowledgments .....   | 1  |
| Introduction .....  | 2  |
| Toward a New Type of Development:<br>Bridging Relief and Reconstruction .....           | 4  |
| Post-Conflict Reconstruction:<br>The Folly of Conventional Wisdom .....                 | 5  |
| Conflict Prevention:<br>Lessons from Recent History .....                               | 6  |
| Strengthening Social Capital:<br>Trust, Institutional Capacity, and Civil Society ..... | 8  |
| Creating an Enabling Environment<br>for the Private Sector .....                        | 10 |
| The Challenge of Conflict Prevention<br>and the International Community .....           | 12 |
| Expanding the Vision .....  | 13 |
| New Partners and New Processes .....  | 15 |
| Appendix A—Agenda, Day One and Day Two .....  | 19 |
| Appendix B—List of Participants .....   | 21 |
| Appendix C—Directory of Post-Conflict Units .....                                       | 26 |





## Preface and Acknowledgements

As part of a global workshop series on the transition from war to peace, the World Bank Post-Conflict Unit, in collaboration with the World Bank's Paris Office, held a workshop focusing on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in Paris, France between April 20-21, 1998.

The workshop was organized by the following World Bank staff associated with the Post-Conflict Unit: Johanna Mendelson Forman, social scientist; Nat J. Colletta, manager; and Steve Holtzman, social scientist, as well as Nicholas Van Praag of the Paris Office. They were assisted by Michelle Cullen and Taies Nezam, operations analysts with the Post-Conflict Unit, and Luisa Chiodi, intern, of the Paris Office.

This report was prepared by Michelle Cullen and Johanna Mendelson Forman under the guidance of Nat J. Colletta. The report was edited by Alison Raphael. Peter Howard provided much assistance with Appendix C, the directory of post-conflict units.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the World Bank, or any of the World Bank's affiliated organizations.

August 1998

## Introduction

Events during the past decade have challenged the thinking of donors about whether development efforts, which have formed a prominent part of post-Cold War engagement in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, have really achieved an enduring legacy of inclusion, economic growth, and human well-being. In a world where the power of centralized authorities is rapidly diminishing and intrastate conflict is on the rise, it becomes evident that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with a scarcity of donor resources than with a lack of understanding of the causes of conflict and the appropriate tools to address them. The need to nurture that understanding and develop new tools has led to the emergence of specific offices within bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to address the development issues of post-conflict societies.

Since the early 1990s, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn societies has become a subspecialty within the broader development agenda. The special needs of societies emerging from conflict have hastened the development planning cycle in such a way as to demand more flexibility of programs and resources and greater responsiveness to emergencies heretofore handled only through humanitarian assistance operations.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a critical step in the continuum between humanitarian relief and longer-term development assistance. It requires all the responsiveness of an emergency operation, as well as a vision of how interventions fit into the longer-term development scheme. It is understandable that units dedicated to meeting immediate post-conflict development needs may operate in isolation from those involved in planning long-term, traditional programs geared to improve economic performance and institutional development. The future, however, will demand that short-term relief and long-term development processes become merged into the type of transition programming that is now beginning to occur.

Those engaged in the initial effort to create programs to assess and heal the immediate wounds of war will discover that their mission requires not only the ability to analyze an unstable on-the-ground situation, but also the capacity to design programs flexible enough to meet emergency needs, yet visionary enough to create the foundation for further development, as the situation stabilizes and life returns to normal. The changing nature of international relations is forcing those in traditional development to meet this challenge through the creation of new products and specialized organs to address a less certain, more volatile environment.

The two-day meeting upon which this report is based was cosponsored by The World Bank's Paris office and held in Paris in April, 1998. It involved two distinct, but interrelated, efforts to bring together recent thinking about the area of post-conflict reconstruction. The first day was dedicated to exploring new ways that development assistance and private investment can address the root causes of conflict.<sup>1</sup> The second day of the Paris conference was planned as a follow-up to an October 1997 conference sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). The 1997 conference brought together donor agencies' newly created post-conflict offices, with the aim of gaining a clearer vision of how governments and multilateral organizations are moving forward to address the operational needs that have emerged since the end of the Cold War.

<sup>1</sup> Day One's meeting was the second of a Global Workshop series on war-to-peace transitions sponsored by the World Bank. The first workshop, "From Civil War to Civil Society," was cosponsored by the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, and focused on war to peace transitions using Guatemala and Liberia as case studies. The next event in the series will be co-sponsored by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and take place in South Africa in October 1998. This event will examine "The Nexus between Economic Management and the Restoration of Civil Society."

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This report, prepared by the World Bank Post-Conflict Unit, seeks to capture the ideas and issues that flowed from discussions during the two days of deliberations in Paris. The intent is not to be totally inclusive of all points made, nor to reflect a consensus, but rather to summarize the main points made by keynote speakers and other participants. The agenda for the meeting is included as Appendix A; Appendix B provides a list of participants. Appendix C is a directory of various post-conflict units of bilateral and multilateral donors. It is not a comprehensive listing of such organizations, but a representation of those units that attended the Paris conference.

It is our hope that this event enabled a number of diverse actors, particularly those on the European scene, to reflect upon and share mutual understandings and concerns regarding societies making the transition from war to peace.

## Forward a New Type of Development: Bridging Relief and Reconstruction

If anything is evident from the growth of post-conflict units, it is that development agencies are seeking to merge several distinct development “cultures:” including conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and traditional development. By seeking to create all-purpose programs to address differing post-conflict needs, development agencies may well be setting themselves up for failure—unless partnerships can be formed between the various types of organizations with expertise in the different cultures associated with the post-conflict world.

During the two-day session, it became clear that each agency starts from a different perspective and point in time when responding to the needs of war-torn societies.

Some units have more experience in moving from humanitarian crises to transition environments, while others are better suited to supporting emergency reconstruction programs, and others still are best at linking reconstruction programs to sustain-

able development goals. It is not clear whether any of these interventions can be strictly categorized as conflict-prevention programs, but an emerging consensus in the development community notes that “good” development—development that addresses inequity, exclusion, and indignity—is the best form of conflict prevention.

In a speech made nearly 40 years ago, former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld sought to define a framework for international cooperation. His response could as easily apply in 1998 as it did when he first presented his ideas in 1960:

“Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to have been of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with our best understanding, in recognition of its limits but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to cooperate.”<sup>2</sup>

Post-conflict support by donor organizations is very much at the cutting edge of development activities. Yet whether such activities will ultimately lead to greater development or will push a country deeper into the abyss remains unknown. As Hammarskjöld correctly noted, failing to provide some means of restarting economic life and social institutions in the wake of conflict is likely to be far more troublesome in the long run. Good development requires that we look at the situation even as the fighting continues, so that planning carries with it important lessons for a transition that is responsive to the structural causes of the conflict and the demands of different interest groups, while also reflecting a concern for human security.

*“Good development, or development that addresses inequity, exclusion, and indignity, is in itself the best form of conflict prevention.”*

—Nat Colletta, Manager, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank

<sup>2</sup> Dag Hammarskjöld, “The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation,” address at the University of Chicago Law School, May 1, 1960, in Brian Urquhart, “Looking for a New Sheriff,” *New York Review of Books*, July 16, 1998, p. 53.

## Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Folly of Conventional Wisdom

The hybrid field of post-conflict development, which so many organizations in the post-Cold War period are calling a new form of development assistance, still requires additional definition and begs for comparative lessons from the field. This year the World Bank's Operations Evaluations Department (OED) released a report<sup>3</sup> that reviews the Bank's experiences and performance in post-war reconstruction. Among the key findings of the OED report were:

- Post-war reconstruction should involve collaborative efforts not only among different development agencies, but also with relief and emergency assistance organizations. In the fragile environment after war, there is a distinct need for transitional support strategies that close the gap between humanitarian assistance and development, and help to organize cooperation and partnering. To date, however, few such initiatives have been taken.
- Success requires strong local ownership. Without a solid base and investment at the community level, development efforts were found to be less likely to succeed or be sustainable. The OED report suggested that, to support this focus on local ownership, military spending should be reduced and the savings used to strengthen social institutions and civil society. At the same time, however, issues such as demilitarization, demobilization, and the reintegration of ex-combatants must not be overlooked. A fine balance must be sought between social sector and military spending, nurturing and thinning each respectively at an adequate rate. The successful implementation of either of these processes demands the presence of a strong, legitimate government. Thus capacity building and guidance for good governance must be provided as well.

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank's Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction. Volume 1: Synthesis Report, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1998 (draft).

- The complexities associated with macro-economic restructuring must be addressed. The fragile political and social conditions endemic to war-torn societies complicate the use of traditional methods of structural adjustment. If undertaken improperly and without special attention to social needs, the adjustment process may exacerbate conflict situations or create new disparities from which new conflict may arise. Political and social factors must be considered, along with economic realities, during post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation. In certain cases, such as in some African countries, the over-

*Post-conflict development is something that falls outside the exact boundaries of traditional forms of development assistance. It is neither sustainable development nor humanitarian response."*

*James Malloch Brown, Vice President,  
International Affairs, World Bank*

all economic program has undermined the peace process by forcing too many budget cuts. The report suggests that new guidelines for debt relief should be established, especially for some of the particularly indebted nations trying to recover from conflict.

The credibility of the development community rests on its performance in this new post-conflict environment. As is the case for all development efforts, there is a risk of doing more harm than good with every intervention. Summaries of lessons learned, such as the OED report, and conferences, such as the Paris gathering, are essential to help improve the standards of interventions, promote better relations among development agencies and more collaborative efforts, and increase overall knowledge of how to operate within a post-conflict society.

## Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Recent History

Perceptions held by both the international community and societies in a post-conflict environment play an important role in the success of any intervention. Donor-supported interventions responsive to deadly conflict and its prevention often create local expectations of end results that exceed the capacity of international actors. In addition the international community's perception of what events and conditions should or should not cause concern in terms of potential conflict can affect its ability to read, or correctly interpret, early warning signals. Thus opportunities to prevent man-made tragedy are sometimes missed. This potential failure to connect the support given to a society emerging from war with a longer-term vision of development may exacerbate tensions and undermine a fragile peace.

### Guatemala

Guatemala has made great strides toward peace. However, the development and humanitarian assistance that came with the end of war overly

*"Newly emerging instability in Guatemala is partially a result of the highly focused distribution of emergency assistance, which has excluded some of the most vulnerable groups. Commitment of area-based programs should now be the preferred approach."*

—Mauticio Valdez,  
Deputy Director, UNDP/Guatemala

raised expectations and thus, to some extent, hindered national reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants. Social unrest and violent conflict have reemerged in areas already heavily effected by armed conflict. This new instability is partially a result of the highly focused distribution of emergency assistance, which excluded some of the most vulnerable groups, including large numbers of indigenous communities. In these sensitive areas initial aid programs were too focused on specific groups, particularly former soldiers and refugees. Although this practice is not unusual during the reconstruction process to help support a more secure environment, they carry an associated risk that some people will feel unfairly treated, especially those not destined to receive aid. Non-recipients perceive this resulting inequity as a continuation of unfair and unjust treatment; therefore, to some degree, aid allocation can serve to refuel or create tensions.

### The Great Lakes

Perceptions by the international community of what constitutes an early warning signal of conflict have not always been correct. Among the concerns of those working in post-conflict states are issues such as whether better-planned development assistance and an earlier acknowledgment of warning signals might have prevented a Rwanda or Burundi. In this sense the tragedy of the Great Lakes genocide can be transformed into a powerful lesson learned. Although development assistance may not have been able to prevent the massacre of thousands of people, recognition of early warning signs and decisive action from the international community might have reduced the extent of human, physical, and natural destruction in the mid-1990s. Signs of building tensions in the Great Lakes region became more apparent in the late 1980s with the drought, the fall of coffee prices, rapid population growth, and an increasing shortage of land. After 1990, and in particular with regard to the genocide in 1994, there is one painful lesson to be learned from Rwanda. Conflict dynamics may become

*"In the Great Lakes, signals of building tensions became more apparent in the late 1980s with the drought, the fall in coffee prices, rising overpopulation, and increasing shortage of land."*

—Dr. Winrich Kuehne, Conflict Prevention Network, Germany

so powerful and dramatic that the long-term instruments of development aid may not exercise any meaningful constraint on them. In these situations, more powerful and decisive action may be needed to stop violence, such as an international peace operation.

## Iraq

The mediation that took place during the crisis between the U.S., the U.N., and Iraq over chemical weapons-site inspections represents a good example of conflict prevention through negotiation. Controversy began when Saddam Hussein denied U.N. weapons inspectors access to presidential sites. Psychological analysis became crucial to dissecting the conflict and clarifying U.S. and U.N. perceptions of what was actually occurring. Negotiators perceived that Hussein's submission to outside invaders would have most likely caused him a loss of public respect and threatened his survival as

leader. Denying access was seen as a method of protecting his political power. After it became more clear that neither economic, social, nor political factors weighed heavily in this particular conflict, the U.N. Secretary General began to negotiate. This eleventh-hour response was clearly risky, but as noted by Staffan de Mistura, a helpful synergy created a situation of military deterrence, on the one hand, and moral pressure on the other.

Participants in the Paris meeting noted that many questions need to be resolved regarding both the relationship between development assistance and conflict prevention, and between those who are giving and receiving aid. How can international actors control the expectations arising from development efforts? How do international actors choose appropriate methods of mediation and negotiation, depending on the differing contexts of conflict and the actors involved in the arena of war? Finally, can a donor policy be formulated to take into account the need to balance programs in conflict prevention as part of a more sophisticated approach to early warning?

*"The eleventh-hour response to the Iraq crisis over U.N. inspection sites was clearly a bit risky, but there was synergy between the major team players that allowed for elements of deterrence through military presence and a common moral pressure from churches and public opinion."*

—Staffan de Mistura, leader, U.N. Secretary General's Technical Team to Iraq

## **Strengthening Social Capital: Trust, Institutional Capacity, and Civil Society**

In the past, post-war reconstruction has focused on rebuilding infrastructure; it is easier to rebuild roads and bridges than it is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen the social fabric of a society. Thus the restoration, or transformation, of social capital has not been the primary focus of development in the post-war context. War militarizes societies, disrupting existing social organizations and creating others. While some of the latter may endure, others are inappropriate once hostilities end. Many difficulties are associated with restoring trust and social cohesion after violent conflict, and much debate exists over the appropriate means of restoring social capital and the nature and value of this process.

To some extent international actors can help strengthen social capital by increasing citizen participation in reconstruction processes, enforcing government accountability, and fostering creative avenues for peaceful change. Yet to do so effectively, development agencies need to better understand how to define and bolster civil society in a post-conflict setting; that is, to be aware of how conflict affects civil society, what factors increase group cohesion under adverse conditions, and which issues are most critical for civil society (human rights, health, or others).

Social capital as a concept has also created its detractors, for it has the potential to yield the negative effect of social exclusion. Development agencies attempting to restore social capital in war-torn countries must be cautious of the groups that they nurture and aware of how these groups gain support. The trust and confidence-building that constitute social capital must be examined as part of the larger development strategy before investments are made.

The restoration of social capital should not be used as a subterfuge for transforming developing countries into models of liberal, free-market democracies. When outbreaks of violent conflict are explained as "deficits of social capital," the roots of the problem are conveniently located in the psychological profile of the soci-

ety in question, thereby absolving the policy of economic liberalization for any share of the blame for the breakdown of the social contract. Efforts to nurture social capital should focus on enabling forms of capital that are socially owned, such as education, health, or technology-transfer services. Overall, rehabilitation of social capital may play an important role in the recovery of a war-torn society, but the forms and manifestations of social capital to be restored should be monitored, and the reasons for support need to be regularly and systematically examined by all involved.

### **The West Bank: Paying Attention to Politics**

Efforts to rebuild trust among civil society and other institutions can be thwarted if they are not matched by strong political will. A good example is provided by events in the Middle East in the early 1990s. The peace process for the West Bank and Gaza had great momentum in September 1993. Aid organizations had agreed on a blueprint for the development of infrastructure and social rebuilding and acted in coordination toward this end. Yet little has been accomplished, because it was implicitly assumed that the development process could proceed separately from the political process. Donors and development agencies presumed that politicians would continue to implement the peace process, and that this political process was not directly related to the efficacy of development intervention. However, when violence erupted in 1994, the international community, donors, and the Israelis were forced to re-examine their assumptions and pay closer attention to the potential impact of political events on social reconstruction.

### **Rwanda: Seeking Justice**

Also in 1994, another tragedy was unfolding in Rwanda. The ethnic war between Hutu and Tutsi came to a head in April with the death of the nation's president, provoking a total break-

*"In post-genocide Rwanda, human rights and justice issues have complicated the rebuilding of civil society. Rehabilitation in such a context demands justice."*

—Hassan Ba,  
Synergie Afrique

down of public order. The result was the genocide of over 500,000 people. In post-genocide Rwanda, human rights and justice issues have complicated the rebuilding of civil society. Rehabilitation in such a context demands justice. Yet the efforts required to restore social capital in the wake of such massive tragedy exceed the current capacity of the international community to respond. Survivors and perpetrators alike must be treated according to appropriate legal standards that encourage healing and a restoration of trust. Many important, but unresolved, issues surround the reconstruction of a judicial system adequate to respond to the legal rights and obligations of the state toward its citizens. Part of resolving these issues requires that the international community and governments better define criminal behavior, the status and rights of criminals, and the process of demilitarization and demobilization of criminal forces. Considering the level of devastation that occurred in Rwanda, it is still too early to determine whether Rwandan society can deal with accountability, punishment, and reconciliation in the short-run, or whether a much longer-term approach will be necessary to restore trust and legitimacy among social groups.

## **Bosnia: Keeping an Eye on the Media**

The media also wield a strong influence on efforts to nurture civil society and social capital in the reconstruction period. In Bosnia, even after the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, the media continued to operate as it had during the conflict, and the war-mongering continued. This occurred for two principal reasons: first, different parties to the conflict supported various media groups during the war; and second, writing about war was familiar territory to journalists, but economic reconstruction was not. Most Bosnians were largely concerned about finding jobs, rebuilding society, and reinstating some form of normalcy, but the media's stance helped refuel tensions and posed a potential threat to rehabilitation and the restoration of social capital. Since the media have a strong impact on the formation of public opinion—and thus the possibility of restoring social capital—the international community should monitor media activities during war-to-peace transition periods and try to clamp down on hate-mongering.

*"By explaining an outbreak of violent conflict as a deficit of social capital, the roots of the problem are conveniently located in the psychological make-up of the society in question, thereby obscuring the policy of economic liberalization for the attribution of the blame for the breakdown of the social contract."*

—Nick Stockton,  
Oxfam (U.K.)

## Creating an Enabling Environment for the Private Sector

After the fighting stops, the economic reconstruction of a country requires a variety of interventions from both international donors and the private sector. The country's infrastructure is typically destroyed, its markets depleted, and its currency weakened or worthless. Human resources are diminished by refugee flows and the flight of the elite, and little institutional capacity exists to help quickly rebuild and replenish these deficits. The destruction of financial, government, and legal structures makes economic restoration all the more difficult. Although there is much economic activity after war, for the most part it is informal and trade-oriented and does not involve production. Unregulated trade is usually rampant, leaving little money in the country and often involving smuggling. In most cases funds for businesses must be provided quickly at the local level to prevent corruption. Alliances between government, civil society, and multinational corporations (MNCs) are crucial to restructuring business.

From Eastern Europe to southern Africa, the private sector remains an important force in development. Partnerships between local communities, private business, and international actors have begun to transform reconstruction from a donor-driven operation to one with more emphasis on the marketing of a country's resources as a source of new capital. In the long run the local private sector will remain the main source of new investment, jobs, and an expanding resource base in the community.

### A Public-Private Partnership in Angola

The World Bank's recent private-public initiative in war-torn Angola is a good example of partnering between the government, MNCs, and civil society. The Bank sponsored an assessment of the private sector to determine whether it had contributed to Angola's development. The survey revealed that MNCs had made few attempts at development activities, and that there were few incentives for long-

term community investments. When development work was undertaken, it was usually in the form of charity to health or education institutions, with the goal of improving relations with the public or the government. Based on these findings, the Bank encouraged increased MNC investment by stressing the resulting long-term benefits—a healthier, more educated, and more gainfully employed community will better support MNCs through labor and demand for products. As a result of this consultative process, members of the surrounding communities and the MNCs helped undertake rehabilitation efforts and came to understand that investment offered benefits for both sides.


### Private Investment and Infrastructure

Lebanon provides an example of the important role to be played by aid to utility companies in post-conflict economies. In general, utility companies invest for the long-term; and after war, the basic services they provide are necessary for the reconstruction process to begin and to attract new investment. In order for companies to stimulate new investment in a post-conflict society, transition governments must create conditions capable of attracting international capital and the relocation of companies. International banks and financial institutions should focus on assisting businesses by creating incentives for such ventures. Electricité de France has played an important role in rebuilding Lebanon's electricity network, but with the understanding that local ownership is critical to sustainability. Local staff must be motivated, appropriately trained, and employed to facilitate a complete transfer of knowledge and technical operations.

## Security and Development

Military conversion is another important aspect of the transition from war to peace. Since the end of the Cold War, almost 3.9 percent of the world's gross domestic product has been freed for use in other sectors. However, the results of this "peace dividend" have not been immediately visible. After a war there is an immediate need for the creation of a sustainable security sector, which implies some reinvestment of savings from fighting to other types of appropriate defense operations, as well as retraining combatants for productive peacetime occupations. External actors need to play an active role in the area of post-conflict security needs. Controlling the illegal weapons trade, demilitarizing police forces, and restructuring armies can be important stabilizing factors in countries making the transition from war to peace. Some-

times weapons are one of the country's major investments; close attention must be paid to the disarmament process to avert further conflict. A reformed security sector will alleviate many concerns of potential investors, and thus help to rebuild the economy.



*Controlling the illegal weapons trade, demilitarizing police forces, and restructuring armies can be important stabilizing factors in countries transitioning from war to peace."*

Herbert Wulf, Director,  
International Conversion Center

## The Challenge of Conflict Prevention and the International Community

Participants at the Paris meeting generally agreed that the international community should not concentrate on preventing conflict so much as preventing violent conflict and genocide—which until now it has failed to do. International actors can gather lessons learned from cases such as Rwanda or Bosnia to assess what went wrong and what may be done in the future to avert similar man-made tragedies.

*"If genocide is still possible in the world in which we live, people can be sure of its survival."*

—Alain Destexhe, *President of the International Crisis Group*

In Bosnia the international community was aware of the preparations for ethnic cleansing several months before conflict erupted, yet did nothing to stop it. The U.N. Security Council and Secretary General, as well as a number of key governments

involved, all ignored their legal obligation under the international convention against genocide by failing both to prevent the ethnic cleansing from occurring and to protect the victims. This failure was caused by a lack of political will and sound analysis of political events, as well as a flawed understanding of the root causes of the crisis. In other situations, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the international community and various humanitarian organizations were responsible for reinstating those who allegedly launched the genocide and did not provide sufficient support to the victims.


Lessons from the past, both technical and political, need to be absorbed and taken into consideration for future policy. The international community should focus on conflict prevention in four areas:

- *Politics.* In the past the political will to curb conflict has involved economic sanctions and embargoes. This type of behavior often leads to huge humanitarian disasters, while

failing to weaken the power of wayward leaders. A more effective strategy on the part of the international community might be to freeze the assets and personal accounts of such leaders being held abroad and to limit the number of visas and permits they and their families are allowed.

- *Justice* is a key concern for conflict prevention, for without justice, there can be no post-conflict reconciliation. Each country must be considered independently. Bosnia, Rwanda, and South Africa, for example, each require different types of truth commissions, for their situations are quantitatively and qualitatively different in terms of the level and impact of conflict. The International Court of Justice has not been helpful in developing guidelines. For a lasting peace to take root, there must be a perception and some tangible evidence that justice has been served. In this regard local courts must be involved in the reconciliation process.
- *Institution building* is critical to post-war reconstruction, both within government and civil society, to create an adequate political, social, and economic structure for the future.
- *Civil society.* Within civil society organizations, special attention should be paid to the media, given its enormous potential to influence the attitudes and behavior of citizens. Investment in a well trained, autonomous media can serve as a strong building block for reconstruction and prevention of future conflict.

Overall, however, no state-of-the-art formula for preventing and solving conflict has yet been devised. In order to avoid further deaths, the international community must come to terms with and learn from its past failures. International political will to avoid conflict, and the political instruments required to achieve this goal, must also be nurtured.



## Expanding the Vision


The second day of the Paris conference, attended mainly by post-conflict unit managers, marked the second time that leaders of donor organizations gathered to share information and better understand their respective missions. The first meeting, sponsored by USAID in October, 1997, allowed each unit to introduce itself and describe its activities and operational capacity in relationship to other similarly situated units. This represented a crucial first step to information sharing and collaboration in the realm of post-conflict reconstruction. The success of this meeting led the World Bank to sponsor the Paris meeting to enable the units to continue and expand their discussions. One of the most notable trends at the Paris gathering was the growing universe of post-conflict units. In the short period between October 1997 and April 1998, ten new units had been created and were actively up and running (see appendix B).

Among the key outcomes of the Paris meeting were a clearer understanding of the operational capacity of different units, more detailed information about the resources each unit has available to address post-conflict needs, and a more accurate sense of the timing required for a donor to disburse resources or provide operational support in the wake of a conflict. Another important outcome was increased openness to partnerships among donor agencies. Acceptance of the notion of working together—combining scarce resources and using the technical skills that each unit could lend to a given situation—made it evident that a new type of development is emerging in post-conflict situations. The new approach is less territorial, more client-oriented, and more attuned to devising programs to address some of the root causes of conflict. Unit managers also discussed the role of new frameworks for post-conflict operations, the comparative advantages of bilateral versus multilateral donors, how to define priorities, and sequencing resources and functions in a way that will support reconstruction.

## Donor Collaboration

Representatives of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) opened the second day of the meeting. As one of the first bilateral donors to create a post-conflict office with operational capacity and resources, OTI's representatives suggested that participating agencies should try to benefit from knowledge of, and lessons learned from, each other's field operations. In particular, it would be useful if one agency could build off another's platform in a post-conflict environment, thereby reducing initial investments and duplication of human resources. For example, OTI has already created several bases of operation that could be developed further by other donors to support large-scale programming in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This practice would be especially useful in situations where one donor might not have resources available immediately for intervention, but could easily participate in initial planning and transition from crisis to medium-term development programming.

In addition post-conflict units might be well served by developing a set of priority countries where reconstruction will inevitably be required. By expanding the vision of where such units might work in the future, it might be possible to develop a strategic approach to such places as Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, or Nigeria. Integrated planning would allow units to set goals that could move two or three countries from war to peace every year. Most large-



*...addressing post-conflict reconstruction through an approach such as "polycentric programming," various types of programs can be implemented by a wide range of actors who can support different high-priority needs simultaneously."*

Elizabeth Gibbons,  
UNICEF

scale reconstruction efforts require the bulk of a donor's resources; fewer resources are allocated to developing new models for rebuilding institutions or providing for community rehabilitation. Joint training of staff, especially for special tasks, is another way to stretch limited resources, and could also help agencies to respond collaboratively to crises. Staff from

of programs implemented by a wide range of actors who, together, could support different high-priority needs simultaneously.

## Canada and Peacebuilding

In Canada, a special fund for "peacebuilding activities" was initiated to support both political and development needs in post-conflict periods. The fund was designed to support short-term, gap-filling activities that can support interim stability, while other longer-term arrangements are being made. Canada views its peacebuilding initiative as a bridge between humanitarian assistance and development. It also uses its resources to set in operation the political initiatives and foreign policy objectives of its counterpart unit in Canada's foreign ministry.

*"Post-conflict units might be well served by developing a set of priority countries where reconstruction will inevitably begin. This integrated planning could allow units to set goals that could move two or three countries from war to peace every year."*

— Frederick Barton,  
director, USAID's Office of Transition  
Initiatives

different agencies that have received similar training will be more likely to take similar approaches and work well together.

Another difficult issue is determining who to collaborate with in a new, post-war government. This issue can have a tremendous impact on the ability of an agency to function during intervention, as well as on the effectiveness of the intervention. Fragile, unstable government leadership can further complicate responsiveness. Central to effective intervention is the ability of a donor agency to help support long-term development needs and build institutions to support these needs, without overburdening the government of countries emerging from crisis. An ideal approach to these issues would be through an approach called by UNICEF "polycentric programming," or the development of various types

## New Partners and New Processes

Donor discussions of their country's respective programs highlighted the existence of different "cultures of development." Reconstruction work can be a challenge for agencies whose dominant development culture is based on longer-term programs. UNICEF, for example, has no core funding to address manmade emergencies. Transitions to peace are often not given emergency treatment. Thus many of the actions required at the outset of a post-conflict program, such as local capacity building, cannot be supported in a timely fashion. The U. K.'s Department for International Development (DIFD), in contrast, has experienced a shift in emphasis toward conflict prevention, rather than general humanitarian assistance. For DIFD, the concept of "prevention" now embraces such areas as security sector reform—reduction of small arms, removal of land mines, and conversion of military resources. DIFD is also engaged in an analysis of conflict through impact assessments.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Program (FAO) is another agency long involved in monitoring of famine and technical support that has assumed a more activist and operational role since the end of the Cold War. Their emergency unit, created to support the more urgent demands on the FAO, is currently being transformed to carry out a new coordination role. In the reconstruction area, however, emergencies are funded on a case-by-case basis, similar to the way UNICEF handles such needs. In the absence of stand-by resources or a capacity to respond quickly, it is sometimes very difficult to provide the timely support that post-conflict reconstruction demands.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has always been an operational organization; in recent years it has become increasingly engaged in all areas of crisis management. From its original mandate as a neutral interlocutor and guardian of civilians in wartime, the ICRC has assumed an increasingly activist role, providing training for police and support for reconstruction, and sometimes serving as

the lone voice of authority in a world plagued by conflict. While the ICRC does not have a special unit devoted to post-conflict management, it views its field operations as central to informing others of on-the-ground conditions. The ICRC remains a key actor in a world with ill-defined centers of authority and plagued by ongoing conflicts.

The European Community's Emergency Humanitarian Operations (ECHO) was reorganized in 1992 and, in the process, moved beyond its purely humanitarian activities to a

*"The challenge for all post-conflict units will be how to become relevant as functional units within traditional development agencies or organizations."*

—Matthias Stiefel,  
War-torn Societies Project, UNRISD

wider range of support in post-conflict environments. As one of the world's largest humanitarian assistance donors, ECHO has experienced ever-increasing demands on its resources. It has, however, developed a working partnership with other donors to establish greater capacity to bring timely relief in complex emergencies. Operations in the post-conflict field are still being developed as part of a wider effort to be responsive to the changes in global politics. Since "long-term" to ECHO means only about six months, its work in the rehabilitation phase must be considered only a temporary contribution, but one which must be taken into consideration when other donors plan the reconstruction phase.

Cultivating respect for human rights in post-conflict periods has been the work of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) since its creation in 1994. The UNHCHR has been developing a field capacity and carrying out technical training to meet the challenges posed by the world's most horrific human rights violations—genocide in Rwanda, ongoing massacres in Burundi, and investigations of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Currently the UNHCHR can serve as a source of information and advice about conditions in the 31 countries where it is working. Often the organization can provide up-to-date information about local conditions and insights into the sources of conflict to involved post-conflict units. The UNHCHR is also concentrating on work in conflict prevention and training U.N. personnel and others who participate in UNHCHR monitoring missions in the relationship between law enforcement and human rights.

Despite these new activities, post-conflict units are still marginal to the work of most multilateral and bilateral donors. This problem stems, on the one hand, from international humanitarian actors that have no political component, and on the other, from development actors who are unwilling to admit the political origins of most intrastate conflicts. Indeed, the clear relationship between politics and field operations makes post-conflict units important interlocutors between development agencies and the unfolding of local events. Yet for many donors, responding to the needs of the post-conflict world seems inimical to the ordered, planned, and integrated nature of development. The challenge for all post-conflict units will be how to become relevant as functional units within traditional development agencies or organizations. Approaches to post-conflict reconstruction require more flexible methodologies in the field. Whether such practices can be mainstreamed will determine the future of post-conflict activities within the broader vision of how the special skills of those involved in reconstruction will be utilized and valued.

The transition from emergency to development assistance may be easier for humanitarian actors, since those who work at the relief end of the continuum tend to have a wider range of partners—due to the nature of emergencies and the varied skills required to address their needs. Those in traditional development agencies usually work in a more isolated fashion. It is obvious from the most recent experiences in post-conflict reconstruction that the development aspects of these complex emergencies require a much more team-oriented approach.

The international community has only begun to apply the lessons learned in the early 1990s to the field. We still lack a consistent analytical framework for assessing the post-conflict period. If post-conflict work is to be effective, the international community needs to develop specific standards for peacebuilding that take into account the short- and long-term nature of this work, so that such standards become a part of every operation. Three important steps in the direction of achieving such standards would include:

- Improving networking and coordination among existing post-conflict units and non-governmental actors engaged in this aspect of development
- Developing a series of indicators for peacebuilding
- Developing a more solid methodology for assessing hot spots and creating paradigms for exit strategies under a variety of conditions.

### **Clash or Congruence of Development Cultures?**

Examination of the different types of cultures that intersect in the transition environment raises questions about the issue of conditionality. Should it play a role in the transformation from humanitarian relief to post-conflict programs? The absence of conditions in the humanitarian

assistance phase, and the wider use of conditions in traditional development programs, leaves the transition period a gray area that begs for greater definition. Without the creation of operational principles, it will be difficult to integrate post-conflict work into the mainstream thinking of those who precede this type of intervention (humanitarian actors) or those who follow it (the development strategists).

In an effort to mainstream emergency assistance operations, The International Monetary Fund undertook a review in 1995. Three main recommendations emerged from the study:

- Each project should have only one or two lead agencies
- An initial blueprint or framework paper for the country should exist to guide actions
- An analysis of where the gaps or overlaps exist at the outset helps to avoid subsequent duplication of effort and waste of resources.

Using this IMF framework as a starting point, it is helpful to add the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict's outline of other important streamlining factors. Among those mentioned in the Carnegie report are:

- The identification of a "lead player—an international organization, country, or even prominent individual around which or whom preventive efforts can mobilize"
- The development of a "coherent political-military approach to the engagement designed to arrest the violence, address the humanitarian needs of the situation, and integrate all political and military aspects of the problem"
- "Adequate resources to support the preventive engagement"

- "A plan for the restoration of host country authority...particularly applicable to intrastate conflict."<sup>4</sup>

Participants also stressed the need to focus on the security aspects of post-conflict situations; for example, there is currently no international mechanism for police training during such periods. The huge gap in police, justice, security, and, to some extent, human rights policies, must be considered as the international community designs its reconstruction programs. Security and justice policies cannot wait for the long-term programming phase; they are time-sensitive and must be handled quickly. Yet major donors have not developed an appropriate way to deal with these issues.

Creating space for reconstruction within the humanitarian assistance phase is also crucial to long-term development. Unless there is some awareness in the early phases of a crisis that reconstruction will follow, the responsibility for transition work will fall on the shoulders of the humanitarian groups. While the U.N. High Commission for Refugees may currently be filling this niche in the humanitarian phase, links need to be created to allow others in the development community to enter early and participate in developing a more integrated post-conflict strategy.

## A New Development Culture

The development dimensions of crisis management still need to be drawn from the various cases that have absorbed much of the resources and attention of bilateral and multilateral donors since the end of the Cold War. What are the priorities for post-conflict units, in light of the difficult situations in which they operate? Those who attended the Paris meeting are

<sup>4</sup> Taken from the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict's *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1997, p. 40.

attempting to establish a mechanism to coordinate concepts, now that they have had the opportunity to share ideas and interact with those managing units and their staffs. Among the key areas for coordination, the group identified the highest priorities as being:

- Training
- Communication through Internet links
- Benchmarking progress
- Cataloguing best practices and lessons learned.

Crucial links among donors can translate into field programs that support the use of each other's platforms as a springboard for longer-term development activities.

While participants expressed concern that, at the operational level, post-conflict development is still lagging behind traditional development culture, it was also evident that much has been accomplished in the years since the first post-conflict units were created to fill the gap

between humanitarian response and long-term development assistance. The presence of so many donors, the rapid expansion of post-conflict units within the donor community, and lessons from recent events—from Haiti and Rwanda to Sierra Leone and Tajikistan—all point to a more enduring role for this area of development. The challenge to the international community is to recognize the critical importance of this transition period and provide the support necessary for post-conflict units to become development “players” with the full responsibilities and obligations that are central to sustaining peace, economic growth, and social equality.

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# Appendix A— Agenda, Day One and Day Two

## **Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects**

April 20, 1998

World Bank Paris Office

### **Introduction and Welcome**

*Nick van Praag, Acting Director, World Bank, European Office*

### **Moving Upstream: From Reconstruction to Prevention**

*Nat Colletta, Manager, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank*

### **The Folly of Conventional Wisdom: The Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

*Mark Malloch Brown, Vice President for External and UN Affairs, World Bank*

### **Session I: Good Development as Prevention: Lessons from Recent History**

*Moderator: Bernard Wood, Director, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD*

- Missed Opportunities in the Great Lakes—Winrich Kuehne, Deputy Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik
- The Role of Parallel Intermediation—Matteo Zuppi, Comunita' Sant'Egidio
- Recent Lessons from Iraq—Staffan de Mistura, Leader, UN Secretary General's Technical Team to Iraq
- The Post-Accord Period in Guatemala—Mauricio Valdes, Deputy Director, UNDP Mission in Guatemala

### **Session II: Strengthening Social Capital in the Wake of Conflict: Trust, Institutional Capacity and Civil Society**

*Moderator: Steven B. Holtzman, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank*

- Building Trust in the Great Lakes—Hasan Ba, Synergie Afrique
- Institution-Building in West Bank and Gaza—Rick Hooper, Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo
- Social Capital Formation in the Wake of Conflict—Nick Stockton, OXFAM
- The Media's Role in Building Social Capital—Mark Nelson, Economic Development Institute, World Bank

### **Session III: Creating an Enabling Environment for the Private Sector in Post-Conflict Economies**

*Moderator: Patrice Dufour, World Bank Resident Mission, Sarajevo*

- Public-Private Partnership in Angola—Andrew Mack, Knowledge Management Unit, World Bank
- EDF Experience in Lebanon's Reconstruction—Alain Regnier, Middle-East Area Manager, Electricité de France
- Local Authorities and the Promotion of the Private Sector in Reconstruction—Fabrizio Pizzanelli, Director, Department of International Activities, The Region of Tuscany
- Military Conversion and Economic Development—Herbert Wulf, Director, Bonn International Conversion Center

### **Concluding Remarks**

*Senator Alain Destexhe, President, International Crisis Group*

**Building New Partnerships  
for Post-Conflict Operations  
A Workshop for Post-Conflict Units**

April 21, 1998

World Bank Paris Office

**Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop**

*Nat Colletta, Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank*

**Remarks**

*Frederick Barton, Office of Transition Initiatives, US Agency for International Development*

**Session I Post-Conflict Units: How Do We Operate?**

*Moderator: Johanna Mendelson Forman, Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank*

*Panelists: Elizabeth Gibbons, UNICEF  
Michael Mahdesian, USAID  
Michael Small, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada  
Robert Walker, DIFDA, United Kingdom  
Anne Bauer, FAO*

**Session II Best Practices in Post-Conflict Operations**

*Moderator: Steven Holtzman, Post Conflict Unit, World Bank*

*Panelists: Matthias Stiefel, War-Torn Society Project, UNRISD  
Esther Brimmer, The Carnegie Corporation  
Larbi Mebtouche, UNHCR  
Lea Drouet, European Union, ECHO  
Hessemaddin Tabatabai, GTZ, Germany  
Gianni Magazzeni, UNHCHR  
William Hyde, International Organization for Migration*

**Session III Organizing for Effective Operations**

*Moderator: Carol Poldermans, The Netherlands*

*Panelists: Harold Siem, World Health Organization  
Lars Backstrom, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland  
Gerard Peytrignet, ICRC  
Gerhard Pfister, SDC, Switzerland*

**Closing Remarks Next Steps**

*Nat Colletta, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank*

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## Appendix C— Director of Post-Conflict Units

### Multilateral and Bilateral Donors

|   |        |
|---|--------|
| <b>Multilateral Organizations</b> .....   | 27     |
| European Community Humanitarian Office .....  | 27     |
| International Committee of the Red Cross .....  | 27     |
| International Monetary Fund .....   | 28     |
| International Organization for Migration .....  | 28     |
| United Nations Children’s Fund— <i>Office of Emergency Programs</i> .....   | 29     |
| United Nations Development Programme— <i>Emergency Response Division</i> .....  | 30     |
| United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization .....  | 31     |
| United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization— <i>Special Relief Operations Service</i> .....  | 32     |
| United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights .....   | 33     |
| United Nations High Commission for Refugees— <i>Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit</i> .....  | 34     |
| United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs .....  | 34     |
| United Nations Office for Project Services— <i>Division for Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability</i> .....  | 35     |
| United Nations Research Institute for Social Development— <i>War-Torn Societies Project</i> .....   | 36     |
| United Nations World Food Program .....   | 36     |
| United Nations World Health Organization— <i>Interagency Cooperation Unit</i> .....   | 37     |
| World Bank— <i>Post-Conflict Unit</i> .....   | 37     |
| <br><b>Bilateral Organizations</b> .....  | <br>39 |
| Canadian International Development Agency, Canada— <i>Peacebuilding Unit</i> .....  | 39     |
| Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada—<br><i>Peacebuilding and Human Security Division</i> .....                              | 40     |
| Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Germany—<br><i>Emergency Aid and Refugee Program</i> .....                                       | 40     |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands— <i>Conflict Prevention and<br/>    Crisis Management Division</i> .....                                 | 41     |
| Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sweden—<br><i>Division for Humanitarian Assistance</i> .....                                    | 42     |
| Department for International Development, United Kingdom—<br><i>Conflict and Human Affairs Department</i> .....                                       | 43     |
| United States Agency for International Development, United States—<br><i>Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Response</i> ..... | 44     |

## Multilateral Organizations

### European Community Humanitarian Office

#### Background Summary

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) is the unit of the European Commission that deals with humanitarian aid to countries outside the European Union. It was created in 1992 and was active in 85 countries as of 1997.

#### Regions

All regions: Latin America, Asia, the Mediterranean, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.

#### Resources

Headquarters staff: 121; field staff: 70. Funding in 1997: 442 million ECU.

#### Publications

*Manual of Best Practices, Manual of Procedures, Manual for Experts* (in preparation).

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Web page: [www.echo.cec.be/homepage.html](http://www.echo.cec.be/homepage.html)

### International Committee of the Red Cross

#### Background Summary

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a humanitarian, independent organization with an internationally recognized mandate, acts as a neutral intermediary between belligerents in situations of international and internal armed conflict as well as internal strife, and endeavors to ensure that victims of

war (that is, wounded and sick soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilian populations in general) receive protection and assistance.

Protection activities consist, for instance, of visiting prisoners of war and civilian detainees, tracing missing persons, and arranging for exchange of family messages. Assistance activities consist of providing medical care and material assistance to victims, as well as engaging in emergency relief and rehabilitation of populations affected by armed violence or its aftermath. It ensures that international humanitarian law (the Geneva Convention of 1949 and additional Protocols of 1977) is respected and promotes its dissemination. The ICRC has observer status to the UN General Assembly.

The ICRC has no post-conflict unit as such. Humanitarian activities in post-conflict situations, such as those conducted in the context of other situations under the ICRC's mandate or of ICRC's concern (for example, internal tensions and disturbances, international and non-international armed conflicts, and conflicts' direct aftermath), are carried out through the operational and regional field offices (delegations), under the hierarchical responsibility of the headquarters-based geographical zones and sectors, and under the supervision of the relevant functional units, which include the following:

- Health and Relief Divisions (surgery, orthopedics, water and sanitation, nutrition, agricultural and veterinary rehabilitation, and others).
- Protection Division (detention- and protection-related activities, tracing services).
- IHL Promotion and Communication and Legal Affairs Divisions (prevention activities, dissemination to armed and security forces and other target groups, promotion and education, campaigns, advisory services on IHL implementation).
- Cooperation within the Red Cross Movement Division (cooperation with and development of National Red Cross Societies).

## Regions

### *Africa*

ICRC delegations: Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire (covering the Republic of Congo). The ICRC also has seven regional delegations covering 39 countries.

### *Americas*

ICRC delegations: Colombia, Haiti, Peru; and four regional delegations covering more than 24 countries.

### *Asia*

ICRC delegations: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; and four regional delegations covering more than 37 countries.

### *Europe and Central Asia*

ICRC delegations: European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro), Tajikistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia; and six regional delegations covering more than 21 countries.

### *Middle East and North Africa*

ICRC delegations: Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the occupied territories and the autonomous territories, Syria; and two regional delegations covering 12 countries.

## Resources

Staff: Headquarters has more than 650 staff members; field staff numbers 7,850 (850 expatriates; 200 national societies; 6,800 local recruits).

Funding: In 1997 the ICRC total budget was US\$558 million.

## Contacts

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CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland  
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## International Monetary Fund

### Background Summary

The division's responsibilities include helping to formulate the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy framework for assisting post-conflict countries and reviewing social policy and military expenditure.

### Regions

Global operation. As of April 1998 the IMF had 182 member countries.

### Resources

The IMF provides financial assistance by extending credits and loans to member countries with balance-of-payments problems to support policies of adjustment and reform. It also provides emergency assistance by allowing members to make draw-downs to meet balance-of-payment needs in post-conflict situations. Technical assistance is also provided through expertise and aid to its members in several areas, including institution building.

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## International Organization for Migration

### Background Summary

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was established in 1951 under the name of Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, with the primary function to assist with the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. Over the years, a necessary extension of IOM role occurred in both scope and geographical basis. In 1987

IOM's council adopted specific amended Organization's Constitution to reflect these changes and altered its name to "International Organization for Migration."

IOM has nine major objectives on which it focuses its programming:

- To provide secure, reliable, cost effective services for persons who require migration assistance
- To provide relief and if necessary migration assistance, including resettlement and reintegration, to persons affected by emergencies and post-emergency environment, such as displaced persons, refugees, former combatants and affected population
- To be the reference point for information on international, regional, and internal migratory flows
- To offer expert advice and cooperation to Governments and other partners on migration matters
- To promote economic and social development in concerned countries through the design and implementation of migration related programs, including transfer of qualified human resources
- To be a forum for and provide leadership in the international debate on migration
- To undertake programs that facilitate the return and reintegration of displaced populations and take into account the needs and concerns of local communities of return and/or origin
- To help Government and migrants find solutions to the problems and causes of irregular undocumented migration
- To work towards effective respect of migrants' rights.

#### **Regions**

Countries of operations: Guatemala, Angola, Haiti, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Philippines, Albania and Mali. Regions of operation: Central and South East Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, Africa, Europe.

#### **Resources**

Staff: Small headquarters staff and over 200 staff in the field.

Funding: Over US \$35 million per year.

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#### **United Nations Children's Fund— Office of Emergency Programs**

##### **Background Summary**

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was established in 1946. Included in its Mission Statement are the following tasks:

"UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.... UNICEF insists that the survival, protection, and development of children are universal development imperatives that are integral to human progress....UNICEF mobilizes political will and material resources to help countries, particularly developing countries, ensure a 'first call for children' and to build their capacity to form appropriate policies and deliver services for children and their families....UNICEF aims, through its country programs, to promote the equal rights of women and girls and to support their full participation in the political, social and economic development of their countries.... UNICEF works with all its partners towards the attainment of the sustainable human development goals adopted by the world community and the realization of the vision of peace and social progress enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

### **Regions**

Eastern and Southern Africa, West and Central Africa, Middle East and North Africa, the Americas and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic States, Central Asia Offices (Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan).

UNICEF operates in over 160 countries, of which 25 are designated as “emergency countries.”

### **Resources**

UNICEF has eight regional offices and more than 130 field offices worldwide.

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## **United Nations Development Programme—Emergency Response Division**

### **Background Summary**

The Emergency Response Division (ERD) of the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) was created to give substantive support to U.N. Country Offices in their multiple roles in emergency situations, whether natural disaster or civil strife. The U.N. resident coordinators are usually the UNDP resident representatives, and normally also fulfill the humanitarian coordination function (as humanitarian coordinators). Experience has shown that the need for U.N. system leadership and coordination becomes crucial during such periods given the

increasing demand for coordination and programming. The emergency backstopping of country offices is accomplished in close collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator (OCHA/ERC), with special units in U.N. system organizations and agencies, and with bilateral donors and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

The ERD is part of the UNDP’s Operational Support Group (OSG) within the Office of the Administrator, and is headed by a director. There are two deputy directors, one located in New York and the other in Geneva, where UNDP’s Disaster Management Program is located. All ERD staff have extensive experience working in crisis environments in the field.

The ERD works in close collaboration with the UNDP’s regional bureaus and country offices, which have direct management responsibility for the UNDP’s development cooperation programs, as well as in consultation with other UNDP units.

### **Regions**

Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Arab States, CIS States, and Asia and the Pacific, including approximately 20 to 25 crisis and post-crisis countries.

### **Resources**

The ERD staff includes 15 specialized professionals with additional support staff. The ERD has approximately US\$135 million in core funding until the year 2000, but other funding sources are available. Two types of operations funded by the ERD are:

*Program responses to complex development situations during and after crises:*

- Strategic programming instruments for international and national action
- Special program initiatives (such as mine action, reintegration, and governance) within such program strategies

- Immediate support to strengthen the country and the U.N. system's ability to provide a coordinated, rapid response to a sudden crisis
- Support is provided for coordination functions of the government and the resident coordinator or representative, including situation assessment and reporting, response planning, resource mobilization, and logistics support.

*Capacity building to avoid and prepare for crises:*

- Stimulating national awareness and human resource development
- Assisting national institutions with programs aimed at anticipating, preventing, mitigating, and managing crisis
- Providing temporary supplemental support to resident coordinators and representatives to facilitate planning and coordination of special program initiatives.

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**United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization**

**Background Summary**

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) constitution was adopted by the London Conference in November 1945, and entered into effect on 4 November 1946 when 20 states had deposited instruments of acceptance. It currently has 186 Member States. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without

distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations. To realize this purpose the Organization will: (a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image; (b) Give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture; and (c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of the Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

**Regions**

Field Offices worldwide, including Africa, Arab States Region, Asia and Pacific Region, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Europe and North America Region. Other units away from Headquarters: Liaison offices with the United Nations, Education Offices/ Institutes.

**Resources**

Headquarters: 3 Sections - about 30 staff.  
 186 Member States and the 4 Associate Members.

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## **United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization— Special Relief Operations Service**

### **Background Summary**

The Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) is currently a service within the Field Operations Division (TCO) of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) Technical Cooperation Department (TC).

The FAO is a key player in emergencies. Its focus is on food production and agriculture, reflecting its specialization and responsibility within the U.N. family. Assisting in preventing disaster-related emergencies, providing early warning of food emergencies, and helping to rehabilitate food production systems are the FAO's predominant roles in humanitarian aid. The main forms of the FAO's intervention include: needs assessments, provision of agricultural inputs, technical assistance for the planning and management of sustainable recovery, and *rehabilitation of rural production systems*. The FAO does not provide food aid; that service is performed by the World Food Program.

The TCOR responds to requests for emergency assistance from countries affected by calamities, natural or manmade, on matters falling within the FAO's mandate. In coordination with other units concerned, the Service formulates the FAO's position on emergency matters. It also provides information and advice on its activities and functions to FAO representatives on the Inter-Agency Steering Committee on Humanitarian Activities and its Working Groups, and ensures liaison both within and outside the UN system on emergency operations. Its implementation activities focus on the urgent recovery requirements of disaster-stricken areas. It also assists in the establishment of related preparedness, post-emergency, and recovery measures.

Activities include:

- In consultation with other units and, as appropriate, with outside organizations, identifying, assessing, and monitoring emergency

relief and rehabilitation needs in sectors within the FAO's field of competence, and appraising requests for disaster relief and rehabilitation.

- Making recommendations for FAO actions in emergency situations, which may include assistance in the establishment of related preparedness, post-emergency, and recovery measures. It formulates and executes emergency and special relief projects to support the rehabilitation of agricultural, livestock, and related sectors through the provision of required inputs and services.
- Maintaining contact with recipient governments and donors through established channels of communication and administers trust funds made available for emergency operations.
- Coordinating the preparation of the FAO's contribution to consolidated appeals on agricultural relief needs for submission to Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- Ensuring periodic reporting on emergency situations and the development of appropriate preparedness, post-emergency, and recovery measures.

### **Regions**

The FAO and TCOR operate worldwide; as of May 1998 TCOR was intervening in 69 countries, following natural and manmade disasters. Between 1991 and 1997 more than 40 percent of TCOR operations were in Sub-Saharan Africa, 29 percent were in North Africa and the Near East, and 15 percent in Asia.

### **Resources**

The FAO has offices in more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. In countries where the FAO is not represented, the UNDP office serves as focal point for FAO affairs. In complex emergency situations, and when funding resources permit, the FAO may field senior agronomists to set up an emergency coordination unit to strengthen its presence in the country for all matters related to relief and early rehabilitation.

In 1997 the TCOR spent over US\$61 million on 83 projects in 33 countries. During the first quarter of 1998, the TCOR approved 41 new projects in 24 countries, at a cost of over US\$50 million.

Except for small, limited interventions funded by FAO's Technical Cooperation Program, the funding for all FAO-assisted agricultural relief assessment missions and field operations, and for many emergency prevention and preparedness activities, comes from extra-budgetary resources provided by external donors (governmental and nongovernmental bodies, multilateral funding organizations, and U.N. bodies).

#### **Publications**

Please refer to the UN Humanitarian Assistance Training Inventory (HATI) site: [www.reliefweb.int/resource/training/t27.html](http://www.reliefweb.int/resource/training/t27.html)

The FAO is currently preparing an FAO emergency preparedness and response manual and a publication on integrating household food security and nutrition into relief and rehabilitation. These publications should be useful to organizations active in emergency aid in the food and agricultural sector. In addition specific technical publications, such as the recent publication *La production des semences de qualite declare au Rwanda* should be useful to those involved in emergency operations.

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## **United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**

### **Background Summary**

The General Assembly of the United Nations officially established the U.N. Program of Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights through its resolution 926. In that resolution the General Assembly (GA) specifically authorized the Secretary General to make provision, at the request of governments, for providing assistance in the field of human rights, including advisory services of experts, fellowships and scholarships, and seminars. Subsequently, the GA expanded the services available under the program to include regional and national human rights training courses. The program was further strengthened through the establishment of the Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights by the Secretary General on November 16, 1987.

The objective of the trust fund is to provide additional financial support for practical activities focused on the implementation of international conventions and other international instruments on human rights promulgated by the UN, its specialized agencies, or regional organizations. States may receive, at their request, technical assistance in the promotion and protection of human rights. Technical cooperation projects are undertaken in specific countries as well as at the regional and international levels. Such projects might include training courses for, among others, members of the armed forces, police forces, or the legal profession, as well as advisory services for the incorporation of international human rights norms and standards into national legislation.

Financed mainly by voluntary contributions, technical cooperation is a quickly expanding area of the United Nations Human Rights Program. Increasingly, technical cooperation projects are implemented through the establishment of a long-term presence in the countries concerned. In some cases, along with technical cooperation activities, field presence might also include a monitoring component.

**Regions**

Africa, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Central and South America. Operations in 56 countries.

**Resources**

Twenty-two office locations.

**Publications**

*Trainer's Guide on Human Rights and Police, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, Human Rights and Prisons* (forthcoming), *Guidelines for Electoral Assistance* (forthcoming), *Human Rights and Conflict Resolution* (forthcoming).

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**United Nations High Commission for Refugees—Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit**

**Background Summary**

The Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit (RSRU) is responsible, among other things, for:

- Providing, mobilizing, and coordinating support (internal and external) for reintegration operations—with a focus on the formulation of reintegration strategies and design of related assistance programs
- Providing and coordinating support (internal and external) for field refugee programs—with a focus on development of self-reliance strategies that promote local integration and reintegration
- Promotion and development of operational cooperation and partnership—in refugee and returnee aid and development—with multilateral, regional, and bilateral development institutions, including international financial institu-

tions, and acting as focal point within the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for cooperation with these organizations.

**Regions**

All regions where the UNHCR is present  
Support to all UNHCR field operations

**Resources**

One office in Geneva with five staff members  
Publications: *Policies Framework and Manual on Self-Reliance, Employment and Microfinance* (December 1997) and *Operational Framework for UNHCR Intervention in (Post-conflict) Repatriation and Reintegration Operations*.

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**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**

**Background Summary**

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established pursuant to the adoption of the Secretary-Generals program for reform. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 46/182, the Emergency Relief Coordinators functions are focused in three core areas: (a) policy development and coordination functions in support of the Secretary-General, ensuring that all humanitarian issues, including those which fall between gaps in existing mandates of agencies such as protection and assistance for internally displaced persons, are addressed; (b) advocacy of humanitarian issues with political organs, notably the Security Council; and (c) coordination of humanitarian emergency response, by ensuring that an appropriate

response mechanism is established, through Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) consultations, on the ground.

#### **Regions**

OCHA currently maintains field coordination arrangements in 16 countries and one region: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Great Lakes, Republic of the Congo, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan.

#### **Resources**

Headquarters staff (New York and Geneva): 137 (50 regular budget posts; 87 extrabudgetary) Core annual budget: \$42.4 million (regular budget \$18.4 million, extrabudgetary \$24 million) OCHA field staff: 51.

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#### **United Nations Office for Project Services—Division for Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability**

##### **Background Summary**

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) manages project resources to help developing nations and countries in transition in their quest for peace, social stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. UNOPS is an entity of the United Nations System reconstituted as of 1 January 1995 for the specific purpose of providing development services to projects and programs supported by UN member states and organizations. Three

unique features differentiate UNOPS from other UN system agencies, organizations and programs: UNOPS specializes in the management of programs and projects; UNOPS does not fund programs or projects; and UNOPS operations, like those of UNDP/OPE and UNDP/OPS before it, are self-financing.

#### **Regions**

Developing countries and countries in transition, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNDP - Trust Funds and Administered Funds, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, United Nations Capital Development Funds, Montreal Protocol Trust Fund, United Nations Development Fund for Women, United Nations Fund for Science and Technology For Development, Office to Combat Desertification and Drought.

#### **Resources**

Offices: Headquarters in New York. Other offices in Copenhagen, Abidjan, Geneva, Kuala Lumpur, Nairobi, San Salvador, and Tokyo.

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#### **United Nations Research Institute for Social Development—War-Torn Societies Project**

##### **Background Summary**

The War-torn Societies Project (WSP) began in 1994 as an experimental action-research project collectively sponsored by some 20

bilateral and multilateral actors in the international assistance field. The U.N. Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and its Program for Strategic and International Security Studies are the WSP's institutional hosts, providing the institutional structure and the multiple identities (such as United Nations, Swiss, political, and academic) that the project needs to perform its tasks.

The project aims to assist the international community, along with national and local actors, to understand and better respond to the complex challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies in post-conflict situations. The WSP has established four country projects, located in Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia, and Guatemala. In each country the project has set up a mechanism (a project group and working groups) that provides a neutral forum for the main external and internal actors to meet and jointly choose pertinent rebuilding issues to discuss and analyze. Each country team produces final country project evaluations and a set of policy and operational recommendations, in addition to papers and reports from workshops, seminars, and local-level research and thematic studies.

#### Regions

Africa: Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia; Central America: Guatemala

#### Resources

Once central office in Geneva with eight to 15 staff members. One to three field offices in each country project, with five to 10 staff members in each country. The number of staff members varies depending on the phase of the project.

At present, the project is phasing out and will conclude its activities by the end of 1998. Funding of between US\$2 and US\$2.5 million per year during the various stages of the project. The WSP is a multidonor project, with over 26 donors. Voluntary contributions range from US\$1,000 to more than US\$1 million per donor.

#### Publications

The WSP's Central Co-ordination Unit in Geneva is recording and comparing findings and drawing lessons useful to the international community. A set of core papers, articulating and analyzing the WSP experience in the four selected countries, including comparative analyses and overall evaluation of the WSP, are being compiled for dissemination in late 1998. Based on lessons learned, the project will produce a set of tools relevant to and useful for policymakers and operational actors—such as guidelines and recommendations. The project will then disseminate WSP lessons and tools to discrete audiences in specialized packages that will make project results easy to use and adapted to the needs of those likely to make use of them.

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#### United Nations World Food Program

##### Background Summary

The vision of the World Food Program (WFP) is a world in which every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. Without food, there can be no sustainable peace, no democracy and no development. WFP is the frontline United Nations organization fighting to eradicate world hunger — whether it is the hunger that suddenly afflicts people fleeing ethnic conflict in Rwanda or Bosnia or the chronic hunger that affects the hungry poor in countries such as Bangladesh or India. WFP became operational in 1963 and is now the world's largest international food aid organization. WFP's mission is: 1) to save the lives of people caught up in humanitarian crises, through

Food-For-Life; 2) to support the most vulnerable people at the most critical times of their lives, through Food-For-Growth; and 3) to help the hungry poor become self-reliant and build assets, through Food-For-Work. In emergencies, WFP provides fast, efficient, life-sustaining relief to millions of people who are the victims of natural or man-made disasters, including refugees and the displaced. The Program is responsible for mobilizing all basic food commodities, and funds for meeting transport costs, for all large-scale refugee feeding operations managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

#### **Regions**

Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, North Africa and Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and CIS. The WFP operates in 84 countries.

#### **Resources**

WFP's staff of 4,000 people work in food aid emergency and development operations that benefit 53 million people. WFP expenditure for 1997 was \$1.2 billion, which provided nearly one third of all global food aid — 2.7 million metric tons.

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### **United Nations World Health Organization—Interagency Cooperation Unit**

#### **Background Summary**

The Interagency Cooperation Unit (ICU) has three main missions: (1) to define the role of

the World Health Organization in relation to other agencies, for complementarity and partnership; (2) to promote policies, standards, and guidelines for good public health practices during emergencies and post-conflict transitions; and (3) to facilitate research in the areas of health and population movements.

The main project goals are to consolidate emergency technical guidelines, develop health information systems for use by agencies in early warning and during emergencies, and develop a conceptual framework and practical guidelines for health interventions during the transition phase.

#### **Regions**

Africa, Asia, and the Pacific

#### **Resources**

Three offices: One each in Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia.

Funding: Nearly US\$1 million from multiple sources.

Publications: Best practices and guidelines.

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### **The World Bank—Post-Conflict Unit**

#### **Background Summary**

The Bank created the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) within the Social Development Department in July 1997. The Unit's work includes:

- Policy development and operational support to Bank staff and client governments. This includes social and economic analysis that looks at the sources and causes of conflict with the aim of reducing the potential for

conflict through development activities which promote inclusion, participation, and social cohesion; watching briefs during conflicts to inform future interventions of the post-conflict situation, the effects of conflict on development, and the assessment of damage and needs in the effected areas; and the design and implementation of transitional support strategies and early reconstruction programs;

- Knowledge-building and sharing within the Bank and in the wider development community;
- Training and capacity-building within the Bank, and in other development agencies and client countries; and
- Developing partnerships within and outside the Bank and representation of the Bank in international fora on reconstruction.

The Bank's work on post-conflict reconstruction eases the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and supports socioeconomic development. The PCU's work relies on a partnership within the Bank and among the United Nations system, the International Monetary Fund, other institutions, and bilateral donors to support this transition, including the following integrated interventions:

- partnering with other donors that have the capacity to respond rapidly to emergency needs;
- jump-starting the economy through investment in key productive sectors; creating the conditions for resumption of trade, savings, and domestic and foreign investment; and promoting macroeconomic stabilization, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks;
- re-establishing the framework of governance by strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively;
- repairing vital physical infrastructure, including key transport, communication, and utility networks; assisting with food security;

- rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure and human capital (such as in education, health, and nutrition);
- targeting assistance to those affected by war through reintegration of displaced populations, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, revitalization of the local communities most disrupted by conflict through such means as credit lines to subsistence agriculture and microenterprises, and support for vulnerable groups such as female-headed households;
- restoring social capital (including trust and organizational capacity);
- supporting land mine action programs, where relevant, including mine surveys and demining of key infrastructure, as part of comprehensive develop strategies for supporting a return to normal life of populations living in mine-polluted areas; and
- normalizing financial borrowing arrangements by planning a work-out of arrears, debt rescheduling, and the longer-term path to financial normalization.

### Regions

Recently, the Bank has played a key role in providing a social safety net for conflict-affected populations in the successor states of the former Soviet Union; and coordinating international aid in Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in the West Bank and Gaza. The Bank has also supported demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries such as Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Mozambique, and Uganda; reintegration of displaced populations in Azerbaijan, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone; and post-conflict community development programs in Angola, Colombia, Eritrea, and Rwanda. Internal guidelines for financing land mine clearance have been approved, and demining programs are underway in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Croatia. Contribution has also been made to the international Bosnian and Guatemalan peace processes, and rehabilitated critical infrastructure in Azerbaijan, Haiti, and Tajikistan. During each of these interventions, partnering occurred with other United Nations agencies,

bilaterals, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

#### **Resources**

To help the Bank respond rapidly to early reconstruction situations, support partnerships, and foster a better understanding of post-conflict reconstruction, a new grant facility - the Post-Conflict Fund - was established in August 1997 as part of a larger Bank Development Grant Facility. The Fund finances conflict analysis and prevention measures, watching briefs, transitional support strategies, and related studies and activities when other World Bank instruments are unavailable. In addition, the program can offer catalytic funding to address emergency needs in countries on the precipice of conflict and emerging from conflict.

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## **Bilateral Organizations**

### **Canadian International Development Agency, Canada—Peacebuilding Unit**

#### **Background Summary**

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was announced on October 30, 1996, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as a joint initiative with the Minister of International Cooperation. The Peacebuilding Fund, operating since April 1, 1997, is one of the main components of this ministerial initiative. The fund is managed by the Peacebuilding Unit at the Canadian Inter-

national Development Agency (CIDA); its mandate is to respond quickly to urgent peacebuilding needs that cannot be met through other funding sources.

Peacebuilding refers to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, or post-conflict reconciliation activities. The focus is on the political and socioeconomic context of conflicts, rather than military or humanitarian aspects. The fund supports local initiatives that promote dialogue and develop local leadership aimed at peacebuilding. Areas of intervention may include conflict resolution, national reconciliation, or the strengthening of local institutions that contribute to social peace. The interventions are well defined, well targeted, and innovative. They must be able to bring about the reconciliation of the parties in conflict and, as a result, contribute to peacebuilding. The activities of the fund aim to help restore a social balance and sustainable peace, and, at the same time, promote dialogue and communication. Non-governmental organizations; U.N. agencies; or other national, regional, or international organizations may be called upon to implement activities financed by the fund.

#### **Regions**

Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, El Salvador, Great Lakes, Guatemala, Haiti, Horn of Africa, Lebanon, Middle East, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, West Africa,

#### **Resources**

One office with three staff members, and a \$10 million (Canadian) program budget.

#### **Contact**

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**Department of Foreign Affairs and  
International Trade, Canada—  
Peacebuilding and Human Security Division**

**Background Summary**

The Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (AGP) of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) was created in 1995 with a view to increasing Canada's capacity to contribute internationally to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and democratic development. In 1996 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for International Cooperation launched a "Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative" designed to assist countries in conflict in their efforts toward peace and stability, and to promote Canadian peacebuilding capacity and participation in international peacebuilding initiatives.

The AGP is both a policy development and a programming division. Policy issues currently under development include strengthening cooperative approaches to conflict prevention, gender and peacebuilding, small arms proliferation and peacebuilding, and children in armed conflict. AGP works with CIDA in developing peacebuilding initiatives for support from CIDA's Peacebuilding Fund. AGP also manages a smaller funding mechanism, the DFAIT Peacebuilding Program, designed to support peacebuilding initiatives in areas that fall outside of CIDA's mandate or priorities.

**Regions**

The DFAIT Peacebuilding program was established to complement the Peacebuilding Fund, administered by CIDA. Therefore, it supports activities primarily aimed at strengthening multilateral mechanisms for peacebuilding and Canadian domestic peacebuilding capacity, and thus does not generally fund projects in the field. One recent exception is the program's

support for a small arms survey, executed by the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa.

**Resources**

AGP has five permanent staff in Ottawa working on peacebuilding and conflict issues. The Peacebuilding Program is administered by one other officer. Other staff are placed under contract for short-term assignments.

The Peacebuilding Program has resources of \$1 million (Canadian) annually. It is a quick-response mechanism designed to support catalytic peacebuilding initiatives in areas that fall outside of CIDA's mandate or priorities.

**Publications**

Peacebuilding policy documents and detailed information on peacebuilding projects funded under the program are available in English and French on the organization's Web page.

**Contact**

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**Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische  
Zusammenarbeit, Germany—  
Emergency Aid and Refugee Program**

**Background Summary**

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH (German Technical Cooperation) in Eschborn, Germany is one of the world's largest consultancy organizations for development cooperation. GTZ was established in 1975, is owned by the German government, and implements technical cooperation activities of the government.

In 142 countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and in the transition countries of Central Europe, more than 10,000 GTZ coworkers are helping to improve living standards and opportunities for local people and preserve their natural basis of life. GTZ's chief financing organization is the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation Development (BMZ). GTZ is a public-benefit company and primarily uses public funds for its operations. Surpluses are used exclusively for development cooperation projects.

#### Regions

GTZ operates in 135 countries, with 2,700 ongoing projects. Regions include Africa, Asia, the Near and Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

Unit 4334 operates in:

*Latin America* - Guatemala, Peru

*Africa* - Angola, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda

*Asia* (Cambodia, China, Mongolia, Sri Lanka)

*Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* - Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Georgia.

#### Resources

GTZ has 63 country offices; head office staff numbers 1,360, and field staff 8,680. Funding comes from the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), budget titles for technical assistance and emergency/refugee aid, other federal ministries, and international organizations and partners.

#### Publications

Information materials and concept papers on:

- Crisis prevention and conflict management
- Emergency and humanitarian aid
- Refugee programs
- Rehabilitation and reconstruction
- Reintegration of ex-combatants
- Integrated demining
- Prevention and management of natural disasters.

#### Contact

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#### Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands—Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Division

#### Background Summary

The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Division and the Humanitarian Assistance Division make up the Directorate for Crisis Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DCH). This directorate was established in 1996 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring together the various policy approaches to complex emergencies. In particular it was deemed important to de-compartmentalize emergency relief and the political aspects of crisis management.

The objective of DCH is to integrate various policy options—political, humanitarian, developmental, economic, and even military—into a coherent response not only to crises, but also to potential violent conflicts and to post-conflict peace building. The Directorate answers to both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation. The work of the Conflict Prevention Unit is not confined to policymaking, but also comprises financing programs and projects in several post-conflict countries and core funding of a limited number of international nongovernmental organizations.

#### Regions

Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, the Philippines, Rwanda, and Sudan.

### Resources

The Conflict Prevention Unit consists of a division head, a deputy head, and four policy advisers. There are no field offices apart from their embassies. The unit shares a budget with the Humanitarian Assistance Division. In 1997 it disbursed NGL39 million. These two organizations fund both long-term (demobilization) and short-term (symposia) projects.

### Contact

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### Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sweden—Division for Humanitarian Assistance

#### Background Summary

The Division for Humanitarian Assistance is responsible for government funding to the Swedish International Development cooperation Agency (SIDA) for humanitarian assistance to alleviate the consequences of natural disasters and armed conflicts. Priority is given to countries that lack resources of their own to mitigate the effects. Long-term development effects are taken into consideration in the planning of projects, which, in addition to emergency relief, can be of a preventative or rehabilitation nature. In emergency situations, for example, where refugees are involved, humanitarian considerations must govern the planning and organization of the projects. Humanitarian assistance is administered through grants to Swedish nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and U.N. bodies, as well as directly through Swedish agencies and consultants.

SIDA's work in the area of humanitarian assistance includes:

- Following conflicts in a large number of countries, even outside SIDA's circle of partner countries, in order to be prepared to assess needs for humanitarian assistance should they arise
- Preparing, following up on, and evaluating projects financed by through appropriations for humanitarian assistance as well as humanitarian projects financed through other funds
- Maintaining a constant dialogue with other parties involved in the field of humanitarian assistance, in Sweden and internationally
- Taking the initiative to ensure that strategic resources are available for such activities as mine clearance, through dialogue with different organizations.

### Regions

A listing of the regions where SIDA is operating is presented yearly in the division's *Situation Report for Humanitarian Assistance*.

### Resources

SIDA will be providing some 8 billion kronor in 1998, including cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. SIDA has around 1,500 partners in cooperation, most of them Swedish. These include companies, popular movements, organizations, universities, and government agencies that have the know-how necessary to make Swedish development cooperation successful.

### Publications

SIDA publishes a yearly report.

### Contact

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**Department for International Development, United Kingdom—  
Conflict and Human Affairs Department**

**Background Summary**

The purpose of the Conflict and Human Affairs Department (CHAD) is to make an effective contribution to the overall aim of the Department for International Development (DFID) to eliminate poverty by working globally to help: “Reduce the incidence and impact of violent conflicts, and manmade and natural disasters, through promoting cost-effective preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery measures via partnerships that create sustainable improvements in international systems for conflict prevention, migration management, and humanitarian assistance.”

CHAD develops and maintains an overview of policy and provides advice and support in areas such as:

- Conflict prevention and resolution and conflict handling/post-conflict peace building, including disarmament, demobilization, demining, and peacekeeping
- Refugee and other forced migration issues
- Human rights in conflict situations
- Emergency response preparedness and contingency planning arrangements
- Disaster and vulnerability/risk reduction initiatives
- Use of military assets for humanitarian work, including links and protocols for cooperation with U.K. and other military establishments
- Directly managing certain humanitarian programs (for example, Afghanistan or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).

**Regions**

CHAD funds humanitarian assistance projects in rapid-onset emergency situations and provides backup to DFID’s regional departments involved in humanitarian response operations. CHAD also plays a policy formulation role in relation to post-conflict reconstruction and a support role to DFID geographical departments involved in post-conflict situations. It is there-

fore difficult to give a definitive list of post-conflict countries for which CHAD is responsible.

**Resources**

CHAD has 18 staff members. DFID funds a range of projects in post-conflict situations but does not have an allocated figure to spend in post-conflict countries. Funding decisions are made by relevant geographical departments.

CHAD has a conflict and humanitarian policy seed-corn fund of \$1.5 million (Canadian) for the current financial year.

**Publications**

CHAD has developed, with the help of outside consultants, a training package in conflict awareness for DFID geographical departments.

**Contact**

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**United States Agency for International Development, United States—Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Response**

**Background Summary**

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was created in 1994 to bring rapid, direct, and overt political development assistance to countries emerging from crisis. Working both in countries where USAID maintains a presence and countries where it does not, OTI has engaged in areas as diverse as demobilization of combatants, media strengthening, and human rights. OTI’s role is to focus on the immediate concerns of the population in countries in crisis.

**Regions**

USAID operates worldwide. As of June 1998, OTI countries of operation were Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), Guatemala, Liberia, the Philippines, and Rwanda. USAID plans to recommence operations in Sierra Leone. It has previously conducted operations in Haiti and plans to conduct operations in Indonesia.

**Resources**

Funding: Fiscal 1997, US\$25 million TDA funds; fiscal 1998, US\$30 million; fiscal 1999, US\$45 million requested.

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